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ABSTRACT 
Democracy in the Real World: 
Empirical Breakdowns in the Justification of Democracy 
by 
Danielle Marie Wenner 
Justifications of democracy rest in large part on unacknowledged 
empirical assumptions regarding the cognitive, informational, and behavioral 
capacities of individuals and voting populations. The goal of this project was to 
identify those assumptions and examine them in light of data from the social 
sciences. To the extent that these assumptions are undermined by empirical 
evidence, the normative legitimacy of democracy as a system of rule is weakened. 
Theories of democracy were organized along a continuum from purely 
instrumental to purely intrinsic or procedural, and a representative sample of 
theories from along this spectrum were analyzed in order to identify their core 
empirical assumptions. Interest-based, deliberative, and egalitarian theories of 
democracy were each demonstrated to be predicated on substantive empirical 
assumptions which were contradicted by the available evidence. A sophisticated 
hybrid account incorporating aspects from along the spectrum of available 
theories was likewise demonstrated to be predicated on unsubstantiated 
assumptions regarding human capacities. 
A concluding analysis of the circumstances which undermine the 
assumptions of democratic theory demonstrated the limited tractability of these 
circumstances, leading to my assertion that a new conception of what democracy 
is and what purposes it should serve is warranted, and that in the interim, 
contemporary attempts to justify the dissemination of democracy are undermined. 
lll 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This project never would have materialized were it not for a visiting professor named 
Stefan Sciaraffa and the seminar he taught at Rice University on democratic theory. 
Having burnt myself out on questions of distributive justice, I was in desperate need of a 
new direction and Stefan's class gave me the inspiration I needed to finally get excited 
about philosophy again. 
The nascent interest in democracy and social choice theory which began to 
develop in Stefan's seminar was molded into something resembling a real thesis topic 
after several long and enjoyable brainstorming sessions with Drs. George Sher and 
Baruch Brody. Those brainstorming sessions with Drs. Sher and Brody continued over 
the course of the following three years, and ultimately proved to be some of the most 
valuable philosophical discussions I've had during my time at Rice. To both Drs. Sher 
and Brody I owe a great deal for their wisdom, for their advice, and most of all, for their 
patience with me as I fumbled my way through several dead-ends before finally finding 
the road to a completed thesis. 
I also want to thank the political scientist on my committee, Dr. Bob Stein, for his 
invaluable advice and direction at the outset of this project. Without his guidance, I 
would have found myself lost in a never-ending sea of literature, with no understanding 
of how to navigate it, or even what to look for. I also should thank a graduate student 
from that department, Andrew Spiegelman, who was generous with his time and advice 
during the formative stages of this process. 
There are a number of individuals who I should thank for the pleasure of their 
discussion and thoughts over the course ofthe years, all of whom had some impact on the 
growth of my philosophical thinking and the progress that was made in developing this 
thesis. These individuals include Anthony Carreras, Phil Robichaud, Garret Miriam, 
Jeremy Garret, Leslie McNolty, Jeff Heikkinen, Heather Phillips, Jacob Kolman, Moti 
Gorin, Braden Mugg, Martha Perez, Bill Nelson, Jamie Kelley, Tony Reeves, Serene 
Khader, Jonathan Trejo-Mathys, and the rest ofthe participants ofthe 2010 National 
Endowment for the Humanities summer seminar on Democracy and the Global World 
Order. 
v 
There are four people to whom I owe special thanks, and a few words here can 
never adequately express how grateful I am to them for their love and support. To 
Anthony Carreras, who has been a true friend from beginning to end, and has helped to 
see me through the roller coaster ride that is graduate school, I owe great thanks. To my 
parents, Debbie Wenner and Dick Waterman, I owe more than I can ever say. 
Throughout fifteen years of anguish, joy, despair, excitement, anxiety, desperation, 
intellectual riches, and economic depravity, they have never once doubted my ability or 
questioned my decision to pursue philosophy as a career. My mom especially was 
always there for a midnight phone call or a mid-day panic, and she was always willing to 
listen and- when necessary- offer a shoulder. I could not ask for a more supportive 
family than the one I was gifted with, and for this I am eternally grateful. 
Finally, I owe to my partner Derrick Gray more than gratitude. For keeping me 
sane (mostly), for all-night brainstorming and day-long proofreading, and most of all for 
his emotional and psychological support throughout a daunting job search and harrowing 
dissertating process. You never gave up on me, even when I sometimes came close, and 
I owe you everything. I love you. And now it's your tum! 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements iv 
1. Introduction 1 
2. Instrumentalism 14 
3. Deliberation 60 
4. Egalitarianism 102 
5. Democracy in the Real World 135 
Bibliography 162 
1 
CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
It is illusory to think that a satisfactory demonstration of the general superiority of 
democracy to its alternatives can ever consist of a straighiforward axiomatical argument 
from unimpeachable premises to an "absolute" and "objectively valid" conclusion. 1 
Everybody Loves Raymond (Democracy) 
Democracy seems to occupy a privileged place in theoretical philosophy. Most of the 
philosophical debate about democracy tends to focus on questions regarding the scope of 
its legitimacy, or the nature of our obligation to promote democratic values in other 
states. Rare is the treatise which questions that legitimacy itself, or attempts to enunciate 
the foundations of such an obligation. There are great swaths of literature devoted to 
hammering out how to enunciate a human right to democracy, or how to show that the 
right to democracy is a second-order right, which only arises as a means to other rights. 
But there is little focus on the justification for a claim that such a right exists. There are 
even popular theorists who go so far as to insist that it is impossible to "force" democracy 
on a people, because until they are democratic, they don't constitute a "people" in the 
right sense!2 (One might worry what else we could justifiably force onto them, ifthis is 
the case.) 
The common element across the literature, however, is a seemingly unshakable 
belief that democracy is just, that democracy is right. There is little attention devoted by 
these theorists to the question as to why that might be the case, and frequently when the 
question is addressed, it is done in a haphazard fashion, with lip-service paid to the 
importance of self-rule and the equality of citizens. However, if it is the case that we 
1 Dahl 1989, I 02. 
2 Applebaum 2007. 
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have an obligation to promote democracy where it hasn't yet taken root; if it is the case 
that there is a right todemocracy, be it a human right or derivative; if it is the case that 
absent democracy, a geographically-succinct and self-identifying group doesn't constitute 
a "people," then shouldn't we understand why? What is it about democracy which makes 
it legitimate? What is so important about democratic rule that many would identify it as a 
human right? And don't we need to be sure that democracy is legitimate, before we start 
to argue about whether we are obliged to spread it or whether people have a right to it? 
My contention is that when we begin to plumb these important, foundational 
questions, we run into a significant body of evidence which vitiates those justificatory 
attempts which have been made to ground the legitimacy of democracy. Although there 
are theorists who have offered comprehensive accounts of democratic legitimacy, a 
survey of these accounts reveals that in each case, there are important empirical 
assumptions which ground the arguments, and that furthermore, those assumptions are 
greatly undermined by evidence from the social sciences regarding the behavior and 
capacities of individuals and of political bodies. 
Defining Democracy 
One's conception of democracy can be more or less demanding. Within the context of 
this discussion, I will rely on a rather minimal conception of democracy, so as to avoid 
limiting the scope of my arguments unnecessarily. Very broadly, I am interested in 
democratic decision-making procedures as used to reach binding decisions in a political 
context. Although nothing in the definition I shall rely on rules out the use of democratic 
procedures in other contexts - voluntary organizations, for example, or private 
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corporations- the context of democracy I am specifically interested in regards the use of 
democratic procedures to determine the structure and functioning of society, as backed by 
the use of law and the credible threat of coercion. 
Democracy can be loosely characterized as consisting of a commitment to at least 
two basic principles, with a third falling naturally out of them. First is a commitment to 
popular sovereignty: the claim that the people are the rightful rulers of themselves. 
Second is the notion of political equality. This is a normative claim, that each member of 
society has an equal right to participate in the political decision-making process, but the 
equality in question can be interpreted as more or less substantive. For some democratic 
theorists, the demand for equality is merely formal, while for others it goes much deeper.3 
Finally, falling out ofthese important commitments is the requirement of majority rule. 
Given the ideals of popular sovereignty and political equality, there must exist some 
legitimate means of adjudicating disputes between equal and autonomous agents over 
what their shared system of rules will be, and although proposals for how to implement . 
majority rule may vary, majority rule as an ideal is an essential aspect of democracy. 
One helpful way to bring out the important characteristics of democracy is to 
understand it in terms of its alternatives, in terms of what democracy is not. One 
potential alternative to democracy as I have described it would be a meritocracy. One 
form of meritocracy might designate a ruling class comprised of highly educated people 
to make all of the decisions for society, although meritocracy need not be so exclusive. 
An alternative conception of meritocracy might look very much like democracy: it could 
involve a large portion of the population voting in representative elections. Perhaps 
instead of counting each vote equally, however, we might conceive of a state which 
3 Christiano 2008b. 
heavily weighted the votes of highly educated citizens so that they would exercise more 
influence than the uneducated masses on political outcomes (an idea actually supported 
by John Stuart Milll Although this scenario shares some features with democracy, the 
weighting of votes importantly diverges from democracy's demand for equality, even 
when that equality is conceived of as merely formal. 
4 
Another alternative to democracy as I have defined it is a full and free franchise 
within a supermajoritarian framework. Within this framework, it might be specified that 
some number greater than 50% of the population (or their representatives) must approve 
new legislation. While an institution such as this would retain some of its democratic 
features - specifically the self-rule implicit in the franchise - it would nevertheless fail to 
respect equality in the requisite way. An example will help to explain why. Imagine 
such a society, in which a 75% supermajority is necessary to pass new legislation. 
Imagine further that there is a new law up for consideration which has 70% support, 
meaning only 30% of the population would prefer not to have the legislation enacted. 
Nevertheless, under the supermajoritarian framework, the legislation would not pass. 
Thus, the desires of that 30% of the population ultimately would have determined the 
political outcome, despite being significantly in the minority. The implication is that the 
votes of those 30% were given precedence over, or weighted more than, the votes of the 
other 70% of the population. This is again in contradiction to the commitments of 
democrats as I have presented them. 
4 Mill [I 861 ] I 977. 
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The Ideal and the Non-Ideal 
Why does it matter if theoretical arguments for democracy depend for their validity on 
empirical assumptions which tum out to be false? The answer to this question brings out 
the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory. Ideal political theory abstracts away 
from many empirical realities regarding individuals and groups, assuming both that 
individuals and societies will observe the principles of social cooperation, as well as that 
individuals and societies are able to function so as to observe social mores, reason 
morally, and engage in political cooperation.5 The value of ideal theory to the real world 
is questionable, however. For example, if the theoretical justification of democracy 
depends for its validity on an empirical claim which turns out to be false, that justification 
can't tell us whether democracy is justified in the real world- only that it would be 
justified if things were such that the empirical claim were true. As long as arguments for 
democracy rely for their validity on assumptions which tum out to be false, any claims to 
the legitimacy of spreading democracy, or forcing it on unwilling populations, are 
necessarily on far shakier ground. Take a thought experiment devised by Frank Jackson 
and Robert Pargetter: 
Professor Procrastinate receives an invitation to review a book. He is the best 
person to do the review, has the time, and so on. The best thing that can happen is 
that he says yes, and then writes the review when the book arrives. However, 
suppose it is further the case that were Procrastinate to say yes, he would not in 
fact get around to writing the review. Not because of incapacity or outside 
interference or anything like that, but because he would keep on putting the task 
off. (This has been known to happen.) Thus, although the best that can happen is 
for Procrastinate to say yes and then write, and he can do exactly this, what would 
in fact happen were he to say yes is that he would not write the review. 
Moreover, we may suppose, this latter is the worst that can happen.6 
5 Wenar 2008. 
6 Jackson and Pargetter 1986, 235. 
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As the case is described, the best that can happen is that Professor Procrastinate can agree 
to write the review and then review it, but the worst outcome is that he agree to write the 
review and then not do so. And, it is stipulated, were he to agree to write the review, he 
would not do so- and so the outcome would be the worst possible outcome. This 
thought experiment is a particular case of a kind of problem that can be identified in ideal 
political theory: 
Ideally, society ought to do (X & Y). 
Society will not do Y. 
Should society still do X? 
In at least some cases, the answer to this last question will be, "no." Specifically, to the 
extent that doing X in the absence of Y will have bad consequences, we might deny that 
society should do X. 7 We might alter the example to derive the following, more 
explicitly relevant set of statements: 
If society is X, then society ought to do Y. 
Society is not X. 
Should society still do Y? 
Notice that as long as "society is X" is false, we no longer have an argument for the 
validity of the normative claim that "society ought to do Y." Instantiating down to the 
case of democracy, then, if arguments for the legitimacy of democracy take a form in 
which a crucial assumption regarding the capacities of individuals or groups within the 
state plays a role in justifying the move to legitimacy, evidence which falsifies that 
assumption undermines any claim to democracy's legitimacy. And if democracy's claim 
to legitimacy is undermined, it looks like many of the projects of contemporary political 
7 Estlund 20 I 0, 8-9. 
philosophers interested in the issues of justice surrounding democracy's dissemination 
may need rethinking. 
Engaging the Empirical 
7 
Some space is devoted in the literature to attempts to engage with the kinds of empirical 
objections I will levy against the democratic theorist, but I have encountered no theorist 
who explicitly acknowledges the deep dependence of democratic theory as a whole on 
crucial empirical assumptions. This deficit is highlighted by the fact that often, in order 
to avoid an objection from one empirical direction, a theorist walks right into another 
one. For example, interest-based accounts of democracy are heavily dependant on 
assumptions about the rational utility-maximization of individual voters, an assumption 
which I argue in Chapter 2 is significantly undermined by data regarding the abilities of 
individuals to identify and pursue their interests. Problems such as this can to some 
extent be mitigated, however, by shifting focus away from subjective interest promotion 
to a more objective account of the interests ofvoters. 8 With a more objective 
understanding of interests, procedural limits to the majoritarian power of government can 
be construed as an attempt to guide the decision-making process in a direction that will 
mitigate the worst potential impacts of irrational voting behavior. A move like this 
generates new problems, however: to the extent that focus is shifted away from 
majoritarian power and towards limits on the outcomes of democratic decision-making, it 
is those limits and not democracy which are serving the interest-promoting role which 
interest-based theorists claim for institutional democracy. If voters are sufficiently 
ignorant or incapable of promoting their own interests to justify external limits on the 
8 Arneson 2003. 
outcome of their decision-making, then the rationale for locating the decision-making 
authority with them in the first place is substantially undermined. 
Similar stories can be told about other attempts to bring theoretical accounts of 
democracy into line with empirical evidence. We will see in Chapter 4 that even the 
most sophisticated accounts of democracy fall victim to this problem, demonstrating that 
in order to stand up to the damaging evidence, theories of democracy need to engage not 
only with one or two empirical worries, but be prepared to withstand an assault from the 
entire body of empirical problems which work to undermine justifications of democracy 
as a system of rule. 
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My intention throughout this project is twofold. On the one hand, the 
identification of the various empirical assumptions upon which democratic theories are 
grounded, as well as of the empirical circumstances which undermine those assumptions, 
is an important project in its own right and will take up the greater portion of this project 
along with an analysis of attempts to account for these empirical worries. However, there 
is a second question to address, specifically: In light of the degree to which major 
theories of democracy are undermined by empirical facts regarding the abilities and 
capacities of voting publics, can we justify our faith in democracy at all? To answer this 
question, we must examine whether the empirical findings are to any extent mitigable, or 
whether they represent deep and unchanging facts about the world in which a system of 
rule must be implemented. It is to this final question which I turn in Chapter 5. 
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The Method 
It is not feasible to do a full analysis of every account of democratic legitimacy. Because 
this is the case, a method needed to be devised which would nevertheless generate results 
which were generalizable to the field of democratic theory as a whole. Otherwise, any 
argument that the theories with which I do engage are insufficient to overcome the 
empirical evidence would leave open the question as to whether democracy is legitimate 
given the current state of the real world. 
In order to ensure that the arguments I present have the widest possible impact, it 
was helpful to consider justifications of democracy as organized along a spectrum from 
the purely instrumental to the purely intrinsic or procedural. At the fully instrumental 
end of the spectrum, arguments for democracy's legitimacy are based on the value of the 
outputs of democratic procedures. At the opposite end of the spectrum are intrinsic 
accounts, which argue that there is value in democratic procedures themselves. Theories 
which don't fit neatly into one category or the other can be conceived of as falling 
somewhere along the spectrum between the two. I proceed on the basis of the 
assumption that theories which fall into similar places along this spectrum are likely to be 
vulnerable to objections from similar empirical areas, and that therefore the arguments I 
present against those theories which I do consider can be generalized to the field of 
democratic theory as a whole. My analysis begins with fully instrumental accounts of 
democratic legitimacy. 
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Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2: Instrumentalism 
Instrumental theories of democracy can take several forms. Foremost among 
instrumental theories are those which claim that democratic procedures bring about the 
interest-promotion or preference-satisfaction of members of the population. In Chapter 2 
I engage with instrumental accounts of this form, and argue that such accounts are 
predicated on important assumptions regarding the rationality of political participants. I 
engage with significant research from the fields of behavioral economics and psychology 
which undermine the vision of man as a rational utility-maximizer. In light of these 
objections, I go on to consider a revisionary instrumental account offered by Brennan and 
Lomasky which proposes that individuals are actually in large part fulfilling an 
expressive function when they vote. Although there is empirical evidence to support this 
interpretation, I argue that if voting is truly an expressive act, and not an act intentionally 
aiming at utility-maximization, then the normative basis for democracy is lost. I 
conclude this chapter with an examination of the conceptual problems demonstrated by 
Kenneth Arrow, Richard McKelvey, and William Riker, which ultimately doom any 
instrumental account which attempts to associate the value of the outcomes of democratic 
procedures with the inputs provided by citizen votes. 
Chapter 3: Deliberation 
Another prominent instrumental account of democracy claims that democratic procedures 
are the best way to generate good, or right, political outcomes. I construe this as an 
epistemic claim, and examine it within the context of a broader analysis of deliberative 
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accounts of democracy - accounts which occupy something of a middle ground between 
instrumental accounts on the one hand, and procedural accounts on the other - in Chapter 
3. Specifically, I focus on the theories offered by Habermas, Cohen, and Gutmann and 
Thompson. I argue that deliberative democrats are committed to three important 
normative claims regarding the virtues of deliberative democracy: the above-mentioned 
epistemic claim that it produces superior political outcomes, that it is best able to promote 
the substantive equality of citizens, and that it is best able to respect the substantive 
autonomy of citizens. I cite empirical evidence regarding the epistemic capacities and 
pathologies of deliberating bodies which substantially undermine the epistemic claims of 
democrats. I go on to make the case that the deliberative democrat is committed to 
substantive claims regarding the equality and autonomy of individual members of a 
polity, and I rely upon data from the fields of moral psychology and behavioral 
economics to demonstrate that the kinds of equality and autonomy the deliberative 
democrat claims arise out of democracy cannot do so. I conclude by arguing that there is 
also a deeper, conceptual problem with the deliberative democrat's claims to enhance the 
substantive equality and autonomy of citizens once we understand that the she has 
committed herself to a notion of equality that must be construed as a certain type of 
equality of opportunity. 
Chapter 4: Egalitarianism 
At the opposite end of the spectrum from instrumental defenses of democracy are 
accounts which consider democracy intrinsically valuable because it embodies the basic 
moral equality of citizens. In chapter 4, I engage with what I have termed "egalitarian" 
12 
or "intrinsic" defenses of democracy. Beginning with purely procedural accounts, and 
progressing through the more sophisticated procedural accounts offered by Singer and 
Dahl, I argue that the problems of persistent minorities, the maldistribution of 
information, and the mal distribution of informational capacities work to undermine the 
normative value of procedural equality. I go on to consider Christiano's more 
sophisticated account based on public equality. I argue that his tum towards deliberation 
ultimately commits him to the same kind of political equality cast in terms of equality of 
opportunity which the deliberative democrat was committed to, and that many of the 
considerations which worked against the substantive equality sought by deliberative 
democrats work similarly to abrogate the kind of hybrid approach Christiano proposes. 
Chapter 5: Democracy in the Real World 
In Chapter 5, I argue that the conclusions of the previous chapters severely vitiate the 
normative bases for democracy as a system of rule. I suggest that if it were the case that 
we could mitigate the kinds of empirical circumstances which work to undermine 
democracy's justification, we might be able to at least partially salvage a defense of 
democracy. I go on to consider the extent to which such circumstances can be altered in 
democracy's favor and, to the extent that they can be, whether attempts to bring about 
such changes would be justified. Relevant to this discussion are considerations regarding 
distributive justice and the presence of alternative forms of governance which could 
potentially be justified given an alternative set of empirical circumstances. Finally, I 
argue that to the extent to which the circumstances required for the justification of 
democracy are not met in the real world, the normative validity ofthe intentional 
dissemination of democracy is undermined. 
13 
CHAPTER2 
INSTRUMENTALISM 
John Stuart Mill maintained that "the ideally best form of government [is that which] is 
attended with the greatest amount of beneficial consequences, immediate and 
14 
prospective."9 That popular government was the best means to this end was the thesis of 
his Considerations on Representative Government. Alexis de Tocqueville similarly saw 
the utilitarian foundations for democracy when he noted that "the laws of democracy 
generally tend to the good of the greatest number, for they emanate from the majority of 
all citizens."10 The putative connection between the outcomes of democratic decision-
making and the benefits to its citizens has received much attention in the literature, both 
positive and negative. In this chapter, I critically examine what I dub "instrumental," or 
"interest-based" accounts of democracy, focusing primarily on the commitments of such 
theories to the claims that individuals are able to both identify their interests, as well as to 
pursue those interests rationally in the market-place of voting. 
Voter Interests 
The simplest expression of the interest-based approach to democracy grounds the 
normative validity of democratic rule in the system's ability to adequately take into 
account and promote the interests of its citizens. This kind of justification claims that 
overall, constituent interest-fulfillment is maximized when the collective decision-
making procedures take the form of democratic majority rule. Because the interest-based 
approach claims that democracy is the system which best takes into account the interests 
9 Mill [1861) 1977,504. 
10 de Tocqueville [1835) 2000,222. 
of its citizens, there is an implicit claim that the interest-based account does take into 
account the interests of its citizens. 
15 
The intuitive pull of such an account lies in the connection between the actions of 
citizens and political outcomes. Citizens are assumed to be in the best position to 
understand their own interests, and therefore to act so as to maximize their fulfillment. A 
further implicit assumption of such an account must therefore speak to what the citizen is 
engaging in when she exercises her democratic rights- specifically, what she is doing 
when she votes. If democratic majority rule is claimed to best promote the interests of 
citizens, the reason for this must be that citizens are defending or promoting their 
interests when they go to the polls - otherwise the causal connection between democratic 
rule specifically (rather than some alternative) and the individual's interests is unclearY 
We can therefore clarify the interest-based theory's major justification through an 
elaboration of the central claim: Democracy as a system of rule is best able to maximize 
the interest-fulfillment of its citizens, because they are able to pursue those interests 
through the mechanism of voting. 
This view of democratic voting is predicated on a characterization of the 
individual citizen as a rational interest-maximizer, where interests correspond to utility, 
measured in terms of wealth and other physical goods. This view is the foundation of the 
wide literature on so-called "social choice theory." 
11 Riker 1982, 5. 
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Homo Economicus and Voter Turnout 
The concept of the economic man finds its origins in an early essay on political 
economics by John Stuart Mill. 12 In On the Definition of Political Economy, Mill 
describes the economic man as man abstracted away from his social mores, and purely 
interested in maximizing his wealth by the most efficient means possible. 13 Although 
Mill's original caricature was focused primarily on the key idea of producing and 
accumulating wealth and leisure, later iterations of homo economicus introduced the 
contemporarily more salient feature: that of rational decision-making based on the 
expected utility of the returns. The economic man has come to be regarded as the model 
of utility-maximization based on a rational cost-benefit analysis, factoring in such 
considerations as the probabilities of alternative outcomes, decisiveness, diminishing 
returns, and opportunity costs. Although homo economicus is understood to rationally 
pursue his economic and physical interests, there is still a subjective component to those 
interests insofar as different individuals will value different goods differently. While 
some may place a high value on modem art and works of philosophy, for example, others 
may find such goods relatively value-less and prefer to invest their resources in large-
screen televisions or luxury cars. 
This picture of economic man comes with some pretty hefty epistemic 
commitments. For example, standard economics assumes that all of those participating in 
market decisions know what they want, and the relative value of those goods for them in 
terms of opportunity costs. 14 It assumes further that economic man has all of the relevant 
information regarding his market decisions, including an understanding of the potential 
12 Persky 1995. 
13 Mill [1836] 1967,321. 
14 Ariely 2009, 49. 
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outcomes of each option. 15 Not only is he in full understanding of the potential 
outcomes, but he also has a fair ability to predict the likelihood of each potential 
outcome's coming to pass, and thus is able to compute the expected utility as a function 
of the probability of the outcome occurring and its value should it do so. 16 While this 
predictive power is not assumed to be perfect, the economic man is assumed to have a 
decent ability in this regard, and whatever mistakes in computation or prediction he does 
make are assumed not to be systematically biased in any way. 17 The ultimate underlying 
assumption is that "almost all people, almost all of the time, make choices that are in their 
best interest or at the very least are better than the choices that would be made by 
someone else."18 
Based on this interpretation of economic man as a rational utility-maximizer, 
Anthony Downs famously described the economic model of the rational voter. Assuming 
the costs of information-gathering and voting are nil, Downs hypothesized that the 
rational voter would compare the utility she would receive out of the alternatives she was 
presented with, and vote for the outcome that would provide her with the greatest 
amount. 19 A more sophisticated model ofthe economic voter incorporates the predictive 
aspects of homo economicus and proposes that the rational vote would be that which 
takes into account the probability ofit's being decisive?0 When the cost associated with 
voting exceeds the expected benefit of the favored outcome multiplied by the probability 
of casting the decisive vote, the rational voter will abstain from voting at all. And of 
15 Ibid., 317. 
16 Kaplan and Kaplan 2009,23. 
17 Thaler and Sunstein 2009, 7. 
18 Ibid., 9. 
19 Downs [1957] 1985. 
20 Brennan and Lomasky 1993, 23. 
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course, in contemporary large-scale democracy, the probability that one individual's vote 
will be decisive is so small it approaches zero. 
An important piece of evidence that voters are not rationally pursuing their 
interests when they participate in the democratic process, then, is the fact that they 
actually vote in rather high numbers. In a survey of 74 countries with major democratic 
elections, Mijeong Baek found a voter turnout range of between 33.15 and 94%, with a 
mean turnout of 65.8% and a median turnout of 68.33% (the United States was well 
below average with a turnout of 41.15% in the elections surveyed in 1998 and 2002)?1 
In seeking an explanation for the irrationally high voter turnout in democratic 
societies, a few competing theories are on offer. One account argues that voters may vote 
because they believe that there is a higher than negligible possibility that their votes could 
be decisive. In addition to the fact that any such belief on the part of voters would be 
erroneous, Brennan and Lomasky point out a deeper, conceptual problem with this 
explanation of the urge to vote. If it were the case that an individual who doesn't vote 
would have a reasonable probability of affecting the outcomes of an election if she did 
vote, this would seem to indicate that electoral outcomes would differ significantly from 
their actual outcomes were voter turnout increased. This, in tum, would greatly 
undermine the legitimacy of the actual outcomes of elections, if that legitimacy is based 
on the ability of electoral outcomes to best reflect the interests of individual citizens.22 
Another attempt to defend the rationality of voting is to argue that even if the 
probability of casting the decisive vote is very low, the stakes are high enough to warrant 
21 Baek 2009, 388-9. 
22 Brennan and Lomasky 1993, 179. 
19 
the effortjust in case.23 This approach argues not that the stakes are so highfor the 
individual, but rather, that because the electoral outcome will affect so many people, this 
will compound potentially small personal differences into widespread effects to the 
population at large. The conclusion is that there may be a moral obligation to participate 
in voting, because so many could suffer if the outcome went "the wrong way." This 
argument suffers from a similar problem as the preceding: "if the stakes are sufficiently 
high that individuals are morally obligated to vote even though the probability ofbeing 
decisive is very low, then the expected cost of getting the 'wrong outcome' must also be 
high enough to cause alarm. In other words: if it is so manifestly clear that one ought to 
vote in the kinds of electoral situations that actually prevail (whether because one is 
likely to be decisive or because the stakes are so high), prevailing electoral situations 
must be held to be highly defective."24 
A more plausible explanation of the seemingly irrationally high voter turnout in 
contemporary democratic elections might go something like this: individuals are doing 
something other than rationally pursuing their interests when they vote. It might be that 
they believe there is a civic duty to do so, or that they think that they are expressing some 
important symbolic right when they go to the polls, but they are not engaging in a cost-
benefit analysis concerning the act of voting itself. We need not concern ourselves 
overly with what it is that they are doing with the act of voting; the important thing is that 
such a view could still be squared with the interest-based account. If it were still the case 
that what the voter was doing with the content of her vote was pursuing or promoting her 
23 Barry 1978, 39. 
24 Brennan and Lomasky 1993, 184. 
interests, then an account of why she engages in the act of voting in the first place is no 
longer of primary concern. 
Rational Ignorance 
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Such an approach faces a devastating problem, however. An important aspect of Downs' 
contribution to economic conceptions of democracy was a recognition of the costs 
associated with a voter rationally pursuing her interests in the democratic marketplace. In 
order to vote rationally (that is, vote for that option which has the greatest amount of 
expected utility, figured as the probability of its success multiplied by the amount of 
utility of that outcome), an individual must be informed about the available options. This 
means that Downs' original assumption that costs associated with voting one's interests 
are nil has to be revised. In fact, the costs associated with informing oneself are rather 
high. Informational resources are virtually unlimited, but the time and effort which a 
voter can devote to collecting and assimilating information is a severely limiting factor. 25 
The vast amount of information available, coupled with the costs of obtaining it, 
understanding it, and reconciling it with the political information the individual already 
holds, combine to force voters to utilize only a fraction of the information available to 
them. The result is that voters must be selective about their information outlets. They 
have options to inform themselves via the media, for example, or from friends and co-
workers, when out socializing or simply chatting over the water-cooler, but the 
necessities of daily life will almost certainly take priority, and opportunities to fully take 
advantage of the information that is available will be limited. 
25Downs [1957] 1985,209. 
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As Downs importantly pointed out, however, all information sources are likely to 
have some inherent bias. News organizations are, ultimately, business. Our friends and 
co-workers are individuals with their own political opinions. But given the plurality of 
views around us, we are more likely to seek out information which if biased, conforms to 
the inherent biases we already hold.26 This might be true for a couple of reasons. On the 
one hand, recent research conducted by the Pew Research Center has shown that the 
public perception of media outlets has drastically declined over the last 15 years. Not 
only do Americans believe more strongly now than ever before that the mainstream 
media outlets are biased and frequently present incorrect information; moreover, their 
perceptions of which direction the media is biased is strongly correlated to their own 
political views. That is, liberals are far more likely to perceive a conservative slant to 
media coverage, and conservatives the reverse.27 A likely result of this is that individuals 
flock to those news outlets they perceive to be least biased against them - or in other 
words, those outlets most likely to be biased in the same direction as the individuals in 
question. 
There is a deeper reason to accept Downs' argument that we tend to devote our 
limited information-gathering resources to sources which are biased in favor of our own 
inherent biases, however. This is because of the extent to which we identify with our 
political beliefs. The more energy and time we devote to informing ourselves politically, 
the more inclined we are to become emotionally invested in the issues of the day. And it 
turns out, we tend to make moral judgments about individuals based on their political 
beliefs, ascribing immorality or other negative character traits to individuals who disagree 
26Ibid., 230. 
27 Pew Research Center 2009. 
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with us politically.28 The unfortunately predictable result is that we prefer to associate 
with those of similar political views, because we think they are better people, and we are 
more likely to flip to a news channel portraying a bias we agree with (although we may 
not interpret it as biased) than we are to befriend the local chair of the opposing party, or 
to tum on the news outlet that seems most biased against us, because we think these latter 
are disreputable and dishonest. 
In addition, the rational voter will only actively seek as much information as she 
can obtain at less than the cost ofthe expected return of voting in her interest. If RiA is 
the expected value to i of an outcome of a, then the value to i of voting for a instead of 
for b can be expressed as follows: 
=0 
if voter i is decisive, 
otherwise. 
That is to say, i's vote for a is only valuable to her ifboth (1) the outcome a is more 
valuable to i than the alternative outcome b; and (2) i's vote for a is decisive (absent i's 
vote there is a tie, meaning i 's vote is the tie-breaker and ultimately decides the winner). 
The expected instrumental value of a vote for a rather than b can then be expressed: 
where h is the probability that i will be decisive (i.e., the probability of a tie among all 
other voters).29 
Each voter is only one among many, however, and as a result the value of his 
very nearly zero. This means that the marginal expected utility return of a vote is also 
very nearly zero, and the rational voter will therefore devote no resources to informing 
herself about which voting option is most likely to further her interests. Rather, she will 
28 Berwitz and Sinrod 2006. 
29 Brennan and Lomasky 1993, 23. 
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rely on whatever information she happens upon incidentally in the course of her everyday 
life.30 And as we saw earlier, individuals tend to associate with others who share their 
political biases, so any information she comes upon is likely to reinforce the opinions she 
already has, rather than challenge them. 
The result is a phenomenon that Downs first referred to as "rational ignorance": 
the rational utility-maximizer will not waste her scarce resources on educating herself 
about political policies which she will ultimately have little or no chance to influence. 
The empirical evidence bears this out: the average citizen in a democracy is indeed 
under-informed about the politicians and policies which affect their interests. Compiled 
evidence from surveys conducted over a period of fifty years in the United States showed 
that more than half of questions concerning the institutions and processes involved in the 
federal government could be correctly answered by fewer than half of Americans, 
including the ability to correctly define liberal or conservative, how many votes are 
needed to override a veto, or how long a House member's term is. Barely a quarter 
(28%) can identify one of their state senators, and only 59% could correctly state whether 
their governor was a Democrat or Republican. Almost a third of Americans believe the 
constitution guarantees them a job (29%), and 45% incorrectly attributed the phrase, 
"from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs" to the US 
constitution rather than to Marx and Engels, an especially poignant observation in light of 
the strong vitriol many Americans express about communism. During George H.W. 
Bush's presidency, the one policy opinion he had that was most readily identifiable by 
American voters was that he hated broccoli, and this was one of only two issues stands of 
30Downs [1957] 1985,245. 
24 
public officials over the last 50 years that could be correctly identified by at least 75% of 
the population (Bill Clinton's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was the other).31 
These results are not spurious, either. In Delli Carpini and Keeter's review of 
fifty years of data, they found that "Americans are essentially no more nor less informed 
about politics than they were fifty years ago." Although there are increases and decreases 
in particular areas of political knowledge, the mean change across all of the observed data 
was less than 1 %. 32 Voting populations are persistent in their lack of political 
knowledge, which makes sense when we consider the likelihood of their informing 
themselves having any real impact on the outcomes of political decision-making. 
The fact that the ideally rational voter, homo economicus, would not take the time 
to inform herself of the important consequences of the outcome of any election severely 
undercuts the normative force of any theory of democracy which locates its authority in 
the reflection of voters' interests in the outcomes of political decision-making. The value 
of democracy in such an account lies in the fact that this form of rule is in some way best 
able to promote and protect those interests. The unique means by which democracy is 
said to achieve this goal is through the input of the voters through the democratic process. 
If voters systematically fail to adequately inform themselves of which officials and 
policies are likely to further their interests, however, then it is unclear how this 
justification gets off the ground. 
This problem is exacerbated by the nature of political knowledge. Many of the 
most important issues to be decided in the collective decision-making process are not 
only complex, but extremely technical. It is not at all clear that, even should a voter 
31 Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 72-101. 
32 Ibid., 105-18. 
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devote a substantial amount of time to informing herself, she would be able to garner for 
herself a full understanding of even one of these complex issues without formal training, 
much less a detailed understanding of multiple issues which cross multiple technical and 
scientific fields. Additionally, there is evidence which suggests that those voters who 
actually devote time to trying to inform themselves politically (by watching the news, for 
example), are more likely to have erroneous beliefs about politicians and policy 
alternatives than those who don't.33 
That the level of political ignorance is justified on the basis of rational cost-
benefit analyses and not the product of societal mores or educative conditions is a fact we 
should not overlook. The rationality of ignorance is a structural feature of any large-scale 
democracy, and therefore cannot be explained away as a consequence of some contingent 
feature of our institutional implementation. As long as democracy is utilized on a scale 
which all but prohibits the possibility of one voter determining an election's outcome, 
individual rationality will dictate a minimal expenditure on information gathering and 
processing. To dismiss this as a merely practical concern is to miss the point entirely. 
The less likely an individual's vote is to influence the outcome, the less likely she is to 
feel any sense of a tangible connection between herself and the decision to be made. As 
Schumpeter pointed out, this distance between the voter and the outcome motivates a 
reduced sense of responsibility, and a resulting absence of will. "Without the initiative 
that comes from immediate responsibility, ignorance will persist in the face of masses of 
information however complete and correct." It is not worth the time and effort for a voter 
to utilize the full capacity of her rationality in an attempt to influence the outcome of a 
political decision, so instead she takes the easier path and "yield[ s] to ... irrational 
33 Ramsay, Kull, et al. 20 I 0. 
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prejudice and impulse."34 Any theory attempting to justify democracy on the basis of any 
part of the potential involvement of its citizens will have to contend with the unfortunate 
phenomenon of rational ignorance. 
Homo Insensatus 
Even if a voter had easy, or even costless, access to all ofthe pertinent information to 
determining her vote and the resources necessary to devote to incorporating that 
information and putting it to good use in the democratic marketplace, it turns out she 
would likely still be unable to rationally pursue her own interests. Man, it turns out, is 
not the rational animal economicus, but rather his irrational twin, insensatus. 
Within the growing field of behavioral economics, much recent data has been 
collected in support of the claim that in fact, individuals' judgments are susceptible to all 
kinds of irrelevant influences from their immediate environment, the context of decision-
making, emotions, shortsightedness, and other non-rational sources.35 These influences, 
moreover, do not operate in a random way- rather, individuals show systematic bias in 
their decision-making and judgment formation, including in the realm of politics. 
Anchoring Effects 
One way in which our decision-making process is systematically biased is through the 
manifestation of anchoring. Anchoring refers to the phenomenon of being influenced by 
our initial impressions or decisions thereafter: exposure to one stimulus or situation will 
34 Schumpeter 1950, 261-2. 
35 Ariely 2009, 318. 
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alter an individual's judgment of a scale or value regarding another stimulus. 36 What 
happens in these situations is that an individual begins from an initial value (the stimulus 
or situation she was initially exposed to), and adjusts that value in order to arrive at a 
response in a situation wholly unrelated to the initial stimulus. Generally, those 
adjustments are insufficient?7 So, for example, in Tversky and Kahneman's classic 
study, subjects were asked to estimate what percentage of African countries were 
members of the United Nations. Before answering, a "wheel of fortune" was spun in 
their presence (a wheel filled with random numbers between 1 and 100). After the wheel 
stopped at a value, subjects were asked whether the correct answer was higher or lower 
than the value showing on the wheel. Finally, they were asked to give their estimate. 
The estimates were greatly affected by the number shown on the wheel. When the wheel 
landed on 10, the median estimate was 25. When the wheel landed on 65, the median 
estimate was 45. The effect of the anchoring was not reduced when subjects were offered 
rewards for a correct estimate.38 
This is all well and good when we're talking about the number of African 
countries in the UN, but it's not clear how such a bias might influence political reasoning. 
One possibility is that the anchoring effect can play a large role in the way voters 
perceive budget proposals and expenditures. Blackley and DeBoer, for example, 
observed that forecasts published by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget may be 
strategically used to anchor expectations regarding deficit spending and outlays, in order 
to manipulate the budget negotiation process. A higher predicted rate of spending serves 
36 Wilson, Houston, et al. 1996,387. 
37 Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1128. 
38 Ibid., 1128. 
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to anchor expectations higher, so that the outcome of the negotiation process is likely to 
be higher, and vice versa.39 
The anchoring effect, like many cognitive biases, is pernicious and stubborn. It 
plays a role in qualitative as well as quantitative judgments,40 and in experiments it 
persists even when subjects are warned in advanced that they will be primed, have the 
anchoring effect explained to them, and are asked to consciously try to avoid being 
affected. 41 
Loss Aversion, Framing, and the Status Quo Bias 
A similar phenomenon involves an unsymmetrical aversion to loss. We are more 
negatively affected by the loss of a certain amount than we are positively affected by an 
identical gain. The result is what Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler called "the endowment 
effect,"42 which also leads to what Samuelson and Zeckhauser referred to as the "status 
quo bias."43 The endowment effect demonstrates that we attach a greater value to things 
already in our possession than we do to those same things when presented with an 
opportunity to acquire them. This was first demonstrated in a simple experiment: in a 
class of undergraduates, a number of coffee mugs were distributed among the students. 
Half of the students received mugs, and the other half didn't. Those students who had 
received a mug were then asked how much they would be willing to sell it for. The 
students who did not receive a mug were asked how much they would be willing to pay 
for one. The result was that those students who received a mug wanted an average of two 
39 Blackley and DeBoer 1993, 220. 
40 Strack, Martin, et al. 1988, 434-7. 
41 Wilson, Houston, et al. 1996,397. 
42 Kahn em an, Knetsch, et al. 1 991. 
43 Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988. 
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times as much to sell their mug as students who didn't receive one were willing to pay.44 
This study has been repeated dozens of times, to the same effect,45 and is such a natural 
aspect of our reasoning that it has even been shown to affect primates.46 
In order to understand the importance and relevance of this kind of bias, think 
about this phenomenon in the context of social programs and their costs, for example. 
Groups of society who are recipients of social aid are likely to value those programs to a 
far greater extent than are members of current non-recipient groups who are considering 
the extension of these programs to their own group or the continuation of these programs 
for those who already receive their benefits at the cost of a higher tax rate. 
A more clear example of the political effects of risk aversion can be shown in the 
status quo bias: given a choice between maintaining the current state of affairs versus 
making a change, individuals disproportionately opt to stick with the status quo. This 
phenomenon is a subset ofthe framing effect, which occurs when "(often small) changes 
in the presentation of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of 
opinion."47 Quattrone and Tversky conducted a series of experiments at Stanford and UC 
Berkeley which demonstrated the strong effects of framing and the status quo bias. Their 
studies confirmed that people are risk averse in the domain of gains and risk-seeking in 
the domain of losses. As a result, the original status quo or starting point becomes 
irrationally favored regardless of its content. For example, the following pair of 
scenarios was presented to subjects: 
Imagine there were a presidential contest between two candidates, Frank and Carl. 
Frank wishes to keep the level of inflation and unemployment at its current level. 
44 Kahneman, Knetsch, et al. 1991. 
45 Thaler and Sunstein 2009, 33. 
46 Kaplan and Kaplan 2009, 30-1. 
47 Chong and Druckman 2007, 104. 
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The rate of inflation is currently at 42%, and the rate ofunemployment is 
currently at 15%. Carl proposes a policy that would decrease the rate of inflation 
by 19% while increasing the rate of unemployment by 7%. Suppose that as a 
citizen of Alpha, you were asked to cast your vote for either Frank or Carl. [65% 
chose Frank; 35% chose Carl] 
Imagine there were a presidential contest between two candidates, Frank and Carl. 
Carl wishes to keep the rate of inflation and unemployment at its current level. 
The rate of inflation is currently at 23%, and the rate of unemployment is 
currently at 22%. Frank proposes a policy that would increase the rate of inflation 
by 19% while decreasing the rate of unemployment by 7%. Suppose that as a 
citizen of Alpha, you were asked to cast your vote for either Frank or Carl. [39% 
chose Frank; 61% chose Carlt8 
Obviously, in this pair of scenarios, the choices are identical- in each case, subjects are 
asked to choose between Frank's policy of 42% inflation and 15% unemployment, and 
Carl's policy of23% inflation and 22% unemployment. The only difference is whether 
Frank's policies are already in place, or Carl's are. Another series presented identical 
options to subjects in which the only difference was whether unemployment was 
characterized as a percentage employed or a percentage unemployed with identical 
results: respondents overwhelmingly opted for lower unemployment rate when the 
options were "5% unemployed" versus "1 0% unemployed," but favored the alternative 
option when as asked to choose between "95% employed" and "90% employed."49 
Framing can play a large role in the way political issues are perceived. Recent 
polling data have shown this effect occurring outside of experimental situations, and in 
real-world political scenarios. For example, during the recent health care debate, a CBS 
and New York Times poll found that a majority of voters favored a public option when it 
was described as a "government-administered health insurance plan,"50 while a poll 
conducted at the same time by NBC and the Wall Street Journal found significantly less 
48 Quattrone and Tversky [ 1988] 2000, 459. 
49 Ibid., 462. 
5° CBS News and New York Times 2009. 
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support for "a public health care plan administered by the federal government."51 
Another recent poll showed that when asked whether they supported "gay men and 
lesbians" serving openly in the military, more than 50% of Americans "strongly favored" 
the idea, but when the same question was asked using the term "homosexuals," the 
proportion who strongly favored the idea shrunk to less than 35%.52 
The types of studies conducted by Quattrone and Tversky and others, along with 
recent polling evidence, demonstrate that context and framing both operate 
psychologically to sway the decisions of voters in an extra-rational manner that cannot be 
adequately accounted for in the model of individual interests or rational utility 
maximization. The mere turn of a phrase cannot affect the actual level of benefit or harm 
to citizens driven by policy outcomes, but that same turn of phrase can have a dramatic 
effect on the level of benefit or harm citizens expect or perceive to accrue to them as a 
result ofthe policy. 
Optimism and Confirmation Bias 
A similar phenomenon causes individuals to pay more attention to evidence which gives 
positive support to their previously held beliefs than they do to evidence which casts 
doubt on those beliefs. 53 The result is an unfortunate combination of optimism (or the 
"optimistic bias") -individuals in general are more optimistic than rationally warranted 
about everything from their chances in life and the outcomes of their decisions to their 
evaluations of themselves and their beliefs54 - and confirmation bias- individuals are 
51 Hart and Mclnturff2009. 
52 CBS News and New York Times 2010. 
53 Kaplan and Kaplan 2009, 114. 
54 Schacter and Addis 2007, 1346. 
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more likely to believe evidence if it supports their previously held beliefs (and 
correspondingly more likely to ignore contradictory claims). For example, in one study a 
group of subjects who self-identified as either "conservative" or "liberal" were shown 
intentionally erroneous reports regarding several controversial issues, such as tax cuts and 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. When they were later presented with indisputable 
evidence which contradicted the original erroneous messages, the subjects would 
continue to believe the erroneous information if it conformed to their political 
orientation. 55 
This phenomenon is especially dangerous in light of other evidence which 
suggests that our judgments and experiences are affected by our expectations- for 
example, if I expect a dish to taste bad, because I know it has anchovies in it, then in all 
likelihood I will try it and find it disgusting. But if I try the dish first, decide whether or 
not I like it, and then you tell me that it has anchovies in it, there is a greater chance that I 
will have enjoyed the food. 56 Given that I disproportionately expect my judgments and 
beliefs to be correct (optimistic bias), then I am more likely to be confirmed in that view 
regardless of the evidence presented to me. 
It is tempting to dismiss evidence such as that presented above, and argue that 
such experiments focus on decisions which involve low stakes. Perhaps if the 
experiments were conducted involving higher stakes decisions, participants would be 
more likely to demonstrate the kind of rationality which the homo economicus model, and 
consequently the interest-based account, is predicated on. 57 However, a meta-analysis 
conducted by Camerer and Hogarth found that higher economic incentives produced no 
55 McKee and Stuckler 2010,937. 
56 Ariely 2009, 204-6. 
57 Thaler and Sunstein 2009, 76. 
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increase in mean performance on just these kinds of tests. 58 It might also be argued that 
participants in these experiments are not given adequate opportunity to learn, and that 
they would perform better were they able to conduct practice trials. As Thaler and 
Sunstein point out, however, the most important decisions which individuals make over 
the course of their lifetime are generally the same decisions for which few to no practice 
trials are available. 59 This certainly holds true for political decisions; not often are we 
given a "do-over" with regards to the outcomes of our political decision-making, and the 
consequences of one decision can be far-reaching and long-lived. 
The fact that these kinds of bias operate at all levels of decision-making and 
preference-formation seems to suggest that individuals do not fit the traditional model of 
homo economicus. Framing and anchoring, confirmation bias, and the mere fact of which 
belief or judgment an individual comes by first can all alter the way in which she views 
the world, and consequently mold her preferences. The implication is that our 
preferences are not necessarily rationally derived, and are consequently not as likely to 
track our "interests," even very broadly construed. Not only that, but the consistency 
with which these biases manifest themselves indicates that individual preferences are 
prime targets for manipulation by those who understand the functioning of these biases, a 
vulnerability which is especially relevant in the political marketplace. 
For the interest-based account of democracy, this evidence presents a deep 
concern. The interest-based account argues that because individual actors are best suited 
to pursue their own interests, a democratic system of rule which leaves political decisions 
to the people will allow them to promote those interests within the political framework. 
58 Camerer and Hogarth 1999, 7. 
59 Thaler and Sunstein 2009, 76-7. 
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If individuals are in fact very poorly equipped to promote their own interests because 
their judgments can be easily swayed and manipulated by irrelevant considerations, then 
the interest-based account loses much of its normative bite. 
One potential reply from the interest theorist might be to argue that for certain 
sorts of major political decisions, not much information is required, and so biases such as 
those in question would have little room to affect individual conceptions of how best to 
pursue their interests. Such a reply is misguided, however. Even the smallest of political 
decisions can have long-lasting and complex ramifications. And as the data show, the 
mere turn of a phrase can influence the way individuals perceive policy options and 
determine their preferences. 
Alternatively, the defender of the interest-based account might argue that these 
data all show individuals are unable to rationally pursue their interests when it comes to 
individual issues, but in most contemporary large-scale democracies, citizens don't vote 
for policies, but rather for candidates and representatives. Although this is also true, it 
does little to alleviate the concerns raised by voters' rational inadequacies. If the interest 
account is going to track voter interests on the basis of their votes, then representatives 
can best be thought of as packages of policies. In choosing a package, the voters must be 
pursuing the policies which are best in their interests, or the interest-based account falls 
agam. 
What is potentially the most plausible reply from the interest theorist is that it may 
well be the case that individual voters are bad at promoting their own interests, but that 
any alternative system of rule must put the decision-making power in the hands of a 
person or persons, and whoever those people are will be similarly affected by the kinds of 
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cognitive biases demonstrated by the studies I've presented. Voters might be truly 
horrible at promoting their own interests, but who is to say that anyone else will be able 
to do a better job? This seems to do little to rescue the interest theorist, though. All this 
establishes is that everyone is bad at recognizing and promoting their interests. It still 
leaves open the question as to whether democracy might allow interests to be better 
promoted than some other form of rule. 
Perhaps this reply could be buttressed by the additional claim that although all are 
affected by the kinds of rational biases I have highlighted, individuals are at least the 
most motivated to promote their interests, whereas there is at least room to doubt 
(probably substantial room) that someone else put in the position of ruling would be. 
Although this is a tempting move to make, I think it misses the mark twice. First, we 
have already seen that the individual voter's input into the democratic process is very 
unlikely to be decisive - the probability approaches zero. This fact alone undercuts any 
potential motivation individuals would have to defend their interests through the 
mechanism of voting. More importantly, while it may well be the case that individuals 
are most motivated to promote their own best interests, it is not necessarily so. The 
interest-based theorist's reply to the suggestion of, for example, a benevolent dictator has 
to refer not to the motivation behind the promotion of interests, but to the ability to do so. 
If I have more motivation to see my interests promoted politically, but am unable to do 
the promoting, then that motivation is not doing any work bringing about the 
maximization of my interest-fulfillment. My votes are unlikely to systematically track my 
interests, and as a result the interest-based account does not distinguish democracy as 
uniquely able to track interests via the mechanism of votes. Additionally, I would point 
36 
out that the ability to rationally pursue interests is not evenly distributed among the 
population. Just as we look at adults and consider them better able to understand and 
pursue their interests than children - despite their rational shortcomings - there are some 
adults who are simply less susceptible to the kinds of rational biases reflected in the 
results of the studies we have examined. This suggests that it is at least plausible that 
there is some system of rule which tracks interests to a greater extent than the full and 
equal suffrage of democracy. 
A Dialectical Recap 
The interest-based account of democracy locates the legitimacy of democratic rule in the 
claim that it is best able to take into account the interests of its citizens. Individuals are 
assumed to be in the best position to identify and pursue their own interests, and 
democracy allows them to do this in the political marketplace through the mechanism of 
voting. 
The interest-based account relies for much of its force on the notion of the 
economic man, a rational utility-maximizer who relies upon cost-benefit analyses in order 
to determine what course of action will best promote his interests. Without the notion of 
homo economicus, the interest-based account would be lacking normative force: if 
individuals were pursuing not their own interests as they wandered the world, but instead 
pursuing all things purple, for example, then allowing them to vote would not be likely to 
promote their interests. It would be likely, instead, to promote a lot of purple things. 
Likewise, if individuals are pursuing their interests, but are not doing so in a rational way, 
the normative force of the interest-based account is again undermined, as this would 
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indicate the greater likelihood that someone other than the individual was best able to 
promote her interests. 
The interest-based account runs into a hiccup, however, in light of the interesting 
result of living in a large-scale democracy: individual votes are highly unlikely to be 
decisive in the outcomes of democratic decision-making. If voters are truly rational 
utility-maximizers, then it seems like we have little ability to explain why they actually 
vote. One potential answer to this is that individuals are doing something other than 
pursuing their interests when they vote - practicing civic virtue, for example. 60 In this 
case, we could distinguish between the motivation for voting and the content of the vote, 
and we might say that although individuals are pursuing something other than their own 
utility when they go to vote, the content of their vote is still determined on the basis of 
rational cost-benefit analysis. Ifthis were the case, then the normative force of the 
interest-based account could be salvaged. Even if it is something other than self-interest 
driving the individual to go to the polls, if she is then using the content of her vote to 
pursue her interests, and doing so in a rational way, it may still be the case that 
democratic procedures are best able to maximize the interests of members ofthe polity. 
The second hiccup for the interest-based account is the phenomenon of rational 
ignorance. If a voter is truly rationally pursuing her interests, then in light of the cost of 
educating herself sufficiently to pursue her interests politically, and in light of the minute 
chance of her vote being decisive, she will not be willing to invest the necessary time and 
effort into adequately informing herself to ensure that she votes in her own best interest. 
What's more, even if she was, somehow, motivated to devote the necessary resources to 
60 We could square this with the account of rational utility-maximization if we postulated that an 
individual's interests could include her desire to be civically virtuous. 
adequately inform herself, it turns out that she would be unable to do so. The invasive 
and all-present nature of several forms of cognitive bias indicate that she will be unable 
to rationally identify what her interests are, let alone deduce the best way to promote 
them within the political realm. 
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In light of the difficulties faced by traditional instrumental accounts of voting in 
explaining the phenomenon of high voter turnout despite a clear lack of decisiveness on 
the part of individual voters, Geotirey Brennan and Loren Lomasky have proposed a 
revisionary account of how voters pursue their interests at the polls. It is to this account 
which I now turn. 
Expressive Voting 
Brennan and Lomasky argue that the motivational structure of homo economicus is not 
entirely dependent on utility defined as a measurement of wealth or other physical goods, 
as social choice theorists would claim. Rather, the utility function does include an 
argument representing utility defined as wealth, but likewise includes an additional, 
expressive argument. 61 The voter is said to place a value not only on the potential 
outcome of a vote for a, in terms of the difference in utility between outcome a and 
outcome b, but also on expressing a preference for a, rather than b, in and of itself. 
Recall that the instrumental return of a vote for a construed merely as a utility function 
based on economic outcomes was expressed as: 
Y =RiA -Ris 
61 Brennan and Lomasky 1993, 15. 
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Where R;A- R;8 represents the value to voter i of voting for a rather than b. Recall that 
after the probability of voter i's vote being decisive was taken into account, the expected 
instrumental value of the vote for a was expressed as follows: 
Y = h(R;A -R;s) 
with h representing the probability that i's vote will actually determine the outcome of the 
election. 
On Brennan and Lomasky's interpretation, however, there is an additional, 
expressive, return to voting, E;, which can be expressed as: 
E; = L;A_L;s 
In this expression, L;A represents the expressive value to voter i of voting for a. 
Therefore, the total expected value, W, ofi's voting for a is the combined total of the 
value of outcome a to i (where this value is determined by the difference in utility to i 
between outcomes a and b) and the expressive value to a of voting for i: 
W =Y+E; 
Therefore, the rational voter will vote for a over b if and only if: 
hR;A + L;A ~ hR;s + Lis 
where his the probability that i's vote will be decisive.62 That is to say, the rational voter 
will vote for a over b if and only if the expected utility of her vote (the chance of her vote 
being decisive times the value to her of outcome a actually prevailing) combined with the 
expressive value of her vote (the value she enjoys from actually voting for a, independent 
of the utility of the outcome) is greater than or equal to this same total for the alternative 
outcome, b. 
62 Ibid., 24. 
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Brennan and Lomasky go on to argue that "the relative price of expressive 
elements in any act of choice, measured in terms of instrumental benefits foregone, is 
higher in markets than in electoral settings ... All other things equal, the relative 
significance of expressive elements increases by a factor equal to the inverse of the 
probability of being decisive."63 Because in the market, our decisions are almost always 
decisive (that is, if i decides to buy something, she will end up going home with it), the 
role of the expressive element is minimal. However, in electoral settings the probability 
of decisiveness is very low, and therefore maximizing the expressive return comes at a 
minimal cost in terms of instrumental benefits foregone - since the decision would not 
have been decisive anyway, the voter is giving nothing up in voting on the basis of 
expressive reasons rather than instrumental ones, other than the costs associated with the 
act of voting itself. Electoral choice, then, will most often be driven by purely expressive 
or symbolic motivations, and not by considerations of individual interest-maximization. 
This presents a problem for the interest-based approach to justifying democracy. 
Unless it is the case that a voter's greatest expressive returns will always arise as a result 
of voting for the outcome which would also be in her best interests, broadly construed, 
then the normative validity of the interest-based justification for majority rule is severely 
undermined. 
What Brennan and Lomasky ultimately argue is that it may be possible for there 
to be "merit goods" - goods which are under-consumed at Pareto-optimal levels. Such 
goods might include philosophy lectures or impressionist art exhibits, which we might 
presume are under-consumed, even in ideal markets. If merit goods are possible, then it 
must be because there is some sense in which the preferences which inform our market 
63 Ibid., 24. 
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decisions can be wrong. The traditional assumption is that market preferences gain their 
normative force because they issue from the "uniquely legitimate fount of values, 
subjective determinations ofindividuals."64 However, this approach to the unique 
normative legitimacy of market preferences overlooks the possibility that individuals can 
have second-order preferences over their market preferences, and that these higher-order 
preferences may actually conflict with market preferences. In the case of voting, where 
one can vote in the direction of their higher-order preferences without thereby bringing 
about the costs associated with forgoing their market preferences, it may be that second-
order, or what Brennan and Lomasky call "reflective" preferences, will more frequently 
come into play.65 
If this is the only way in which preferences expressed through voting may diverge 
from market preferences, then it may be possible to salvage the normative basis for 
democracy. Specifically, if voters are more likely to vote on the basis of their reflective 
preferences due to the indecisiveness of their votes, then perhaps they are acting more in 
their own interests than in those situations in which market preferences are the driving 
forces of their actions. "What one is likely to focus on in electoral choice is the virtue of 
x over y tout court- one expresses one's assessment of the value ofx quax, with little 
hanging on that assessment apart from the assessment itself. Whatever grounds one 
might have for believing that x is to be preferred in principle are grounds that seem likely 
to secure one's support in the electoral context."66 This might suffice if we were to 
construe individual interests more broadly, so as to include preferences based in moral 
considerations and not only those associated with personal wealth or utility. 
64 Ibid., 148. 
65 Ibid., 151. 
66 Ibid., 152-3. 
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Unfortunately, it is not necessarily the case that the preferences expressed in 
voting always mirror reflective preferences. Because costs are separated from choice in 
the act of voting, voters may be inclined to vote less morally than they would act in 
analogous market settings; "individuals may be induced to vote in a direction that they 
themselves believe to be immoral and of which they reflectively disapprove. "67 This may 
be the case for two reasons. First of all, individuals are more likely to truly reflect and 
devote energy to decision-making when their actions are likely to make an appreciable 
difference to the outcomes and how they are affected by them. Conversely, in the voting 
situation, where their decisions are unlikely to be decisive, any reflection at all is likely to 
be minimal. Secondly, anonymity reigns inside the voting booth. As a result, individuals 
are able to express impulses they know to be immoral without the risk of retaliation or 
judgment. For example, a bar owner (we'll call him Mr. Booze) may secretly harbor a 
deep-seated racism and hatred of Hispanics. Rationally, he knows this to be wrong (or at 
the very least unpopular), and he also knows that if he were to put a sign on his door 
advertising "Hispanics not welcome," this would likely have an adverse consequence on 
the business at his bar. When it came time to vote, however, Mr. Booze might take the 
opportunity to vent his otherwise repressed feelings about Hispanics, and vote for the 
anti-immigration candidate without any concern about "being found out" or suffering the 
consequences such an expression would drive were it made in a more public setting. In 
market behavior, where actions are immediately followed by consequences, this is not the 
case. So while some individuals may be inclined to vote their conscience, rather than 
their own interests, others may be persuaded in the other direction. And if the democratic 
process drives voters to expressive extremes in both directions, then it is not the case that 
67 Ibid., 157. 
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it necessarily reinforces reflective preferences. It may also be the case that it undermines 
them. 
At the end of the day, the causal connection between individual voters' interests 
and the outcomes of democratic procedures are too far removed to serve as normative 
foundation for majority rule. On the one hand, voters who vote with the intention of 
pursuing their interests may intend to do so, but this intention is not enough for them to in 
fact secure favored outcomes - not only is their vote not decisive, but given the 
prevalence of irrationality, they are likely to not be voting in the direction of their 
interests at all. On the other hand, voters who vote with the full knowledge that they 
cannot bring about favored outcomes, and so instead engage in expressivism at the polls, 
cannot be said to have intentionally brought about any outcome at all, since their votes 
were not made with the intention of driving an outcome!68 
Further Considerations 
The traditional interest-based account of voting faces several problems. On the one hand, 
it doesn't look like rational utility-maximizers would vote at all, however we still see a 
level of voter turnout that is high in relation to this fact. On the other hand, if we concede 
that voter turnout may be related to something external to individual interest, but 
maintain that nevertheless the content of individual votes are motivated by rational utility 
maximization, the interest-based account still must contend with the fact that a rational 
utility maximizer would not devote any resources to informing herself politically, 
because she would be aware of the miniscule possibility of her vote having a decisive 
impact on the outcomes of democratic procedures. Finally, even if it were the case that 
68 Ibid., 171. 
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individuals were for some reason motivated to inform themselves politically, it turns out 
that most of them are not adequate to the task. A host of irrational biases obscure their 
true interests as well as their abilities to rationally pursue them. 
The claim that interests do not play a decisive role in individual political 
preferences is borne out by the impact of candidate personality on the outcomes of 
elections and individual voter choices. Brennan and Lomasky cite several studies 
demonstrating the impact of candidate personality on electoral behavior, including a 1966 
Stokes study which found that a candidate's personality had a greater impact on voting 
than either specific issues or party affiliation,69 and a 1986 study which concluded that 
individual perceptions of presidential candidates were generally comprised of 
assessments of personality traits rather than issue positions or ideological 
considerations. 70 
Obviously, character carries a lot of epistemic weight, or at least epistemic 
content. Perhaps it is the case that voters are able to use character schemas in order to 
determine the behavior of the candidate once in office, and perhaps they are able to do so 
with some level of reliability. Ifthis were the case, then the fact that voters focus on 
character traits rather than on specific policy positions might buttress, rather than refute, 
the claim that individuals are rationally pursuing their interests through their voting. 
As it turns out, this is not far from the truth. The same study demonstrated that 
although voter perceptions of candidates were widely formed on the basis of personality 
traits rather than issues positions, the character traits which were focused on were 
strongly correlated with important performance-related characteristics, such as integrity, 
69 Stokes 1966. 
70 Miller, Wattenberg, et al. 1986. 
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competence, and reliability. 71 What this shows, however, is not that individuals are 
rationally pursuing their interests in the political sphere. In fact, it shows that individuals 
are not tracking their specific, policy-related interests at all. Rather, they are pursuing 
their interests only insofar as their interests are better promoted by individuals who 
appear to have "integrity, competence, and reliability"- regardless of their policy 
positions. Given that citizens track these personality features rather than particular policy 
preferences, we cannot ascribe to them the rational pursuit of their interest promotion 
unless we can demonstrate some further correlation between candidates with "integrity, 
competence, and reliability" and political positions which are in the best interests of a 
majority of citizens. This seems unlikely, as the implication would be that candidates 
associated with certain policy packages are more honest, competent, and reliable than 
candidates with opposing viewpoints. At least without further data to support such a 
claim, it must remain highly suspect. 
A further problem confronts the interest-based theorist: if individuals really do 
vote on the basis of how political outcomes will affect their individual interests, then you 
would expect that the format of political advertising would better reflect that fact. That 
is, if individuals vote in order to promote their interests in political outcomes, then why 
doesn't the majority of political advertising focus on explaining to voters how certain 
policies or outcomes will increase their share of the pie? Instead, the political rhetoric we 
see during campaign times focus on abstract notions of the good, appealing to voters' 
normative conceptions, and less frequently on how policy options and party lines will 
impact individual citizens or groups. 72 
71 Ibid., 528. 
72 Brennan and Lomasky I 993, 97-8. 
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This is in line with the behavior we see regarding the most politically divisive 
issues. For example, no merely interest-based account of voter behavior could possibly 
account for the attitudes and strong emotions which accompany the abortion debate. 
There is no group to whose members we could ascribe a strong personal interest in the 
prohibition of abortion- the unborn, as the only "members" of society with a vested 
interest in this issue, obviously cannot vote. And yet, this issue has frequently taken over 
the political landscape with such a ferocity that we must be able to offer an account of 
why. The expressivist account is able to provide an answer: when individual members of 
a democracy participate in the political process, they are not merely working to promote 
their interests, they are expressing or promoting normative principles or ideals to which 
they subscribe. 73 We might make the same point with the current debate over 
homosexual marriage: there is no group of individuals whose economic or other physical 
interests will be harmed should homosexual marriage be permitted. Nevertheless, we see 
vociferous opposition to the prospect and countless state laws passed "protecting" the 
institution of marriage- suggesting that more than mere individual interests are playing a 
role in political behavior, a gap which needs to be filled. 
An account such as the expressivist account on offer from Brennan and Lomasky 
can do something to quell these kinds of worries, but has a difficult time providing the 
normative foundation necessary for coercive authority, and so does little to aid the 
interest-based theorist in her predicament. And although there is not an overwhelming 
amount of robust quantitative data to back the expressivist claim, there is some anecdotal 
evidence which suggests that an account such as this one may not be too far off the mark. 
For example, if the public choice model is correct, and voters vote for the outcome which 
73 Ibid., I 0 I. 
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is most likely to produce the most overall good for them, then it is unclear why the 
economic consequences of particular policy choices serve as such poor indicators of voter 
behavior.74 In fact, Brennan and Lomasky cite a number of studies conducted using data 
from the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center, in which it has been found 
that there is virtually no correspondence between individual voting behavior and 
economic outcomes. Kinder and Kiewiet, for example, found that "voters are not 
egocentric in any narrow sense - they do not vote their own pocketbooks. Rather, their 
preferences follow a more collective reckoning."75 Their findings lead them to conclude 
that voters act on the basis of "symbolic" politics - expressing grievances of the 
collective- rather than on the basis of personal interest. Similarly, Hawthorne and 
Jackson found that individual preferences regarding tax policies- the most clearly 
relevant area of policy to individual economic interests - were greatly affected by 
attitudes towards collective issues and "are not merely a rationalization for their own 
economic interests."76 They go on to show that individuals with similar economic 
positions and prospects in light of policy options show widely divergent preferences 
across redistribution schemes and taxation structures. 
One potential means of explaining this is to argue that individuals do not 
necessarily vote for their own, individual, interests, but rather in the interests of some 
group or party with which they identify. In this case, it may happen that some specific 
policy outcome which is in the group's overall best interest contradicts the individual's 
interest in that instant, but that overall the group's interests and the individual's are 
correlated strongly enough to warrant group identification. If this is right, however, the 
74 Ibid., 93. 
75 Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 524. 
76 Hawthorne and Jackson 1987, 772. 
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interest-based theorist is left in the position of having to explain why individuals identify 
with the groups they do - why they do not form coalitions which better represent their 
interests.77 
Another possibility is to say that although some voters vote in their own interests, 
others vote to bring about some conception of the "common good." This would be in 
keeping with the evidence presented above, namely, that many voters appear to be 
interested in collective issues rather than merely their own economic fortunes. Such a 
conception presents a problem, however, if it is acknowledged some voters are motivated 
to vote in the direction they perceive to be in their best interests (a claim which is also 
supported by the evidence above). The problem is that if some voters vote for what they 
see to be in the interests of the common good, and others vote for what they see to be in 
their own best interests, the outcome selected by the majority could very well be in 
neither the majority interest nor believed by the majority to be in the interest of the 
common good. For example, take the following scenario devised by Jonathan Wolff: 
1. Suppose voters are choosing between A and B. 
2. A is in the interests of 40% and B is in the interests of the remaining 60%. 
3. Suppose among the electorate 80% believe B to be for the common good, 
while 20% believe this of A. Suppose also, that such belief is independent of 
interests: i.e. the A-believers and B-believers are spread evenly through the 
electorate. 
4. Suppose, finally, that those for whom A is in their interests (the A-interest 
people) vote according to interest, while the B-interest people vote according 
to their ideas of the common good. 
From these assumptions, we arrive at the disturbing conclusion that 52% of voters will 
vote for A, even though it is in the interest of only 40% of voters, and even though only 
77 Brennan and Lomasky 1993, 95. 
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20% of voters believe that A is in the interest of the common good! 78 This example, 
although clearly contrived specifically to make the point, still succeeds in making it: that 
we cannot depend on majority rule to produce either the outcome which best reflects the 
individual interests of the voters, or to produce the outcome which is in the interest of the 
"general good," however conceived. 
A final alternative would be to deny that the content of individual votes is ever 
determined by what voters perceive to be in their best interests, and instead argue that 
individuals vote solely upon the basis of what they take to be in the interest of the 
common good. If this were the case, then it might also happen that when everyone votes 
on the basis of the common good, individual interests are somehow maximized and we 
could still locate some normative foundation for the interest-based theory. If this is the 
case, we must ask what the common good is that individuals are voting on the basis of. 
On the one hand, the "common good" might simply refer to the aggregation of all 
individual interests. If that were the case, then the interest-based account would retain its 
normative force based in the interests of citizens. However, if we accepted the interest-
based theorist's major premise that individuals are best suited to identify and promote 
their own interests, it seems that this interpretation would imply that individuals should 
vote on the basis of their interests. This interpretation leads us back to all of the problems 
we have already enumerated. 
On the other hand, it might be that the "common good" refers to some state of 
affairs which exists independent of, or in addition to, the interests of individual citizens. 
Such an interpretation might absolve the interest-based theorist from having to provide an 
account of how rationally abstaining, rationally ignorant, cognitively biased individuals 
78 Wolff 1994, 194. 
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are actually capable of identifying their interests and promoting them in the democratic 
marketplace of the voting booth, but it turns out that this option also does not work. This 
is because of the deeper, conceptual problem with any account of democracy which 
claims that the outcomes of majority rule in some way reflect the interests of voters or 
any other identifiable value- including the "common good," however construed. 
Deeper Problems 
The interest-based justification cannot carry normative weight, precisely because of what 
has been shown in groundbreaking work done by Kenneth Arrow, Richard McKelvey, 
and William Riker demonstrating that the outcomes of majority rule decision-making are 
ultimately meaningless in terms of their relationship to the initial inputs (i.e. votes or 
voter preferences). 
William Riker's groundbreaking 1982 work demonstrated that for any system of 
voting, if it satisfied the basic requirements of procedural fairness, the outcome would be 
"meaningless." This meaninglessness indicates that the outcomes of the voting system 
are unrelated to the interests ofthe members of society, as expressed through the voting 
mechanism. (An outcome would be "meaningful," in contrast, if the outcome could be 
interpreted to be in direct relationship to the interests or preferences or intentions of the 
individual voters.)79 Riker's point that the outcomes of voting procedures are 
meaningless can be demonstrated with the help of the voting paradox. Imagine a set of 
alternatives (candidates, policy outcomes, etc.), x, y, and z. Now imagine that society 
divides evenly into three groups, with the following preference orderings across all of the 
options: 
79 Riker 1982, 115. 
51 
1. x>y>z 
2. y>z>x 
3. z>x>y 
Now say that we have a method of determining outcomes which compares preferences 
orderings pairwise and takes the winner to be that outcome with majority support. So we 
compare outcomes x andy first: x wins because in two out of three cases (or two thirds of 
our population), xis the preferred outcome. Next, we compare x and z. In this case, z 
wins because z is preferred to x by two thirds of our population. It looks like our decision 
procedure has netted a winner: z! But the observant will notice that this is not enough. 
For we have not compared z toy, and it turns out that two thirds of our population prefers 
ytoz. 
The problem the voting paradox generates is a cyclic majority: there is no 
outcome in this scenario which is not inferior to another option on two thirds of the 
population's view. The voting paradox shows the potential difficulties in settling on a 
proper democratic procedure: whichever pairwise comparison we choose to evaluate first, 
we will end up determining arbitrarily what the outcome will be. This is doubly 
dangerous when we consider the potential for agenda manipulation- the possibility that 
an individual or powerful group could manipulate the way in which decisions are made 
(for example, by altering the order in which we made pairwise comparisons) in order to 
control the outcomes. The voting paradox is but a symptom of a greater problem, 
however, which is that the outcomes of majority rule are themselves ambiguous. 
Whatever procedure is chosen for aggregation, we could produce a different result with a 
different procedure -even if we limit ourselves to aggregation rules which are 
procedurally fair. Given a set of voter preferences, a cardinal utility comparison 
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(Bentham winner) will diverge from the winner of ordinal pairwise comparison 
(Condorcet winner), which will again diverge from the winner of a Borda count, which 
assigns decreasing point-values to outcomes based on their preference ranking, with the 
lowest-ranking alternative scoring 0 for that voter. 
Take the following example from Riker: Voters rank potential outcomes a 
through e in order of their preference, and the resulting distribution is as follows (with 
the cardinal utilities assigned to the various outcomes by the voters in parentheses): 
Rank Order Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 Voter 4 Voter 5 
1 (Highest) a (1.00) d (1.00) e (1.00) b (1.00) b (1.00) 
2 d (0.90) a (0.61) c (0.80) d (0.90) e (0.96) 
3 b (0.60) b (0.60) a (0.70) a (0.75) c (0.70) 
4 c (0.55) e (0.59) b (0.55) e (0.74) a (0.60) 
5 (Lowest) e (0.50) c (0.50) d (0.50) c (0.50) d (0.50) 
Given this hypothetical distribution of preference rankings, outcome b is the plurality 
winner, as it occupies the highest ranking for 40% of voters (with outcomes a, d, and e 
tied for second with 20% each). The Condorcet winner, however, is outcome a: in a 
pairwise comparison with each of the other alternatives, a wins. Finally, the Bentham 
winner- determined by additive cardinal utility- is outcome d, with a total utility of 3.80 
(outcomes band e are tied for second with a total utility of3.75 each). 80 
This all seems a bit contrived, but in fact there is good historical evidence to 
suggest that the instances in which this problem has been relevant have not been 
80 Ibid., 36-40. 
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infrequent. Looking at the 39 U.S. presidential elections from 1824-1976, the outcomes 
of 14 of them (39%) could have been different if voters who had chosen the third place 
candidate had been forced to choose between one of the two who were more popular - a 
process known as "reallocation" which is frequently used in party caucusing in individual 
states. In another four elections in the same time span, a third candidate received 5% or 
greater of the popular vote. In these cases, the very presence of a third candidate may 
have motivated strategic voting on the part of many, in which case some meaningful 
proportion of voters may have voted against their primary preference - undermining the 
claim to unique legitimation for these outcomes, as well. This suggests that 18 of 39 U.S. 
presidential elections - 46% - may have turned out differently had we only utilized a 
different aggregation method than that which was actually used. 81 
Perhaps, however, we can distinguish between the different aggregation methods 
on the basis of which is more likely to satisfy the interests of more voters. What looks to 
be the best way to avoid the kinds of cycles referred to earlier is to limit the democratic 
procedure to simple majority voting over two alternatives. This form of simple majority 
decision has the important properties ofmonotonicity (adding a vote to a winner cannot 
make it a loser), anonymity (who cast which votes has no impact on the outcome), and 
neutrality (the aggregation rule is neutral between outcomes). As it turns out, simple 
majority decision across two alternatives is the only aggregation rule which can satisfy all 
three of these criteria simultaneously. Unfortunately, if we want a decision procedure 
that is actually responsive to the interests of voters, simple majority voting over two 
alternatives is the least likely to be the one that we want. Binary choices are the least 
81 Ibid., 22-4. 
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representative of the interests of citizens, and any limitation of outcomes to two will, by 
definition, leave all divergent interests without any possibility of representation at all. 
Once we move to three or more alternatives, however, we not only run into the 
kinds of problems highlighted above, but additional problems such as those demonstrated 
by Arrow and McKelvey. In the 1960's, Kenneth Arrow showed that when there are 
more than two options, no aggregate preference ordering can be obtained across 
individual voters when minimal requirements are in place, such as non-dictatorship and 
Pareto efficiency.82 Arrow designates several criteria which describe a fair voting 
procedure: universal admissibility (individuals may choose any of the possible preference 
orderings); Pareto optimality (if everyone prefers x toy, the outcome of the aggregation 
procedure may not bey); monotonicity (adding a vote to a winner cannot make it a loser); 
non-imposition (it cannot be the case that the outcome will be the same no matter what 
individual voters choose); independence from irrelevant alternatives (the same preference 
distribution will generate the same outcome on every iteration); and non-dictatorship (no 
one person's favoring x will result in x being chosen no matter what the remaining 
distribution of preferences is). Any method of aggregation which simultaneously satisfies 
each of these criteria will result in an intransitive ordering in the outcome of 
aggregation. 83 
Further work in this area by Richard McKelvey demonstrated the highly 
disturbing fact that given a set of more than two policy alternatives, we can generate any 
82 Arrow 1963. 
83 Many theorists have attempted to refute the relevance or importance of one or more of these criteria. 
Although such a discussion would take us too far off course, interested readers might look to Riker I 982, 
pp. 115-35 for a convincing defense of Arrow in the face of these objections. One important line of 
argument for our purposes is that which claims that the cyclic problem is not practically significant, as 
cycles are rare. Riker makes a convincing case that they may be rare regarding trivial issues, but are much 
more frequent on important, ideological political issues. These greater political questions are, of course, 
the very ones with the potential to affect the greatest quantity of constituent interest-fulfillment. 
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policy outcome included in the set, via a sequence of majority-approved decisions. What 
this means is, given some distribution of preference-orderings across more than two 
policy outcomes across the population, we can legitimately get to any set of policies 
included in the preference orderings from any other, with a series of majoritarian votes. 
This is a more damaging result of cyclic voting, and the implication is that policy 
outcomes are not at all constrained by the requirement that each policy change be 
approved by a majority ofvoters! 84 For the interest-based account, this means that the 
real interests ofvoters have no impact on the outcomes of majority-rule decision-making. 
Given a set of individual interests, any policy outcome can be reached if the steps are 
taken in the appropriate order. Moreover, this results shows that those who control the 
legislative agenda hold the true power in determining the outcomes of elections: strategic 
agenda-setting can determine the outcomes ofmajoritarian decision-making a priori.85 
Ultimately, then, democratic decision making cannot be said to best fulfill the 
interests expressed by voters at the voting booth, because the results of democratic 
decision making are almost always meaningless and arbitrary, determined by factors 
wholly external to the motivations behind individual votes - be they individual interests 
or the collective good. Even if the common good explanation for voter behavior could 
sidestep all of the objections raised on the basis of voter rationality and irrationality, it 
would still have to contend with the fact that democratic outcomes are ultimately 
arbitrary. Riker himself goes on to claim that in light of the meaninglessness of voting 
outcomes, the value in democracy is that it allows the population to occasionally oust 
leaders who have gone too far or overstepped their bounds. This is a weak foundation 
84 McKelvey 1976,472. 
85 Coleman and Ferejohn 1986, II. 
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upon which to base a system of rule, however, and it is unclear that such an argument 
uniquely grounds democracy as the correct choice out of the alternatives. Recent events 
in Egypt, for example, demonstrate that even a dictatorship can be overthrown when 
things have gone too far. 86 
Alternative Construals of "Interests" 
Given the myriad empirical and conceptual challenges to a justification of democracy 
grounded in the interests of citizens, it is not surprising that some theorists have 
attempted to characterize "interests" along alternative lines. For example, Richard 
Arneson agrees that majority rule is likely to protect the interests of more people than 
alternative systems of rule, 87 but his construal of interests is far more narrow than the 
social choice position I have so far considered. Rather than taking democracy to protect 
the broadly construed interests of citizens, Arneson focuses on the protection of 
fundamental rights. Democratic rights - such as enfranchisement or the right to stand for 
office - serve to protect the more fundamental rights which are taken by Arneson to be 
requirements of justice, such as freedom of speech, individual liberty, and certain 
egalitarian rights to material resources. 88 According to Arneson, the protection of these 
rights serves as "the most natural and compelling justification of political regimes of 
substantive constitutional democracy. "89 
Arneson's argument is based on the central Millian tenet that one person does not 
have the moral right to exercise power over another. The exception to this rule is the case 
86 AI Jazeera 20 II. 
87 Christiano 2003b, 7. 
88 Arneson 2003, 95. 
89 Ibid., 96. 
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in which A exercises power over B, but does so in the interests of B, or in furtherance of 
B's fundamental rights. Arneson argues that we cannot design a non-democratic means 
of identifying individuals who will reliably observe this maxim, and that therefore 
democracy is our second-best alternative.90 Note the implicit instrumentality of this 
claim: democracy is justified as a system of rule only insofar as it safeguards fundamental 
rights to a greater extent than the alternatives available. And as democracies go, it is the 
constitutional democracy which is best able to protect democratic rights, and therefore 
the more fundamental rights which Arneson takes to be our basic interests for the 
purposes of justifying coercive authority. 
The bulk of Arneson's argument, however, is in support of strong judicial review. 
Since the protection of fundamental rights provides the ultimate justification for 
democracy, the non-majoritarian operation of the judicial branch to protect those same 
basic rights is justified. Likewise, the limitations to majoritarianism based in a strong 
constitution are justified for the same reason. In order to make this argument, however, 
Arneson has to acknowledge that majoritarian rule endangers those fundamental rights, 
which he does: "the danger in majority rule is rights violations inflicted on minorities and 
the danger in any form of minority rule is rights violations inflicted on the majority. 
Ceteris paribus, the latter is worse,"91 but the former is still a legitimate concern, and 
grounds for constitutional protections and judicial remedies. 
The force of this argument seems terribly misplaced to me. Ultimately, Arneson 
argues the following: 
90 Ibid., 99. 
91 Ibid., 99. 
1. Protecting fundamental rights is the most important function of a system of 
rule. 
2. A democracy without constitutional and judicial protection is likely to 
endanger those rights. 
3. A democracy with constitutional and judicial protection can better protect 
those rights than a non-democratic form of rule. 
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4. Therefore, democracy serves the most important function of a system of rule 
and is justified. 
The disconnect is in the jump from premise (3) to the conclusion in (4). The fact that a 
democracy with constitutional and judicial protection can serve this function says nothing 
about the ability of democracy simpliciter as a system of rule to do so. And in fact, it is 
Arneson's own acknowledgment that majority rule endangers these fundamental rights 
which launches him on his defense of strong judicial review and constitutionalism. The 
correct conclusion must then be that constitutional protection and strong judicial review 
provide the necessary framework for a system of rule. The validity of democracy as the 
most justified system of rule is not spoken to. Thus it becomes unclear why pairing 
constitutional protections with this form of rule rather than with some alternative is the 
recommended outcome. Arneson claims that "no one has rights to placement in social 
roles that allow one to exercise power over other human beings without first obtaining 
their consent unless such exercise of power best promotes fulfillment of the fundamental 
rights of the people over whom power is exercised together with one's own fundamental 
rights,',n however he nowhere backs up the claim that democracy is better able to limit 
power to these circumstances than potential alternatives. 
92 Ibid., 96-7. 
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Hopes for the Interest-Based Theorist? 
Given the evidence presented here regarding the abilities of individuals to rationally 
pursue their interests in the marketplace of ideas, it is not clear what other route the 
interest-based theorist could take. Any account of the legitimacy of democracy which 
grounds that legitimacy in the instrumental value of individual votes to the voters placing 
them will have to contend with the kinds of issues presented here. 
Further, and perhaps more importantly, any instrumental account will rely for its 
validity on the value of the outcomes of democratic decision-making. Regardless of how 
we construe that value, then, the democratic process has to be producing outcomes which 
track something. But given the works of Arrow, McKelvey, and Riker, there is a great 
body of evidence demonstrating that the outcomes of democratic decision-making are not 
reflective in any meaningful way of the inputs. The end result is that the role of the voter 
in producing outcomes which are valid on some instrumental basis is minimal at best, 
and does not clearly establish democracy as the sole, or even the best, legitimate form of 
government. This is a concern which will persist no matter how we construe the 
instrumental benefit that democracy is intended to produce, and the implication is that 
interest-based theories of democracy which predicate legitimacy on the connection 
between voter inputs and democratic outputs must be abandoned. 
In light of these difficulties, I now turn to the quasi-instrumental, quasi-intrinsic 
deliberative account of democracy, in order to determine iflimits to individual rationality 
might be less damaging to such an account. 
CHAPTER3 
DELIBERATION 
60 
In the previous chapter, I argued that instrumental accounts which predicate democracy's 
legitimacy on the idea that voters are able to pursue or promote their interests through 
their inputs at the polls are ultimately hopeless in light of the ways in which electoral 
outcomes can be manipulated to produce almost any results. However, interest-based 
accounts are not the only instrumental theories of democratic legitimacy. Perhaps the 
most widespread and popular account of democratic legitimacy, deliberative democratic 
theory relies for its validity on both instrumental and intrinsic considerations in equal 
parts. On the one hand, deliberative democracy is centered on the ideal of political 
justification, which is a procedural consideration that speaks more towards the intrinsic 
value of democracy than to the value of its outcomes. 93 On the other hand, the diverse 
body of deliberative theories all appear to rely crucially on certain instrumental claims 
regarding the types of outcomes deliberative democratic procedures are likely to produce. 
Because these instrumental benefits are argued to arise through the deliberative process 
rather than as a result of the act of voting, deliberative theorists escape the kinds of 
empirical challenges which proved so detrimental to interest-based accounts in the 
preceding chapter. 
Although deliberative accounts of democracy can vary widely, part of the aim of 
this chapter is to identify what core features of deliberation are relied upon by all 
deliberative theorists. My intention is to identify the shared foundations of these 
accounts through a focus on the theories of Jilrgen Habermas and Joshua Cohen, as well 
as a less thorough examination of other theorists from this school of thought. However, 
93 Cohen 2009b. 
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there is a larger question I am interested in throughout, and that is, to what extent do 
these core features of deliberation rely for their validity upon dubious empirical 
assumptions regarding the actual capacities of political citizens and deliberating bodies. 
In identifying the core substantive principles upon which this approach to democracy is 
grounded, I hope to show in what sense the deliberative democrat is predicating her 
account on implausible assumptions about the actual capacities of individual participants 
in political decision-making as well as those of deliberating groups more generally. 
Deliberative Democracy 
Theories of deliberative democrats vary; however, at the heart of deliberative theory is an 
acceptance of the core democratic principle that collective decision-making should be 
undertaken with the participation of all of those who will be affected or governed by the 
outcomes of the decision-making process, as well as a deeper subscription to the idea that 
such decision-making should be conducted on the basis of reasons and justifications 
which are given by and directed to participants in deliberation "who are committed to the 
values of rationality and impartiality."94 Precisely how theorists fill out this picture 
differs from one account to the next, however there are four core commitments upon 
which all claims to the legitimacy of deliberative democracy tend to rest, and it is these 
commitments on which I will focus my critique. 
The most important characteristic of the deliberative conception of democracy, 
already mentioned, is what Gutmann and Thompson refer to as the reason-giving 
requirement. That is, in the course of collective political decision-making, citizens and 
their representatives should publicly base their positions upon reasons which all 
94 Elster 1998, 45-52. 
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individuals committed to deliberation are unable to reasonably reject. Political 
legitimacy is in large part predicated on the idea that laws must be justifiable to those 
who will be governed by them.95 Deliberative democracy institutionalizes this ideal 
through the notion of political justification, cashed out by means of a deliberative process 
that involves public argument and reasoning among citizens in the determination of 
political outcomes.96 
The reason-giving requirement itself finds its normative foundation in the second 
commitment, to the democratic ideal of self-rule or political autonomy. The deliberative 
process is thought to promote and protect the autonomy of political subjects, by placing 
the focus of political decision-making on a reasons-based interaction among those who 
will be affected by political decisions. The deep commitment to political autonomy or 
self-rule is one characteristic of deliberative democracy that seems to be universally 
present across the varied accounts within this field. Consider, for example, the following 
excerpts from deliberative democrats of various breeds: 
[T]he autonomy of citizens and the legitimacy of law refer to each other ... The 
only legitimate law is one that emerges from the discursive opinion- and will-
formation of equally enfranchised citizens. The latter can in turn adequately 
exercise their public autonomy, guaranteed by rights of communication and 
participation. 97 
Beginning, then, from the formal ideal of a deliberative democracy, we arrive at 
the more substantive ideal of an association that is regulated by deliberation ... 
that respects the autonomy of the members.98 
The moral basis for [the] reason-giving process is common to many conceptions 
of democracy. Persons should be treated not merely as objects oflegislation, as 
95 Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 3-4. 
96 Cohen 2009a, 21. 
97 Habennas 1996, 408. 
98 Cohen 2009a, 28. 
passive subjects to be ruled, but as autonomous agents who take part in the 
governance of their own society. 99 
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The basic appeal of this foundation in autonomy is the very same that grounds a 
commitment to democracy itself, the notion that political legitimacy is closely linked 
with self-governance. However, the autonomy the deliberative democrat wishes to 
promote is substantive, in line with the traditional Western conception of autonomy as 
being directed by one's own goals, desires, and characteristics which are not externally 
imposed, but rather are a manifestation of one's "authentic self."100 That is to say, truly 
autonomous decisions are formed on the basis of reasons, without influence from external 
factors. 
Two paradigm examples of external influences on autonomous decision-making 
are adaptive and accommodationist preferences. An individual would have adaptive 
preferences if her preferences were to change on the basis of changing circumstances 
without the agent deliberately contributing to the change in her preferences - for 
example, a woman who has accustomed herself to life in a society in which the 
systematic oppression of women is the norm may unconsciously revise her preferences in 
light of the social reality that certain options are unavailable to her. In contrast, she 
would have accommodationist preferences if she deliberately changed her preferences, 
but did so in response to a circumstance in which her initial preferences were unlikely to 
be met due to her being in a position of subordination. The popular example is that of a 
Stoic slave, who intentionally cultivates in herself preferences which will not be 
frustrated as a result of her station in life. Deliberative democrats argue that political 
deliberation minimizes the effects of such external influences, and fosters autonomy 
99 Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 3. 
10° Christman 2009. 
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through its recognition of all participants to the deliberative process as full members of 
equal standing within the deliberation. Adaptive preferences are thought to be eliminated 
through deliberation's requirement that all parties state their reasons for the policies they 
support. Since adaptive preferences are formed unconsciously and without a basis in 
reasons which can be expressed, the deliberative requirement of public reasoning 
discourages the formation or retention of such preferences. Likewise, accommodationist 
preferences are said to be addressed and minimized through the recognition of the 
deliberative capacities of all participants and a strong focus on equality within 
deliberation, thus neutralizing relations of power and subordination during the process. 101 
It may seem unclear in what way such power relations are "neutralized" through 
the deliberative process. The answer to this question resides with the third normative 
commitment of the deliberative democrat, which is a strong emphasis on a deep 
substantive equality. The deliberative process is intended to be one in which everyone 
can participate and have an equal ability to contribute to the outcomes of political 
decision-making. The reason-giving requirement plays a large role here, too: because 
deliberation is conducted on the basis of reasons, the types of influence which are often 
seen to undermine equality (such as money, political power, etc.) should not have the 
same pernicious effect that they can in the bargaining scenarios which characterize non-
deliberative forms of democratic rule. Every participant in the deliberative process can 
offer reasons for or against policies, propose topics or issues for deliberation or 
legislation, and have an equal voice in the ensuing debate, and the results of the decision-
making procedure must be capable of being justified on the basis of reasons which are 
101 Cohen 2009a, 27-8. 
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accessible to all. 102 Like the foundation in autonomy, the argument for deliberative 
democracy's respect for substantive equality is present across theorists: 
Deliberative democracy requires a particular, relatively complex sort of equality. 
Given our stress on the uncertainty of outcomes produced by democratic 
arrangements, such arrangements obviously cannot require equality of outcomes. 
Democracy, then, requires some version of equality of opportunity. More 
specifically, democratic deliberation requires equal opportunity of access to 
political influence. 103 
The discourse principle, which is supposed to secure an uncoerced consensus, can 
thus be brought to bear ... through procedures that regulate bargaining from the 
standpoint of fairness. In this way, non-neutralizable bargaining power should at 
least be disciplined by its equal distribution among the parties. More specifically, 
the negotiation of compromise should follow procedures that provide all the 
interested parties with an equal opportunity for pressure, that is, an equal 
opportunity to influence one another during the actual bargaining, so that all the 
affected interests can come into play and have equal chances of prevailing. 104 
In ideal deliberation parties are both formally and substantively equal. They are 
formally equal in that the rules regulating the procedure do not single out 
individuals. Everyone with the deliberative capacities has equal standing at each 
stage of the deliberative process ... The participants are substantively equal in that 
the existing distribution of power and resources does not shape their chances to 
contribute to deliberation, nor does that distribution play an authoritative role in 
the deliberation. 105 
It is important to see that the kind of equality at issue here is not the mere formal equality 
that characterizes the aggregation of votes, with one vote per person, which is often 
characterized by legislative bargaining, undermining any claim to substantive equality 
among citizens from widely disparate economic backgrounds. The deliberative process 
itself is argued to have a negating effect on the influence of inequalities in economic, 
social, and political power among participants, resulting in a system in which all 
102 Ibid., 24-5. 
103 Knight and Johnson 1997,280 (original emphasis). 
104 Habennas 1996, 166-7 (original emphasis). 
105 Cohen 2009a, 24 (original emphasis). 
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participants have an equal opportunity to influence the outcome of political decision-
making, regardless of their social or economic position. 
The final shared commitment among deliberative democrats is a shared belief in 
some kind of epistemic value to deliberation itself. This epistemic value is manifested in 
the production of substantively better outcomes. Although this is an aspect of 
deliberation to which theorists' commitments vary widely, most deliberative accounts 
affirm in some way that the outcomes of deliberation will actually be superior to the 
outcomes of mere procedural aggregation or bargaining, including along rational and 
epistemic lines. 
The idea here is that the use of deliberation will generate better information or a 
better ability to use relevant information in the making of political decisions. Deigo 
Gambetta, for example, argues that deliberation can spur the imaginations of deliberators, 
leading to proposals involving new solutions to shared problems, and further, that 
deliberation "can render the outcomes of decisions Pareto-superior by fostering better 
solutions."106 James Fearon makes a similar claim when he argues that public 
deliberation can lead individual participants to share information they have which 
otherwise would not have come to light in decision-making, thereby broadening the 
epistemic foundation from which decisions are taken. He goes on to argue that 
conditions of rational discussion can help deliberating groups to break out of "bounded 
rationality"- the fact that we have a limited capacity to imagine new solutions to 
problems- and derive new or imaginative approaches to familiar issues. 107 Finally, Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson concede that "any adequate theory" of deliberative 
106 Gambetta 1998, 24. 
107 Fearon 1998, 45-52. 
democracy must recognize an epistemic function to deliberation; a procedure which 
produced bad outcomes would fail to manifest the kind of equal respect required: 
"because the stakes of political decision-making are high, and deliberation is a time-
consuming activity, a deliberative process should contribute to fulfilling the central 
political function of making good decisions and laws."108 Later I will discuss David 
Estlund's argument that the theories ofHabermas and Cohen are both implicitly 
committed to similar claims regarding the privileged status of the outcomes of 
deliberation. 
Although theorists' claims regarding the epistemic value of deliberation vary 
widely, the important thing to note in each case is that the outcomes of deliberation are 
claimed to be better in some way than political outcomes absent the kind rational 
discussion emphasized by deliberative theories. The superiority of outcomes is due to 
access to a wider base of information, or the use of a procedure which harnesses more 
imaginative power, or else due to reliance on a method of decision-making which is 
restricted to rational considerations. 
Although deliberative theories of democratic legitimacy vary widely, I have 
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argued that there are at least four core normative commitments to which all deliberative 
theorists ascribe to a greater or lesser extent. Because I do not have space to engage with 
all of the field of deliberative theory, the above commentary is intended to demonstrate 
that the objections I will raise in the remainder of this chapter are relevant to deliberative 
theory in all of its various forms. Given that the preceding has taken the form of a broad 
outline of the normative commitments of deliberative democrats, I would like now to tum 
108 Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 22 (emphasis added). The full context of this quote makes it clear that 
Gutmann and Thompson's use of the word "should" here is normative and not merely predictive or 
descriptive. 
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to two specific theories. My hope is to provide a more comprehensive picture of 
deliberative democracy in order to give the reader a fuller understanding of the structure 
of deliberative arguments for legitimacy. The theorists I have chosen to discuss are the 
most influential accounts, and are thereby intended to be representative of the major 
streams of deliberative theories. That said, they are by no means intended to exhaust the 
theoretical possibilities open to deliberative democrats. 
Habermas 
Although historically, political deliberation finds support as far back as ancient Athens, 
discussion was traditionally confined to small subsets of the population, such as experts, 
the wealthy, or the most educated. 109 As a result, deliberation was tainted with a 
decidedly un-democratic connotation. It was not until Jlirgen Habermas developed his 
discourse theoretic account of democracy that we saw a contemporary unification of 
deliberation and fully-enfranchised democracy. 110 
Habermas approaches his project with the goal of reconciling the normative and 
factual bases of political legitimacy. On the one hand, a theory of democracy must 
account for the fact that individual citizens within the state take the legitimacy of the 
political system for granted, and as a result generally obey the laws. On the other hand, 
mere de facto legitimacy does not provide a normative basis for the coercive enforcement 
of law. Therefore, an account of democracy must also provide a substantive basis for 
legitimacy. The discourse theoretic account Habermas offers is intended to meet both of 
these requirements. 
109 See, for example, Aristotle 1984, book III; Mill [1861] 1977. 
110 Habermas 1996. 
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Habermas bases his discourse theoretic account on what he calls the discourse 
principle: 
D: Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could 
agree as participants in rational discourses. 111 
The discourse principle is supposed to provide the basis for a political association among 
free and equal persons. Through the discourse principle, Habermas arrives at a 
procedural account of democracy: the institutional structure of decision-making, and the 
laws which it produces, must be capable of being generated through a certain kind of 
rational decision-making process which takes into account the equality and autonomy of 
all involved. The discourse principle embodies the requirement that institutional rules 
and legal norms are justified only if equal consideration is afforded to the interests of all 
who are involved, out of respect for their individual autonomy. 
The discourse principle followed to its logical consequents generates a robust 
system of rights, the upshot of which Habermas argues is the legitimacy of democratic 
procedures. The basic right to the "greatest possible measure of equal individual 
liberties" is the only conception of general liberties which could be rationally agreed to 
by all of those affected, and robust due process rights would also be required in order to 
ensure that those liberties were protected. Membership rights in the political association 
are likewise necessary in order to ensure that the political decisions which are generated 
continue to be acceptable to all and that some individuals don't find themselves 
arbitrarily excluded from the rights and benefits which accrue to members of the state. 112 
These rights taken together, however, do not yet guarantee the political autonomy, or 
Ill Ibid., I 07. 
112 Ibid., 122. 
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self-rule, that is necessary to take into account the interests of all citizens. Therefore, a 
basic right to an equal opportunity to participate in the process of what Habermas calls 
"opinion- and will-formation" (the deliberative process itself) is also necessary. 
It is in this sequence of rights generation that Habermas locates the normative 
basis for deliberative democracy as a form of rule. The deliberative aspect is essential, as 
it is through deliberation that the equality of individual interests is manifested. The focus 
on discussion is intended to reduce the impact of monetary and administrative power, 
since a deliberative consensus is required and sought, rather than a mere aggregation of 
votes in which a majority achieved through bargaining can prevail. The substantive 
equality of participants in a deliberative democracy is exemplified by the ideal speech 
situation, within which participants arrive at legitimate rules for society: 
1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a 
discourse. 
2. a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. 
b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse. 
c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs. 
3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from 
exercising his rights as laid down in ( 1) and (2). 113 
Habermasian discourse theory offers a blend of actual normative constraints on 
legislation and hypothetical norms for the discursive process. On the one hand, the 
conditions of freedom and equality for citizens seem to be presented as substantive 
constraints on the actual generation of law, as when he states that "the only legitimate law 
is one that emerges from the discursive opinion- and will-formation of equally 
113 Habennas 1990, 89. 
enfranchised citizens" 114 and that "the negotiation of compromise should follow 
procedures that provide all the interested parties with an equal opportunity for pressure, 
that is, an equal opportunity to influence one another during the actual bargaining."115 
71 
Together, these conditions provide the normative foundation for a system of rule. On the 
other hand, the ideal speech situation and its attendant restrictions on the kinds of rules 
which can be generated require not that legislation actually be generated through the 
deliberative procedure, but only that it could be: "only those statutes may claim 
legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of 
legislation."116 Habermas seems to be saying that the only limit to legitimate regulation 
is that it must be capable of gaining the assent of all citizens in a rational discursive 
process. The actual historical generation of the regulation does not, itself, play a 
justificatory role. So while deliberative democracy appears to generate societal norms 
that can meet the substantive requirement of the discourse principle, Habermas does not 
seem to demand that the deliberative process itself be present in an actual society; merely 
that the outcomes of whatever procedure is in place mirror the outcomes of hypothetical 
deliberation within the ideal speech situation. 
What is the practical upshot for Habermas, then? What implications does this 
theory have for our actual political arrangements? It seems like the normative 
requirements can only be cashed out in light of some additional, practical requirement 
that our actual political system in some way approach the ideal to as great an extent as 
possible. In the absence of such a functional demand, discourse theory lacks the practical 
power necessary to a feasible political theory. While Habermas apparently lacks this 
114 Habermas 1996, 408. 
115 Ibid., 166-7 (emphasis added). 
116 Ibid., 11 0. 
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additional element, Joshua Cohen has taken this approach one step further, and situated 
within the deliberative context a practical requirement of the kind we are looking for. 
Cohen 
While Habermas relies upon the ideal speech situation to evaluate the outcomes of 
deliberative democracy and their reasonable justifiability, Joshua Cohen builds upon this 
construct to propose an ideal deliberative procedure, which he argues must be imitated as 
far as possible by actual democratic institutions: 
The notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a 
democratic association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of 
association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal 
citizens. Citizens in such an order share a commitment to the resolution of 
problems of collective choice through public reasoning and regard their basic 
institutions as legitimate insofar as they establish the framework for free public 
deliberation. 117 
Whereas Habermas seeks to evaluate political outcomes on the basis of whether or not 
they could have been generated from within the ideal speech situation, Cohen's approach 
is much more grounded in reality: he wants to evaluate the legitimacy of political 
institutions insofar as they actually resemble the ideal deliberative procedure: "the ideal 
deliberative procedure is meant to provide a model for institutions to mirror."118 This 
procedure is characterized by four features. First, deliberation must be free in two ways: 
citizens must be bound only by the outcomes of their deliberation and any necessary 
preconditions for that deliberation, and they are free (and assume themselves to be free) 
to act on the outcomes of those deliberations. Second, deliberation should be reasoned in 
that all proposed outcomes should be backed by reasons and attacked by reasons - all of 
117 Cohen 2009a, 21. 
118 Ibid., 23. 
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which are public in the sense that they are accessible to all. Third, the participants in the 
deliberation must be formally and substantively equal, in the manner outlined above. 
And finally, the aim of rational deliberation must be to arrive at a consensus. Even 
though a consensus may not always, or even frequently, be the outcome of deliberation, 
the fact of entering into deliberation with consensus as an actual goal will generate 
different outcomes than a mere aggregation of non-deliberative preferences (before or 
after bargaining), as the goal of consensus will motivate a discussion based on "a free and 
reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals."119 Actual political arrangements are seen 
to be legitimate to the extent that they approximate this ideal. 
One distinctive feature of Cohen's deliberative account is his explicit emphasis on 
common good reasoning in deliberation as one of the primary features of deliberative 
democracy. Using Rawls' notion of a well-ordered democracy, Cohen argues that 
political debate should be organized in a manner that recognizes the presence of 
alternative conceptions of the public good, and that because of this pluralism of views of 
the common good, political debate should not be conducted on the basis of self- or group-
interest. Recall that one of the core commitments of the deliberative democrat is the 
reason-giving requirement, a commitment to public deliberation on the basis of reasons 
that are accessible to all political participants: "outcomes are democratically legitimate if 
and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals."120 
Additionally, deliberation should be conducted with the goal of securing agreement 
among all participants to the deliberation. Cohen reasons that if deliberators are truly 
committed to reaching a consensus, then they will realize that they cannot offer self-
119 Ibid., 25. 
120 Ibid., 23. 
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interested reasons for their political preferences. Citizens being limited in this way 
regarding the arguments they bring to public deliberation, the deliberative process will 
eventually function to shape the content of citizen preferences: "the discovery that I can 
offer no persuasive reasons on behalf of a proposal of mine may transform the 
preferences that motivate the proposal."121 So while initially, individuals will attempt to 
offer public reasons for outcomes which are actually preferred on the basis of self-
interest, the deliberative process will ultimately shape their preferences and common 
good reasoning will dominate both public deliberation as well as individual political 
preferences. The common good, then, ends up being comprised of precisely those 
interests and aims which survive the deliberative process because after reflection they are 
considered legitimate to appeal to in making claims on public resources. 
This approach captures two of the most important aspects of deliberative 
democracy: that deliberation should be responsive to "no force except that of the better 
argument,"122 and that the parties to deliberation should be substantively equal in terms of 
the voice they have in the decision. That said, it is not an approach which is adopted by 
all deliberative democrats. This is, in fact, one of the ongoing disputes among 
deliberative democrats- whether consensus must be met on a comprehensive common 
good (what Gutmann and Thompson call a thick common good), or if there need be only 
agreement on basic principles along with a recognition of pluralism as intractable and a 
more modest goal of fair cooperation among competing conceptions. 123 Although his 
insistence on common good reasoning does make Cohen more vulnerable to certain 
objections to which other accounts are less susceptible, this aspect of Cohen's theory is 
121 Ibid., 25-7. 
122 Habennas 1975, 108. 
123 Gutmann and Thompson 2004,26-7. 
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not where I will focus my objections. Alternative conceptions of deliberative democracy 
which do not admit of this theoretical commitment should be equally vulnerable to the 
arguments presented below, especially insofar as they all espouse a commitment to the 
need for individuals to make arguments on the basis of reasons which all can accept - a 
commitment which is, as far as I can tell, universally accepted by deliberative theorists. 
The fact that I have relied upon Cohen's account is due only to its being the most well 
known, and does not mitigate the impact of the empirical findings I present on the 
breadth of deliberative theories. 
A Wrench in the Gears: The Empirical Realities 
The ideal of deliberative democracy is complex, and involves many factors which must 
come together in order to manifest the reason, equality, and autonomy that are at the root 
of its intuitive appeal. The importance of these aspects of deliberative democracy cannot 
be overemphasized. The notion of autonomy takes on a more substantive meaning than 
traditional democratic conceptions of self-rule, for which a procedural voice might 
suffice. There is an implicit extension of the notion of autonomy to include the ability to 
partake in the deliberative process with other rational members of the political 
community in attempting to derive the shared rules for society. 124 The implication is that 
autonomy includes the ability to reason with others in a productive manner. On the other 
hand, equality also plays a central role in deliberative politics. The requirement that 
reasons be acceptable to all implies that both individuals and their interests are equal, 
such that each person's ability to accept the rational basis for policy decisions plays a 
decisive role. The ability of each individual to take part equally in the deliberative 
124 Rosenberg 2007, 339. 
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process is also a pre-requisite for substantive autonomy: To the extent that any individual 
is able to exercise a less-than-equal say in the deliberative process, her political autonomy 
is compromised, demonstrating the interconnectedness of these key theoretical values. 
What all of this implies is that although the substantive ideals referred to by the 
deliberative democrat can be discussed independently of one another, there is a complex 
interaction between all of the normative facets of this kind of theory. In the following 
sections, I have attempted to address first the epistemic claims made by deliberative 
democrats, followed by an analysis of the plausibility of the requirements for autonomy 
and substantive equality. When considering these components in light of empirical 
findings, however, it would be near impossible to completely separate them. It is often 
the case that the empirical evidence which undermines one of these important aspects of 
deliberative theory also speaks to others. (For example, concerns regarding the arbitrary 
influence of order of speakers on the outcomes of deliberation is mentioned primarily as 
undermining the claim that deliberation provides a privileged route to what is ultimately a 
better outcome for political decision-making. This same evidence also speaks 
importantly against the feasibility of individuals manifesting the kind of substantive 
autonomy demanded by the deliberative ideal.) Where possible, I have attempted to 
indicate where the data speaks to more than one of these important values of deliberation; 
however, it is entirely possible that in the complexity of the interactions between these 
aspects I have not highlighted all of the ways in which this evidence can be brought to 
bear. What is important to take away from the discussion is that the key components of 
deliberative theory, as an integrated whole, are undermined to a significant extent by the 
empirical data regarding the behavior of groups involved in deliberation, as well as the 
apparent rational incapacity of many members of society. 
Deliberative Pathologies 
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Across deliberative theories, there is either an implicit or explicit claim that the outcomes 
of deliberation will in some sense be better than the outcomes of mere aggregation or 
other forms of majority rule. Whether interpreted to mean that the outcomes will be more 
just, or more likely to promote the interests of society, or something else entirely, the 
claim is made that the outcomes of deliberation are more legitimate not only due to the 
procedural values of autonomy and substantive equality, but because they are 
substantively superior to the outcomes of other decision-making procedures. In fact, 
however, there is a great deal of evidence suggesting that deliberation as a form of 
collective decision-making is susceptible to a number of persistent pathologies which 
undermine this core claim. 
Two of the better-documented forms of deliberative pathology are self-
censorship, which leads deliberation towards uniformity rather than diversity in ideas 
(therefore limiting rather than increasing the epistemic content of the discussion), and 
what Irving Janis called groupthink. 125 Studies have shown that deliberating groups tend 
towards the correct decision only when a good number of the members of the group 
already tend towards that decision before deliberation. In an unfortunate manifestation of 
Condorcet's results, when the correct or more rational answer is in the minority at the 
beginning of deliberation, it is far more likely that the majority's incorrect bias will guide 
the group's collective decision, and no epistemic gain will be made from having the less 
125 Ibid., 336. 
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popular opinions voiced within the group. Deliberation actually exacerbates systematic 
bias, as when individual members of a deliberating group enter into the deliberation with 
a bias or erroneous position, deliberation often pushes them towards an even more biased 
or erroneous position than the one they began with. Especially when the discussion 
centers on brainstorming problems rather than problems which have clear, concrete 
answers - which are precisely the types of problems likely to be encountered in a 
political deliberation- deliberating groups far under-perform a mere statistical 
aggregation ofthe individual members' original preferences. 126 
Studies have also shown that the order in which individuals speak within a 
deliberating group can have a significant effect on both the willingness of speakers to 
share information that others in the group don't have, as well as, consequently, on the 
outcomes of deliberation. 127 For example, if several members of the deliberating group 
express one position, individuals with an opposing position may be less likely to voice 
their dissent. Or, if they do voice it, they may not do so as strongly as otherwise. To the 
extent that deliberation is meant to produce "legitimate" or "superior" outcomes, it is 
unclear how to account for this strange phenomenon. If the order of speech can impact 
the outcome of deliberation in this manner, then the claim that the outcome will in some 
way be better than decisions made via other procedures seems to lose some of its force: If 
members had just taken turns differently, the result might have been radically different! 
This particular phenomenon also appears to undermine the supposed equality and 
autonomy of deliberation participants, since the arbitrariness of the order of speech can 
reduce the likelihood that an individual can effectively pursue her policy preferences. 
126 Sunstein 2006, 57-60. 
127 Austen-Smith 1995, 6. 
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This same arbitrariness also demonstrates the pervasive nature of external influences on 
rational preference-formation, which is in direct contradiction to the substantive 
autonomy deliberative democracy is argued to promote. Additional studies have shown 
that deliberation often leads individuals to agree to decisions which are in conflict with 
their considered judgments, decisions which they later come to regret, again 
demonstrating not only that the outcomes of deliberation may not be privileged, but that 
in fact they may represent the paradigm of non-autonomous decision-making for many 
members ofthe deliberating body. 128 
Perhaps the most important pathology is the amplifying affect of deliberation. 
When the individuals who comprise a deliberating group suffer from systematic biases, 
these biases are amplified by the deliberative process. 129 Deliberation often pushes 
participants to even greater extremes in their views than those they started out with, 
causing group polarization instead of leading to considered consensus. This phenomenon 
is heightened when the deliberating group is composed primarily of like-minded 
individuals or persons who identify strongly with each other as members of a particular 
sub-group, such as a political party. In these cases, deliberating members who are not 
considered part of the "group" (the sub-group) have greatly reduced influence within the 
deliberative process due to a form of dissent-suppression, while polarization of the sub-
group members becomes even more extreme. 130 Such data again suggests that 
deliberation results in a degradation of the potential outcome, rather than an 
improvement, but also speaks importantly against the potential of individual's having a 
truly equal opportunity to influence the outcomes of deliberation. These amplification 
128 Ryfe 2005, 54. 
129 Sunstein 2006, 78-9. 
130 Sunstein 2003, 81-5. 
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effects can also compound the negative effects of rational bias: Framing issues (discussed 
below) can become more acute, leading to a more extreme and dug-in preference for the 
status quo, for example, or polarization can become more severe. And a commitment to a 
given policy decision, even in the light of evidence of its failure, can become more 
d 1 . d 131 eep y engrame . 
Both the phenomena of sequence-affected outcome and the amplification of 
systematic biases indicate the ability for manipulative-minded individuals to have 
significant harmful effects on the deliberative process. Sunstein points out the possibility 
of "polarization entrepreneurs" who could be in the business of encouraging and 
reinforcing group identification with extreme views, so as to manipulate the outcomes of 
deliberation, 132 a suggestion that is particularly cogent in light of current tendencies in 
mainstream American politics, where polarization is indeed seized upon and magnified in 
the service of a few individuals. 
Despite these findings, we should question the relevance of studies conducted on 
small deliberative groups to the larger public sphere. The studies cited by Sunstein and 
others were conducted in small, face-to-face settings, whereas democratic deliberation 
takes place across the greater political community. David Estlund questions the 
generalizability of the results, therefore, and suggests that we shift our focus onto 
deliberation's ability to lead to changes of perspective or to generate more accurate 
decisions. 133 
The generalizability of results to larger groups appears to be less of an issue than 
Estlund presumes, however. We can see this by examining the specific differences which 
131 Sunstein 2006, 79. 
132 Sunstein 2003, 88. 
133 Estlund 2009b, 17-8. 
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exist between large-scale political deliberation and those smaller deliberative contexts 
which are the typical subjects of empirical research on group decision-making. 
The first and most obvious difference is the number of participants. Estlund 
questions whether such a difference might mitigate some of the effects previously 
discussed. However, research into the effects of group size on deliberative interaction 
have shown that participation in a larger group actually amplifies many of the effects 
already addressed. For example, LePine and Van Dyne found that individuals were less 
inclined to voice their own opinions and perspectives in larger groups, both undermining 
deliberation's potential for epistemic gain, as well as exacerbating problems related to the 
equality of individual participants. 134 It has also been shown that as group size increases, 
individual members feel less responsible for the outcome of deliberation and are therefore 
less likely to put forward their own ideas, or to voice them strongly. 135 Group size turns 
out to be inversely related to the volume of new idea generation. 136 Such evidence 
suggests that as the size of a deliberating group increases, the role of dominant 
personalities will likewise increase, as more apprehensive members of the group feel 
pressure to conform. Group size will consequently have a negative effect on the 
epistemic value of deliberation, since new ideas are less likely to emerge. This despite 
the logical necessity that in a larger group there will be at least as many individual 
perspectives as in a smaller one, and likely far more. 
The larger scale of political deliberation generates a greater necessity for 
organization in the deliberative process. The sheer number of participants indicates that 
some kind of grouping will have to occur in order for any other than a very few 
134 LePine and Van Dyne 1998. 
135 Latane and Wolf 1981. 
136 Burgoon and Dunbar 2000. 
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participants to have their voice heard. Even in Athens, a relatively small democracy by 
modem standards, it is likely that most of the public deliberations were dominated by a 
very small number of speakers, as there was simply not time or opportunity for every 
individual to have an input. 137 This limit seems naturally to suggest political parties, or 
else organization into community- or location-based sub-populations. However, as 
discussed above, the great extent to which individuals associate themselves with groups, 
the more extreme polarization tends to become. The establishment of such groups also 
limits the options available to those whose perspectives are not adequately represented in 
the existing conglomerates. They must either join a party as it already exists, sacrificing 
some of their considered viewpoints to the position of the group as a whole, or maintain 
independence and suffer from a marginalized impact on the outcome of deliberation. 
Another salient fact regarding political deliberation on a large scale is that not all 
participants can participate at the same time. Given the size of the deliberating body in a 
modem political setting, one all-inclusive deliberative discussion will not be possible. 
Deliberations will need to be iterated across smaller overlapping sub-sets of the 
population in order to reach the level of inclusivity required by the deliberative ideal. 
Such iterations of deliberation, however, have been shown to increase the effects of 
polarization: the more times an issue is discussed and debated, the more extreme 
alternative positions tend to become. 138 Polarizing effects are likely to be further 
compounded by the need for some kind of centralized media to maintain the discussion, 
resulting in greater informational, and thus manipulative, power for those in control of 
the informative apparatus. 
137 Dahll989, 21. 
138 Sunstein 2003, 86. 
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Each of the above considerations suggests that the results of empirical studies on 
deliberating groups will generalize to the larger body politic. Not only do they 
demonstrate that deliberative pathologies will be exacerbated by an increase in the size of 
the deliberation; additionally the evidence demonstrates that the concerns outlined below 
regarding substantive equality and autonomy are compounded by the large scale of actual 
political deliberation. 
Dennis Thompson tries a different approach to the empirical data regarding 
deliberation. He argues that the normative value of deliberation is not necessarily in its 
outcome. Rather, he would shift the emphasis to the procedural aspects of deliberation, 
and argue that it is the legitimating function of mutual justification that is essential to the 
deliberative approach to democracy. Equal participation, equal respect, and public-
spiritedness play the justificatory role, and so the outcomes of deliberation, even when 
affected by the types of deliberative pathologies discussed above, are not the basis upon 
which we judge a procedure's success. 139 Below I will discuss the likelihood of 
substantively equal participation in the deliberative process, but what of Thompson's 
additional claim that the outcome of deliberation is not important? That, rather, the 
legitimacy of deliberation resides only in its procedural components? The claim that 
Thompson appears to be making is that the normative value of democracy resides only in 
the procedural aspects of its generation, and that there is, and should be, no appeal to 
what David Estlund terms procedure-independent values in the justification of 
deliberative outcomes. 140 If this claim is accurate, then objections from the direction of 
139 Thompson 2008, 504. 
140 Estlund 2008. 
empirical data regarding deliberative pathologies become moot. The claim is therefore 
worth examining. 
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Estlund examines the notion of deliberative democracy as purely procedural in 
Democratic Authority. As I have done above, he focuses on Habermas and Cohen as 
paradigm instances of deliberative theory, and argues quite convincingly that despite their 
protests to the contrary, both of their theories do rely for normative force on procedure-
independent values. 
Habermas makes the claim that the only way to evaluate political decisions is to 
look at the procedures via which they were, or could have been, produced. It is the latter, 
hypothetical aspect which Estlund seizes upon. According to Habermas, political 
decisions are legitimate if they could have been produced by ideal deliberative 
procedures. This means that a political decision can not be evaluated on the basis of the 
decision procedure which produced it alone - it is quite possible that a decision which 
was not reached in accordance with procedural rationality might still be legitimate, 
because it could have been. As Estlund rightly points out, this amounts to a procedurally-
independent means of evaluating political decisions. The normative basis for the justice 
of a political outcome is not the procedure via which it was reached, but rather whether it 
meets the hypothetical of potential production via a legitimate route, providing a 
"substantive procedure-independent standard" by which political outcomes are 
reached. 141 The evaluation of outcomes would therefore entail a substantive account 
regarding what kinds of outcomes are capable of being justified on reasons which are 
acceptable to all, and seems to open the door to an objective account of what laws are 
legitimate. Such an objective standard, however, would undermine the procedural basis 
141 Ibid., 88-9. 
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for legitimacy, and instead allow us to import our pre-conceived intuitions regarding the 
legitimacy of rule. 
Cohen is unlike Habermas in that he insists that actual political decision-making 
should model the hypothetical ideal to the greatest extent possible. Given this, he is able 
to sidestep Estlund's critique ofHabermas, since the actual procedure by which decisions 
are reached is essential to the legitimacy of the political outcome, and no hypothetical 
justification is used as a substantive normative criterion for the evaluation of said 
outcomes. However, for Cohen the procedural basis of legitimacy includes the 
requirement that any political decision must be able to be justified on the basis of reasons 
which can be accepted by all reasonable citizens, what Cohen calls the principle of 
deliberative inclusion. To fail to provide reasons which they can acknowledge as 
legitimate "is to deny them standing as equal citizens" and constitutes a "failure of 
democracy."142 In this way, Cohen, like Habermas, imports an additional constraint 
beyond the mere procedural. It is not enough that the ideal deliberative procedure was 
modeled to as close an extent as possible; in order to be legitimate the outcomes of such 
procedures must meet an additional, procedure-independent standard: that of being 
justifiable in terms acceptable to all reasonable citizens. 143 
Thompson himself seems to commit himself to a similar claim in a co-authored 
work with Amy Gutmann. In Why Deliberative Democracy?, they argue that democratic 
principles have both procedural and substantive dimensions. Although it is the case that 
the substantive dimension does not necessarily have to be cashed out in epistemic terms, 
the legitimacy of deliberative democracy is heavily grounded in the substantive notions 
142 Cohen 1996, I 03. 
143 Estlund 2008, 91-2. 
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of autonomy and equality, and these criteria are used as external standards by which to 
evaluate the outcomes of deliberation. For example, Thompson and Gutmann suggest the 
possibility that a procedurally valid deliberation may generate an outcome which is 
supported by the vast majority but nonetheless can not be justified in terms that the 
minority could reasonably accept. Despite the procedural validity of this outcome's 
generation, they argue that the reasoning from which it arose "denies members of the 
minority group the status of free and equal persons."144 They have made similar 
arguments regarding the inability of deliberative democracy to get off the ground as a 
purely procedural account elsewhere, and its need for additional, substantive principles. 
145 
So although there does not have to be recognition of an epistemic component to 
deliberation, deliberative democrats do seem to want to be able to evaluate the outcomes 
of political decision-making on the basis of some kind of substantive procedure-
independent standard. Although most theorists place some weight on the outcomes of 
deliberation in terms of epistemic value, those who do not devote a lot of attention to the 
epistemic facet of deliberation tend instead to focus the bulk of their justificatory energy 
on the theory's more central claims regarding equality and autonomy. It is these claims 
to which I now tum. 
The Twin Towers of Deliberation: Equality and Autonomy 
Recall that the deliberative process is argued to promote and protect a special kind of 
autonomy for citizens. Individuals are to take part in their own governance, and to have 
144 Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 103-4. 
145 Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Gutmann and Thompson 2002. 
input into the deliberative process that is their own in a deep sense - that is, not 
influenced by external factors such as residing in a position of subordination, having 
access to less economic or social power, or manifesting adaptive preferences. 
Complimentary to this is a strong emphasis on equality: citizens must have an equal 
opportunity to influence the outcomes of deliberation, and the outcomes of deliberation 
must be justifiable to all who will be governed by them. 
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What does an "equal opportunity to influence the outcome" really entail? If it 
means merely that everyone has the same chance to participate in the deliberative 
process, then it's not clear what advantage to equality is gained over an aggregative 
approach to democracy: those with more privileged backgrounds and better educations 
are likely to be better at giving persuasive arguments and to have a greater impact on the 
outcomes of deliberation, just as in an aggregative approach they would be more likely to 
be competent at pursuing their interests electorally. It seems, then, that in order for 
deliberative democracy to be able to use equality as a point in its favor, a far more 
substantive conception of equality has to be playing this role. On the one hand, 
deliberative democrats must show that deliberation promotes or furthers the kind of 
equality they are interested in to a greater extent than other conceptions. On the other 
hand, it must also be the case that it is empirically and conceptually possible to establish 
the kind of equality that deliberative democracy requires to function the way its 
proponents claim it will. 
Obviously, the demand for equality cannot be interpreted to require that all ideas 
and views be treated equally within the deliberative framework, since the very purpose of 
deliberation is to allow for the "force of the better argument" to win the day. However, 
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deliberative institutions should protect competing ideas procedurally - that is, ensure that 
as many views as possible have an equal opportunity to be brought to bear on the 
deliberation, and that all of the arguments are evaluated on the basis of the force of the 
arguments only, and not ignored or given less influence due to arbitrary inequalities 
between the participants proposing them. Essentially, there should be ex ante neutrality 
among alternatives, a neutrality that resolves into favor for one alternative or another only 
in light of the deliberative process itself. 146 
This does not yet speak to the equality of the participants themselves. 
Deliberative democrats argue that deliberation respects the equality of participants in a 
way that aggregational accounts of democracy do not. This is cashed out in terms of an 
equal opportunity to influence the outcomes of deliberation. And this seems to entail 
more than the ex ante equality of proposals: in order for participants to have a 
substantively equal chance to influence the outcomes, they must have an equal chance of 
producing suggestions and making arguments which will survive the deliberative process. 
Jack Knight and James Johnson make a plausible case regarding the kind of equality of 
opportunity that must be at play for the deliberative democrat: on the one hand, 
asymmetries in social and economic power must not give unfair advantages to 
participants, highlighting the need for procedural requirements regarding the resources 
participants are allowed to employ in the deliberative process. On the other hand, social 
and economic asymmetries must not put anyone in a position of unfair disadvantage in 
deliberating itself, highlighting the need for a social distribution that guarantees all the 
personal resources necessary for effective and persuasive participation in deliberation. 147 
146 Knight and Johnson 1997, 287-8. 
147 Ibid., 292-6. 
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How we can guarantee the personal resources necessary for an equal opportunity 
to influence deliberation itself raises a host of questions in light of empirical data 
regarding the capacities of individuals. Leaving aside the direct influence of the 
distribution of economic goods on power dynamics within a deliberation, Knight and 
Johnson's account of politically relevant capacities describes three primary ways in 
which the equality of democratic deliberation may be indirectly undermined by 
inequalities of social power and resources. First and most obviously, there will be a basic 
discrepancy of cognitive capacities among participants in a deliberative democracy - it is 
a fact ofhumanity that different individuals have differing levels of rational ability. To 
the extent that some members of a polity lack the capacity to adequately express their 
political positions in the form of persuasive arguments, they will suffer an inequality in 
their opportunity to influence the outcomes of political decision-making. 148 Because of 
the emphasis on persuasion and public reason within the deliberative framework, even 
should an individual have a good, or valid, or "valuable" proposal - on whatever scale of 
value is appealed to -their inability to engage with other members of the deliberating 
group can adversely affect the chances of that proposal's adoption. 
A second capacity relevant to the equal opportunity for political influence relates 
to what Iris Marion Young referred to as linguistic "cultural imperialism." In order to be 
effectual in the deliberative process, disadvantaged and minority groups must be able to 
express their positions "in the language of the dominant groups in society."149 To the 
extent that they are less familiar with, or effectual in, the use of this dominant language, 
their ability to influence the political outcome will suffer relevant to those who occupy 
148 Ibid., 299. 
149 Ibid., 298. 
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more privileged social positions, allowing for social and economic disparity to impact the 
real opportunity individuals have to argue and persuade in favor of their preferred 
political outcome. 
Obviously, we don't need empirical "data" to show us that individuals have 
widely varying abilities to engage in rational thought and constructive dialogue. The 
claim that people are unequal in this regard is fairly intuitive. But the evidence 
demonstrates more than a mere difference in intelligence level or ability to reason. There 
is a significant amount of empirical data which suggests that the ability to reason 
specifically on the basis of public (or publicly accessible) reasons is both uncommon and 
unlikely among individuals. The kind of functioning which deliberative democracy 
demands requires a "relatively high level of ability for perspective taking [sic] and 
coordination of divergent perspectives."150 However, the bulk of research suggests that 
this ability -to reason in a manner that is accessible to other perspectives - is generally 
present only among those who possess an unusually advanced cognitive capacity, and 
that individuals in general do not manifest this level of "communicative competence." 
Rather, research such as Kohlberg's well-known explorations of moral development 
suggests that most people never develop post-conventional moral reasoning, and as a 
result have great difficulty shifting to perspectives foreign to their own. Additionally, 
this deficiency causes an inability to "critically reflect on the conventional social mores 
and categories they use to guide their judgments of what is right and wrong," as well as 
an inability to recognize or meet the need to present their own views in a manner 
accessible to those with differences in understanding. 151 Rather, several studies have 
150 Reykowski 2006, 327-8. 
151 Rosenberg 2007, 345. 
91 
shown that individuals placed in contexts of conflict are more likely to manifest 
individualistic motivations and attempt to "dominate" others rather than treat them, or the 
positions they come from, as equals. 
What is perhaps most damaging to the deliberative theorist, however, relates to 
the ability to form authentic preferences- the third issue to which Knight and Johnson 
pay homage. The unequal distribution of resources within a society can motivate citizens 
to adopt new preferences which reflect the "diminished possibilities that ... result from 
being disadvantaged by an asymmetric distribution of resources."152 Preference-
formation is often predicated on an unconscious desire to "reduce cognitive dissonance 
by adjusting to undue limitations in current practices and opportunities."153 Insofar as 
this is the case, preferences may be considered non-autonomously formed -that is, 
influenced by factors external to the individual- violating deliberative democracy's 
commitment to autonomy in a way that also undermines claims regarding substantive 
equality: While all individuals may have some preferences which are influenced by 
external factors, if individuals in subordinate socioeconomic positions are forming their 
political intentions on the basis of those socioeconomic positions, their ability to have an 
equal opportunity to influence policy in a manner which reflects preferences which are 
independent of those socioeconomic positions is severely undermined. 
Recall that Cohen argues that such accommodationist preferences will be 
addressed via the deliberative process and its implicit recognition of the deliberative 
capacities of all participants to the deliberation. If this is correct, deliberative democracy 
would not require this kind of equality to exist external to the deliberative process, as it 
152 Knight and Johnson 1997, 298. 
153 Sunstein 1991, 21. 
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would foster and produce it through the deliberative process itself. How deliberation 
could have the impact Cohen claims for it is unclear, however. If accommodationist 
preferences are formed external to the deliberative process and then brought to the table 
by individual participants, this would merely imply that the accommodationist 
preferences are those which the participants are expressing and arguing on behalf of 
within deliberation - that the accommodationist preferences are those which are being 
accorded an equal opportunity to influence the deliberation. However, if individuals who 
are arbitrarily disadvantaged outside of the deliberative procedure are adopting and 
attempting to put forward preferences which are informed by that disadvantage, then it is 
unclear how the deliberative process is "neutralizing" the effects of social and economic 
disparities and furthering a more substantive political equality. This suggests that the 
kind of equality necessary for the formation of authentic preferences must exist ex ante -
so that deliberative democracy must not only promote the equality of its citizens, but also 
must exist in a context in which a kind of substantive equality is already present. If we 
don't have the requisite level of equality antecedently, then it does not look like 
deliberative democracy can function to produce the kind of substantive equality its 
adherents claim. 
This need for a certain level of antecedent equality raises a deeper, conceptual 
obstacle to the realization of the kind of equality deliberative democracy assumes. Due 
to the pervasiveness of differences in capacities, in order to equalize the opportunity to 
influence deliberative decision-making, it would not be enough to simply equalize the 
social and economic resources of the individuals participating. Amartya Sen 
acknowledges this fact about egalitarianism in general - that we can't be purely 
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interested in equalizing resources because ultimately, individuals have widely varied 
capacities to convert external resources into something more meaningful. 154 In the case 
of deliberative democracy, what is ultimately desired is an equal opportunity to influence 
the outcomes of political decision-making. It is plainly false that given the same 
resources, individuals would be able to manifest the same level of rational argument and 
persuasiveness, given the vast differential in natural capacities. 
What Sen proposes for true equality, and what others such as James Bohman have 
taken up in applying substantive equality to deliberative democracy, is a capacities 
approach to equality, which focuses not on equal outcomes but on equal possibilities. 
The approach seeks to equalize the best outcome which each individual could attain, 
given their resources and natural capacities. In this way, the focus is shifted onto the 
opportunities individuals actually have, recognizing that some have a better capacity for 
converting resources into favorable outcomes. Applying this approach to deliberative 
politics, we wouldn't seek to equalize the actual results, because of the intuitive idea that 
individuals should be held responsible for decisions they make which influence their 
ability to participate meaningfully in the political decision-making process. Rather, in 
recognition that individuals should not suffer disadvantages due to arbitrary differences 
in natural abilities or social or economic starting points, Bohman suggests that what 
should be equalized in a deliberative democracy are individuals' abilities- conceived of 
as possibilities based on their social status, persuasive abilities, and so on - to influence 
the decision-making process, should they focus their resources and time there rather than 
on other pursuits open to them. Bohman argues that an approach which takes its lead 
154 Sen 1992. 
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from this kind of conception of equality would be more effective at meeting the "equality 
of opportunity" requirement of deliberative democracy. 155 
The implicit problems with such an approach, however, are twofold. On the one 
hand, since we would not be seeking to equalize the actual impact that individuals have 
on deliberative processes, but rather their potential to impact deliberation, the causal 
connection between capacities and outcomes is not clear. Without the ability to 
determine the causal impact of one individual's participation on the deliberation, we will 
not know what constitutes equal capacities, and are left without a concrete understanding 
of what is necessary to guarantee it. What this entails is that the kind of equality required 
by deliberative democracy will be difficult, verging on impossible, to identify and 
promote. What's more, given that we are not in a position to judge the actual causal 
relationship between a member's capacities and their actual influence on the deliberative 
process, it would be difficult verging on impossible to apply the capabilities standard as a 
criterion to particular institutional arrangements and thereby judge whether they are 
actually meeting the requirement. 156 Although this does not amount to an empirical 
criticism of deliberative democracy, it does highlight an equally important conceptual 
obstacle which the deliberative democrat must face. 
In addition to this very difficult to enunciate, let alone achieve, notion of 
substantive equality which is at play in deliberative accounts of democracy, we must also 
return to the importance of autonomy. Recall that autonomy excludes the formation of 
preferences on the basis of influences external to our rational evaluation of the situation 
at hand. We took as our paradigm cases accommodationist and adaptive preferences; 
155 Bohman 1997,325-37. 
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however other external influences on our decision-making process are also capable of 
undermining our autonomy. The claim of the deliberative democrat is that the value of 
autonomy is an important normative basis for this approach to democracy, and that 
deliberative democracy is uniquely capable of providing citizens the opportunity to 
engage autonomously within the decision-making process due to its demand that 
decisions be made on the basis of reasons. What the evidence shows, however, is that 
the kind of reasons-based autonomous decision-making that deliberative democracy both 
demands and purports to achieve is not possible: external influences work to undermine 
the rational preference-formation of individuals in a number of ways and in a variety of 
different circumstances. 
Situational factors, for example, have been shown to have an unreasonably large 
and seemingly arbitrary impact on rational preference-formation. Empirical studies have 
demonstrated that innocuous environmental factors can have inexplicably large impacts 
on our behavior. John Doris cites several studies in which it was demonstrated that minor 
daily incidents can cause individuals to behave in drastically different ways. In one 
study, for example, individuals who found ten cents in the coin return of a pay phone 
were much more likely to stop and offer assistance to an individual who had dropped a 
pile of papers on a city sidewalk than those who found no change in the coin return when 
they looked. In another study, subjects were asked to participate in some unpaid research 
regarding teaching methods, then told either that they were running late, were right on 
time, or were ahead of schedule. Along the way, subjects encountered an individual on 
the side of the street who was in obvious physical distress. While 63% of those who had 
been told that they were ahead of schedule stopped to help the man, a mere 1 0% of those 
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who were "running late" offered assistance. 157 In another series of experiments set up by 
Schnall, Haidt, et al., subjects were asked to make moral judgments regarding written 
descriptions of certain scenarios and public policies. Subjects who had to make these 
judgments while surrounded by filth - sitting at a messy desk next to a trashcan 
overflowing with greasy pizza boxes and used tissues, for example - were far more likely 
to judge an action or policy as "wrong" or "extremely wrong" than subjects who were 
administered the same questionnaire under "clean" conditions characterized by a clean 
desk and an empty trash can. 158 
These and similar findings suggest that our decisions and judgments are 
inappropriately sensitive to situational factors which should not come into play in rational 
deliberation. Recall that the substantive notion of autonomy relied upon by deliberative 
democrats rests on the distinction between preferences and judgments which are truly 
"ours" versus those which are influenced by factors external to the individual. Our 
paradigm examples of this kind of external influence were accommodationist and 
adaptive preferences - preferences which are either consciously or unconsciously formed 
on the basis of the socioeconomic circumstances an individual finds herself in. 
Judgments or actions which are likewise strongly influenced by situational factors such as 
those in the studies Doris refers to similarly have their autonomous basis undermined. 
Perhaps more damning is evidence that our preferences are also susceptible to 
framing effects which undermine the authenticity of considered judgments. To recap 
from the preceding chapter, framing effects occur when "(often small) changes in the 
157 Doris 2002, 30-4. 
158 Schnall, Haidt, et al. 2008, II 01-2. 
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presentation of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion."159 
Above I presented the following example from Quattrone and Tversky: 
Imagine there were a presidential contest between two candidates, Frank and Carl. 
Frank wishes to keep the level of inflation and unemployment at its current level. 
The rate of inflation is currently at 42%, and the rate ofunemployment is 
currently at 15%. Carl proposes a policy that would decrease the rate of inflation 
by 19% while increasing the rate of unemployment by 7%. Suppose that as a 
citizen of Alpha, you were asked to cast your vote for either Frank or Carl. 
Imagine there were a presidential contest between two candidates, Frank and Carl. 
Carl wishes to keep the rate of inflation and unemployment at its current level. 
The rate of inflation is currently at 23%, and the rate of unemployment is 
currently at 22%. Frank proposes a policy that would increase the rate of inflation 
by 19% while decreasing the rate of unemployment by 7%. Suppose that as a 
citizen of Alpha, you were asked to cast your vote for either Frank or Carl. 160 
When this pair of scenarios was presented to study subjects, responses overwhelmingly 
favored the status quo, even though in both cases the outcomes are identical: Frank's 
policy of 42% inflation and 15% unemployment, versus Carl's policy of23% inflation 
and 22% unemployment. 65% of respondents chose Frank in the first scenario, while 
61% chose Carl in the second. The full body of studies conducted by Quattrone and 
Tversky demonstrate that context and framing both operate psychologically to sway the 
decisions of voters in an extra-rational manner that cannot be adequately accounted for 
via public reasons within a deliberative context, and which clearly demonstrates the 
operation of external factors on the preference-formation of individual voters. 
As mentioned earlier, there is also evidence that the order in which ideas are 
presented within a deliberating group can have significant effects on the sharing of 
information and the outcomes of deliberation. The kinds of arbitrary impact on the 
outcomes of deliberation that these and other studies highlight imply that deliberation as 
159 Chong and Druckman 2007, 104. 
160 Quattrone and Tversky [1988] 2000, 459. 
98 
a form of decision-making is hostage to factors external to the reasoning and preferences 
of participants, leaving no way to reliably determine whether a given arrangement 
actually treats alternative proposals equally or respects the authentic preferences of 
individual participants. 161 
Because it is impossible to judge the causal impact of individual's arguments on 
the outcomes of deliberation, it becomes near to impossible to judge whether substantive 
equality is being sufficiently maintained. This same inability makes it impossible to 
judge whether substantive equality is being maintained better than it might be under other 
institutional frameworks. Additionally, in light of the deep requirement of equality of 
opportunity to influence the outcomes of deliberation, it seems vastly unlikely that any 
instantiation of deliberative democracy that even closely resembles contemporary social 
reality will meet this criteria. Implicit in any claim that a deliberative framework could 
attain this standard of equality must be some fairly revisionist notion of what the social 
and economic distribution of society should actually look like. Add to this that evidence 
regarding the influence of external, and indeed arbitrary factors on the rational capacities 
of individuals who are party to a deliberation severely undermines claims that 
deliberation will in some way further the political autonomy of individual participants, 
and evidence of the pervasiveness of deliberative pathologies, and it seems that 
deliberative democrats have a large uphill battle to fight in proving their claims. 
The Empirical and the Ideal 
Although it is relatively clear how the foregoing empirical analysis works to undermine 
the deliberative theories of writers such as Joshua Cohen, Amy Gutmann, and Dennis 
161 Knight and Johnson 1997, 291. 
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Thompson, who focus on the qualities and capacities of actual citizens in a deliberative 
context, the generalization of this critique to the vision of Habermas, decidedly more 
ideal in its structure, is less clear. It is important to remember that the theory on offer 
from Habermas is one of a hypothetical discourse process, predicated on assumptions not 
regarding actual deliberation, but an idealized deliberative situation. It is not the case, for 
Habermas, that legitimate law must have been produced by the appropriate deliberative 
procedures, but rather that it could have been. As a result, objections based on empirical 
findings which undermine deliberation in its actuality seem misplaced. What can the 
empirically-minded say to Habermas? 
I think this question misses the mark. Habermas is only relevant to democratic 
theory insofar as he is either offering a justification of our current instantiation of 
democratic principles, or else is arguing in favor of some alternative arrangement to what 
we currently have. It is not clear that he's doing either of these things. Due to the 
hypothetical nature of his approach to deliberation, his argument does not serve to ground 
deliberative democracy as the only valid system of rule. In fact, any system would 
suffice, as long as the outcomes ofthat system were capable of meeting the requirements 
of the discourse principle. It is actually not clear that there is anything empirically 
relevant in Habermas' s account, in which case his arguments are interesting, but do not 
speak to the question at hand. On the other hand, if he is offering some kind of empirical 
test of our political institutions, it seems likely that his recommendations don't go beyond 
what is on offer from Cohen or Gutmann and Thompson. If this is the case, then the 
above arguments make contact with him to the same extent to which they do more 
explicitly practical accounts. 
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What is Left? 
In light of the preceding discussion, how damaged is the deliberative approach to 
democracy? Many of the studies cited were actually conducted with the hope of pointing 
to new directions in which to take deliberative theory, or perhaps new ways of 
implementing deliberation within a political community in order to reduce the effects of 
arbitrary external factors and deliberative pathologies on the outcomes of joint decision-
making.162 New or inventive deliberative structures may minimize or even entirely 
alleviate the effects of deliberative pathologies on the feasibility of a productive 
deliberative process. My intuition is that this is unlikely, however. The unavoidable 
scale of political deliberation necessitates characteristics of deliberation such as political 
parties, representation, and iterated debates - each of which tends to compound rather 
than relieve the pathological pressure. 
The evidence regarding the feasibility of manifesting a substantive equality of the 
kind that legitimate deliberative democracy demands is even more damning. The 
implementation of the kind of equality of opportunity that deliberation requires would 
verge on the impossible, as would any evaluation of the resulting institution in terms of 
whether they met their mark. The influence of external factors on the reasoning and 
preference-formation of individual participants further suggests that the kind of political 
autonomy in decision-making which the deliberative democrat wishes to promote is not 
grounded in a realistic understanding of the manipulability of average individuals. The 
persistence of the individual's inability to take the perspectives of other political 
participants and the incapacity of the average person to formulate or express her 
preferences in terms available to other perspectives suggests that deliberation conducted 
162 For example, Sunstein 2006, Rosenberg 2007. 
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on the basis of mutually-available reasons is unlikely. These concerns are likely to 
persist however deliberation is structured: non-contingent facts about individual 
rationality and deliberative capacities will continue to undermine deliberative outcomes 
regardless ofthe institutional context. 
Given the difficulty of fleshing out and implementing the kind of equality 
required to ground deliberative democracy, I will tum finally to egalitarian accounts of 
democracy, which focus their attention on the fairness of the democratic procedure itself. 
The hope of egalitarians is to avoid the kinds of critiques I have so far offered which 
focus their attention on the outcomes of political decision-making, and instead rely upon 
the egalitarian treatment of citizens within the democratic process. 
CHAPTER4 
EGALITARIANISM 
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The previous two chapters have focused on accounts of democratic legitimacy which rely 
in part or entirely on the instrumental value of democratic procedures. What I called 
"interest-based" accounts grounded democratic legitimacy in the connection between the 
outcomes of democratic procedures and the interests of citizens. Deliberative accounts, 
on the other hand, rested in part on the claim that public deliberation on the basis of 
reasons can produce epistemically superior outcomes to mere aggregative procedures of 
decision-making. In each case, the instrumental claims of theorists were demonstrated to 
be predicated on erroneous empirical assumptions. 
Deliberative accounts of democracy also signaled a tum towards procedural 
concerns, insofar as they claimed that the deliberative process embodied a certain kind of 
respect for the equality and autonomy of citizens. For the deliberative democrat, this 
claim is situated within a further instrumental claim - that deliberation can promote these 
important ideals. Egalitarian conceptions of democracy, on the other hand, are likewise 
grounded in a recognition of the basic moral equality between members of society, but 
eschew any claims regarding the kinds of decisions democratic procedures are likely to 
produce. Rather, given the persistent disagreement among citizens about how best to 
organize society, the egalitarian asks how we can resolve those disagreements in a way 
which takes the basic moral equality of citizens into account. The intuition is that the 
political decision-making process ought to be one which treats all citizens equally, and 
the egalitarian argues that democracy is uniquely capable of meeting this criterion. The 
problem for the democratic theorist then becomes how best to characterize the egalitarian 
aspect of democracy. In this chapter I look first at two simplistic egalitarian accounts and 
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at the conceptual objections to them which have already been adequately formulated in 
the literature. Then, I turn to more sophisticated egalitarian accounts of democracy in 
order to determine whether they can better withstand objections from the social sciences 
than their instrumental and deliberative counterparts. 
Fairness as Pure Proceduralism 
Perhaps the most intuitive way to resolve persistent disagreements is to devise a fair 
procedure. One might naturally argue that the best way to respect the basic moral 
equality of all citizens is to have a procedure for decision-making which is fair to 
everyone. Majoritarian democracy, construed as a system of decision-making which 
gives each individual one vote, appears to be procedurally fair. Therefore, democracy 
must be the most suitable decision-making apparatus. 
We might describe this kind of defense of democracy as "pure proceduralism." 
The pure proceduralist claim is that democracy is justified due to the procedural fairness 
of democratic procedures, and not due to any procedurally-independent standard such as 
the justness of the outcomes, or other instrumental benefit. Such an account might 
initially seem quite attractive: a procedural defense of democracy would not be obviously 
vulnerable to any of the empirical worries I have so far raised for interest-based and 
deliberative theories. 
This is a little too quick, however. As David Estlund points out, the notion of 
fairness does not uniquely pick out democratic decision-making. If a couple are arguing 
over whether to spend their hard-earned savings on a vacation or on a new couch, for 
example, the epitome of a fair procedure for making the decision would be to flip a coin. 
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Yet no one would take seriously the suggestion that the best way to make political 
decisions would be to roll a many-sided die, or to use some alternative "fair" method of 
random selection. 163 The implication is that there must be some feature of democratic 
procedures in addition to their fairness by virtue of which they are preferable to these 
other fair procedures for political decision-making. An adequate account of democratic 
legitimacy must be capable of filling in this gap: what is it that makes democratic 
procedures more legitimate than a simple random drawing from a hat? The answer 
Estlund gives to this question is that we think that political decision-making needs to be 
sensitive not only to procedural equality, but also to the distribution of interests and 
preferences across individual members of the polity. What is needed in addition to 
fairness is what Estlund calls "aggregativity:" a sensitivity to the ends of those who had 
an input into the process, such that different decision outcomes reflect different 
distributions of voter ends. 164 Specifically, we think that the outcomes of political 
decision-making should be determined by the "cumulative impact of multiple inputs [and 
that] relevantly similar inputs should be considered cumulatively."165 In other words, if 
individual voters were to change their preferences, or if the distribution of preferences 
were to change such that the cumulative favor for outcomes shifted, these changes ought 
to impact the outcome of the procedure. 
Fairness and Compromise 
Peter Singer attempts to define a fair procedure in a manner which reflects the importance 
of aggregativity by shifting the emphasis from "fairness" simpliciter to fairness as 
163 Estlund 2003, 71. 
164 Estlund 2008, 66-83. 
165 Estlund 1990, 402-3. 
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compromise. The situations in which political decision-making processes are relevant are 
those in which there are persistent substantive disagreements about how to best organize 
our society and the rules which govern it. Although we often think of "compromising" as 
meeting in the middle or dividing outcomes evenly, but the types of substantive 
disagreement which are characteristic of political debate frequently involve various 
incompatible claims, and occur in scenarios where we cannot, for example, "split the 
difference." For example, if a group of friends is divided on whether to spend the 
evening at the Ginger Man drinking micro-brews, or down the street at the Kelvin Arms 
enjoying good Scotch, a reasonable compromise might be to divide the evening and 
spend an hour or two at each. Political disagreements are not often of the kind that such a 
substantive compromise is a possibility, however. In this scenario, Singer claims that an 
alternative way to compromise is to divide the decision-making power equally instead, 
and this is what democratic procedures are meant to do. 
To illustrate what he has in mind, Singer asks us to imagine a situation in which 
all of the members of our community have taken part in an equal majoritarian vote. 
Perhaps we were deciding whether to install a fountain in front of city hall or a small rose 
garden. After the vote is concluded, a member who found herself in the minority 
nevertheless still feels her favored outcome is superior. And so, rather than accepting 
that the majority voted for the fountain, she spends the town's money and has a rose 
garden installed instead. In essence, she has acted on the basis of her own preference in a 
way which affects all of us, rather than accepting the decision which the majority made. 
According to Singer, we can interpret this member's behavior as demonstrating that our 
dispute was not about the substantive issue upon which we voted (the fountain or the rose 
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garden), but rather about the decision procedure itself. Specifically: this member seemed 
to think that she should have a greater say in the outcome of our decision-making than 
any other member in the collective. Ultimately, then, Singer wants us to reconceive of 
fair compromise in a situation of incompatible substantive claims as a compromise on the 
procedure itself: each member of the collective wants most of all to make the decision 
herself. Since we cannot compromise on the issues, due to incompatibility and potential 
incommensurability, we must instead focus on those commensurable procedural claims 
upon which we can compromise. And the fairest compromise is to distribute the 
decision-making power equally. 166 
Singer's fair compromise account suffers from the same inability to single out 
democracy as the more simplistic pure procedural fairness, however. As Thomas 
Christiano has pointed out, there are important differences between compromising on the 
substance of a disagreement and compromising on a procedure for settling the dispute. 
Singer suggests that because we can't always "find the average" across disparate policy 
preferences, that procedural compromise can serve as an adequate stand-in for 
substantive compromise. But his suggestion that it is, in fact, procedure which we are 
arguing about is simply false: If it were the case that the entire population always agreed, 
we wouldn't still argue over who should get to make decisions. We are interested in 
having an input, because we think the preferences of that guy over there are wrong! The 
problem for Singer is therefore that the two different types of compromise could result in 
different outcomes, and in most cases, they will. If, as seems natural, what we are truly 
interested in is a fair compromise which takes into account the content of individual 
positions, then it is not clear that democratic decision-making alone can fill that role, or if 
166 Singer 1973, 32-5. 
it can fill that role at all. We might instead look to an independent arbitrator, for 
example. 
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Singer could perhaps anticipate this response, by saying something like the 
following: "sure, we could use an arbitrator instead, if we could only agree on who the 
arbitrator ought to be!" However, this reply points directly to the deeper problem with 
Singer's move to procedural compromise. If the procedure itself is what we are 
compromising on, then just as we might disagree on who should arbitrate if we were 
using an arbitrator, we might likewise disagree about the fair way to compromise on our 
decision-making procedure: There could be more than one fair way in which to 
compromise on the decision-making procedure, and if we could not agree on which to 
use, then we would again need to compromise on the decision-making procedure for 
selecting the decision-making procedure. The problem here is regressional, so that 
procedural compromise is itself ultimately self-defeating. 
This leads directly to the final reason why Singer's account does not show that 
democracy uniquely satisfies his criterion of fair compromise: if our dispute is 
procedural, then giving everyone an equal say is not necessarily a fair compromise. What 
constitutes a fair compromise will be determined by our starting points. Singer's fair 
compromise would only result in democratic procedures in the empirically contingent 
circumstance in which all individuals initially want to make the decision for everyone 
themselves. But this is not necessarily the case. We can imagine a situation in which a 
good portion of individuals would prefer that Derrick rule, while each of the remaining 
individuals wanted the ruling power for themselves. In this situation, a "fair" 
compromise might result in a division of power which gave to Derrick a great deal of 
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influence, and to each other individual a share of the remainder. Looking at it another 
way: if a good-sized minority of individuals began with the preference that political 
power should be shared equally, while a majority each preferred their own rule, then 
democratic procedures involving "one person, one vote" would not be a fair compromise. 
That would instead be giving the minority what they wanted, at the expense of the 
majority's preferences. 167 In order to maintain Singer's argument, there would need to be 
good empirical reason to believe that each individual wants to determine the outcome on 
each separate vote, and the facts seem to suggest otherwise. Individuals often have some 
issues which they feel more strongly about than others, and often will get involved 
politically only when those issues are at stake. This fact alone suggests that it is not the 
case that each individual always wants the procedure to be such that she gets to decide for 
everyone. 
Equal Consideration of Interests 
A more plausible means of establishing that democracy uniquely reflects the principle of 
equality is to argue that it accords equal consideration to each person's interests in the 
political decision-making process, through its central features of equal enfranchisement 
and majority rule. 168 Each individual is accorded an equal chance to express her 
preference, and therefore to pursue her interests, through the franchise, and each vote is 
given an equal weight. If each individual's input counts equally, the decision by the 
greater number of individuals should have a greater impact on the results than the 
167 Christiano 2003a, 42-3. 
168 Sadurski 2008. 
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decision of the few. 169 The result is that a simple majority carries the day. To allow a 
minority, of any size, to dictate the outcome would be to give the interests of those in the 
minority a greater weight than the interests of those in the majority. 170 
There is an important unstated assumption in this type of account, namely, that 
having an equally counted vote is equivalent to having one's interests given equal 
consideration. This assumption is comprised of two crucial claims. The first is that 
voting is akin to expressing or promoting one's interests. I have already taken up this 
claim in chapter two. Here I would like to focus instead on the second, more substantive, 
claim: if getting to vote implies getting to promote one's interests (which for the sake of 
argument I will here grant), then getting an equal vote implies that one's interests will be 
given equal consideration. 
In fact, however, this is not always the case. This is clearly demonstrated by the 
problem of persistent minorities, that is, "group[ s] of persons who are consistently 
members of the v'oting minority over a series ofvotes."171 The interests of those who are 
consistently members of the minority are in fact never represented in the voting outcome, 
indicating that they are not given equal consideration. Consider an example first devised 
by Lani Guinier and later expanded by Steven Lee: A group of children are out of school 
for the summer, and each day they get together to play a game. Each day they vote on 
what game to play, and each day a majority (say six out often) vote for baseball, while 
the rest vote for soccer. Given the majoritarian voting rule of"one person, one vote" then 
each day, the children will play baseball. But this shows that "one person, one vote" as 
implemented across multiple votes does not necessarily treat all individuals' interests 
169 Saunders 20 I 0, II5. 
170 Dahl 1989, I38. 
171 Lee 200 I b, 262. 
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with equal regard. Were we to consider the interests of each child equally, we would be 
likely to recommend that they play baseball three days out of every five, and play soccer 
on the other two. 172 
Or take a more substantive example: the political strategy of gerrymandering in 
representative democracy, which involves the reapportionment of voting districts in such 
a manner as to ensure that your party (or group, or interest) represents a majority of votes 
in as many districts as possible. If successful, gerrymandering can ensure that a 
particular political bloc remains in power continuously, effectively negating all of the 
political influence of those outside of the bloc. For example, in what Michel Balinski 
calls "tailored districts" in the United States, incumbent congressional candidates are 
almost assured of re-election (over 98% won in 2002 and 2004, and over 94% in 
2006). 173 Other political strategies can have similar results: for example in the U.S. 
south, after the 1965 Voting Rights Act was passed, many southern states changed their 
electoral procedures from district-based elections to at-large voting. As a result, the 
influence of black voters could be nullified, since 51% of the voting population could 
determine the outcome of 1 00% of the elections. 174 
One might object that these are contrived instances- situations in which the 
majority have conspired to keep the minority from having an equal say in a manner that is 
patently undemocratic. In fact, the objection might continue, it would be in keeping with 
democratic principles of equality to legislate against precisely this kind of interference 
with voting procedures, when the motives are transparently the effective 
disenfranchisement of a minority group. But a majority does not have to intentionally 
172 Lee 2001 a, 127-8. 
173 Balinksi 2008, 97. 
174 Guinier 1994, 7. 
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create their persistent status in order to limit the effectiveness of the minority's votes. In 
fact, the majority could be acting in good faith upon principles which it believes are in 
the interests of the minority as we11. 175 Take our initial example often children deciding 
how to spend their summer days. The six in the majority may even, on occasion, concede 
and play soccer, because they themselves think it unfair that the minority never get their 
way. But this would not solve the problem of persistent minorities for democracy, since 
in this case it would not be the democratic procedure which was taking into account the 
minority's interests in this scenario, but rather the good graces of those in the majority. 176 
The problem is not only that this minority is a minority at this time, but also that as a 
persistent minority, they have no effective means of ensuring that the majority will even 
consider their interests, much less take them into account. 
Another reply might be to say that the objection from persistent minorities 
misunderstands what is supposed to be distributed equally in a democracy: it is not that 
each individual should have an actual equal influence on the outcomes of political 
decision-making; rather, it is that each individual should have an equal a priori chance to 
influence the outcomes of political decision-making. Persistent minorities don't violate 
this requirement, since absent any knowledge regarding the distribution of interests 
throughout the electorate, each member of the minority has just as much chance as each 
member of the majority of casting the decisive vote on each iteration. 177 Such an 
interpretation would rob democracy of its unique ability to satisfy the equal consideration 
of interests requirement, however, in much the same way as the fair compromise and pure 
175 Christiano 2008a, 290. 
176 Lee 2001b, 263. 
177 Beitz 1983, 72-4; although Beitz himself appears to abandon this line of reasoning in later works. See, 
for example, Beitz 1989, 155-8. 
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proceduralist accounts. If all that was implied by "equal consideration of interests" was 
an equal potential influence, then the alternative political arrangement of each individual 
writing her preference on a slip of paper and having a winner drawn out of a hat would 
satisfy it. In that situation, too, each member of the electorate has an equal chance as 
every other of casting the decisive vote. In order to retain aggregativity, the principle of 
equal consideration of interests needs to be interpreted to require that interests have an 
equal actual, rather than potential, influence on political outcomes. 
The phenomenon of persistent minorities appears to undermine the move from 
equal consideration of interests to democratic decision-making, then. One suggested 
solution to this problem is to abandon the representative scheme currently used in the 
United States in favor of proportional representation. By eliminating the "winner-take-
all" approach to local and state elections, the potential for gerrymandering is at least 
negated. 178 This approach has little impact on the substantive impact of persistent 
minorities in representative democracy, however: given a minority's persistent status as 
such, the proportional representation scheme merely replicates the problem at the 
legislative level: now, the persistent minority will be the minority's representatives in the 
broader legislative body. 179 Alternative suggestions have focused on altering the 
majoritarian scheme in favor of supermajoritarianism. Unfortunately, such an approach 
violates the principle of equal consideration of interests to the same, or an even greater, 
extent than the presence of persistent minorities. 180 
178 Guinier 1994, 16. 
179 Lee200la 134 
180 If each ind,ividu.al's input is to count "equally," then more individuals should have a greater impact than 
fewer. Were a supermajoritarian scheme to be implemented, this would entail that a minority would have 
the power and ability to block decisions agreed upon by the majority- thus imbuing each member of the 
minority with a greater than equal share of the political power. 
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Dualistic Democracy and Persistent Minorities 
So far, the accounts we have evaluated in this chapter have been monistic in their focus 
on the egalitarian nature of democratic procedures. According to the more simplistic 
procedural accounts, the validity or justice of political outcomes are evaluable only 
insofar as they were or were not produced in accordance with fair democratic procedures. 
More sophisticated accounts look to whether or not procedures provide equal 
consideration to the interests of individual citizens. This is in contrast to the instrumental 
accounts we saw in chapter two, which evaluated democratic procedures solely on the 
basis of their ability to produce desired outcomes. In each case, then, it looked like 
theorists were interested only in the procedure, or else only in the outcome. Like 
deliberative theorists, Thomas Christiano has rejected this dichotomy, arguing instead for 
what he calls an "evaluative dualism" with respect to democratic authority. 181 
On this account, democratic decision-making is the embodiment of the equal 
consideration of interests in that it provides each citizen equal political resources, 
conceived of as an equal say in the decision-making process. However, equality of 
political resources is not the only value procedures must respect. According to 
Christiano, respect for the basic moral equality of citizens requires not only that 
individuals' interests are treated equally via the equal distribution of political resources; it 
must also be the case that individual interests are seen to be treated equally. Each 
individual has a fundamental interest in her equal status being manifest to herself and 
other members of society publicly. 182 In filling out what is entailed by the public 
acknowledgement of the equal status of each member of society, Christiano points out 
181 Christiano 2004, 268. 
182 Christiano 1994, 186. 
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that much political disagreement focuses on exactly what it means to treat people equally. 
Some members of society believe that equal treatment requires the respect for equal basic 
liberties and strong private property rights, for example, while others believe that to treat 
everyone equally requires a more egalitarian distribution of resources than tends to occur 
under laissez:faire economic systems. Because of the persistence of such disagreements 
(in fact, such disagreements comprise the bulk of our political disagreements), there is no 
way to settle on an interpretation of equal treatment which will satisfy everyone: to 
structure society around some particular understanding of equality would be to privilege 
that view unjustifiably, and thereby to publicly treat the adherents of opposing views as 
less than equals. But we must be able to see that the political process itself holds the 
interests of all in equal regard, and democratic procedures provide a way for us to make 
these decisions which does publicly take into account the beliefs and preferences of all. 
According to Christiano, we should understand justice as the public realization ofthe 
equal advancement of interests, and democracy as the system of rule required by this 
conception of justice: "Democracy is required by justice understood as the public 
realization of equal advancement of interests." 183 
That said, however, there are certain outcomes of political decision-making which 
clearly and publicly do not respect the equal moral status of persons or the principle of 
equal consideration of interests, regardless of the procedure which produced them. 
Procedures which will predictably result in such outcomes cannot be just, but what about 
procedures which tend to embody public equality, but nevertheless sometimes produce 
outcomes which clearly disrespect the equal moral status of persons? For example, what 
183 Christiano 2004, 269. 
about the fact that adherence to democratic procedures - which otherwise appear to 
publicly respect equality - can generate persistent minorities in certain circumstances? 
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This, Christiano wants to say, is why we can introduce procedure-independent 
standards and place substantive limits on the outcomes of democratic decision-making 
procedures. Although persistent disagreement about the nature of equality and how best 
to manifest that equality in the structure of society prevent us from justly dictating 
specific substantive political outcomes, we are capable of identifying some outcomes as 
clearly in violation of the principle of equality. In these cases, we not only can 
legitimately limit the outcomes of democratic procedures, we ought to. But in doing so, 
we are not necessarily constraining "democracy," as properly understood. These limits, 
Christiano thinks, are a natural upshot of the very foundation of democracy in the public 
realization of equality, and therefore do not constitute external restrictions. Rather, 
insofar as democracy is correctly understood as the decision-making procedure which 
arises from the principle of public equality, it is only justified to the extent that these 
limits delineate. 
The challenge of persistent minorities to democratic procedure is a deep one. A 
group which rarely or never gets the outcome it desires through democratic decision-
making will be substantially alienated from the rest of society. The effect of persistent 
minority status is that one's policy preferences (construed as a reasonable proxy for 
interests) are never respected in political outcomes. Given this fact, and given the 
fundamental interests which individuals have in being able to have a say in how their 
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political world is organized, when a persistent minority exists democracy can be seen 
publicly to not recognize and affirm their equal moral status. 184 
In response to this problem, Christiano proposes what he calls the "minimum 
outcome standard." The general idea is to identify a minimum level of preference-
satisfaction (as a proxy for interests promotion) below which it would be unjust to allow 
an individual or group of individuals to fall. This minimum outcome standard can be 
used to constrain the outcomes of democratic decision-making in such a way as to ensure 
that even those who may find themselves members of a persistent minority are still 
having their interests (using the practical substitute of preference-satisfaction) taken into 
account. This minimum standard is a means of attempting to respect the democratic 
procedure while simultaneously demonstrating a public regard for the interests of all 
citizens. Because democratic procedures find their justification in the public regard for 
the equal moral status of citizens, this threshold standard functions to ensure democratic 
legitimacy by accommodating the very interests which are at the foundation of the ideals 
of the democratic procedure itself. 185 
Equal Political Resources and Equal Consideration of Interests 
Christiano's dualistic account of democracy appears to provide the procedural account 
with just the substantive tools it needs to sidestep objections from the existence of 
persistent minorities. However, his hybrid account looks to remain vulnerable to the 
following objection: The account assumes that equal political resources in the form of an 
equal say are sufficient for the publicly equal consideration of interests, once the 
184 Christiano 2008a, 291-6. 
185 Ibid., 297-8. 
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minimum outcome standard is reached for all individuals. However, while the minimum 
outcome standard may be sufficient to ward off concerns specifically related to persistent 
minorities, it leaves concerns regarding the vast discrepancies in political knowledge 
across the populace unanswered. The fact that each citizen is guaranteed a minimum in 
terms of preference-satisfaction does not speak to that citizen's interests being given 
public, equal consideration in the political decision-making process. 
One reply to this might be to argue that the principle of equality does not require 
that individuals' interests be given actual, fully equal consideration in the process. It 
might be the case that once individual interest-fulfillment has reached a certain threshold, 
citizens are equal enough in the relevant way for public equality. Such an attack has been 
levied against egalitarianism generally by Harry Frankfurt, who argues that "[w]ith 
respect to the distribution of economic assets, what is important from the point of view of 
morality is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough."186 
While a full examination of this claim with regards to economic egalitarianism would 
take us too far off course, I think it is important to understand that this type of sufficiency 
view of political power would not satisfy Christiano's principle of public equality, nor 
would it likely satisfy any conception of the principle of equality more broadly construed. 
This is due primarily to political power being a positional good. 187 An example might 
help to clarify. Imagine that you and four friends are trying to agree on what movie to 
see tonight. In an attempt to give everyone an equal say, the group decides to vote on it. 
But rather than giving each member one vote, the group decides that Anthony, Phil, 
Leslie, and Garret should each get five votes, while you will only get one. It should be 
186 Frankfurt 1987, 21 (original emphasis). 
187 Estlund 2009a, 246. 
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obvious that in this situation that your interests are not being accorded equal 
consideration - neither publicly nor otherwise. This is because the practical value of 
your political input is importantly determined by the comparative weight of the political 
input of others. So while we can leave it an open question as to whether a sufficient 
economic threshold would be enough to respect the equal moral status of individuals, it 
seems obvious that a threshold of political power would not suffice. 
Given the implausibility of this response, we must consider the impact that 
discrepancies in political knowledge will have on political equality. It is a generally 
accepted fact that the vast majority of citizens within a democratic state are ignorant 
about affairs of state. However, in addition to the average low level of political 
knowledge across the state, it is equally the case that there is great inequality in terms of 
those who do have the information necessary to promote their own interests. The 
maldistribution of political knowledge is extreme, with a small percentage of the 
population having ready access to vast stores of political knowledge, while the majority 
of the population hold but a minute fraction of the total amount of political knowledge. 188 
Data collected by Delli Carpini and Keeter over a period of fifty years in the United 
States suggest there is "substantial inequality in how much people know;" the mean 
within the best-informed 30% of Americans demonstrate nearly three times the amount of 
political knowledge as the mean within the least-informed 30%. 189 The disparities in 
political knowledge "rival those found in the distribution of income and wealth," and the 
distribution of political knowledge closely mirrors social standing in that women, 
188 Converse 2000, 333. 
189 Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 154. 
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African-Americans, and the poor are generally substantially less knowledgeable about 
politics. 190 
Discrepancies in political knowledge would not signify political inequality unless 
it were the case that political knowledge impacts the way in which individuals vote. But 
research has shown (what may seem obvious) that the level of information voters have 
can have a drastic impact both on whether they vote at all, as well as the voting decisions 
they take. 191 Both misinformation and the lack of information cause individuals to vote 
differently than they would had they more, or more accurate, information, and 
uncertainty about candidate traits can cause citizens to vote differently than they would 
under more certain knowledge conditions. 192 
The result of the mal distribution of knowledge is that a merely procedural 
equality ignores what Anthony Downs referred to as democracy's inherent foundations 
for power inequality. It is not only the case that there is this discrepancy of political 
knowledge, but that the discrepancy can be mapped with a fair degree of consistency to 
differences in social and economic status. Women, racial minorities, and blue collar 
workers know less about politics on average, and this pattern has been consistently 
demonstrated across a range of modern democracies. 193 Not only are these groups less 
knowledgeable in the political sphere, but the abstention rate is higher in these groups as 
well. With such groups, as well as individuals who systematically lack political 
knowledge, it is likely that when they vote they are doing so on the basis of faulty or 
incomplete knowledge regarding the policies and candidates they are selecting from, 
190 Delli Carpini 1999, 32-3. 
191 Palfrey and Poole 1987, 530. 
192 Bartels 1986, 722-5. 
193 T6ka 2002, 42. 
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implying that even should their "favored" outcome prevail, it is likely not the outcome 
that is actually in their interests and that they would have voted otherwise had they 
possessed a greater quantity of political knowledge. Given the extreme lack of political 
understanding in much of the voting population, in many instances a citizen's voting in a 
way which does promote her interests will be the result of random chance, rather than due 
to any intentionality on her part. 
This is supported by further research which has shown that the socially unequal 
distribution of political knowledge introduces a systematic bias into the results of 
electoral politics. Chronically under-informed groups demonstrate a larger gap between 
actual voting behavior and "fully-informed" voter behavior; when controlling for other 
factors, individuals who share key socioeconomic and demographic features (and who 
ought therefore to have similar policy preferences) vote differently based on how 
informed they are. Although the "most informed" of a given demographic will tend to 
vote in one way, those who are less informed tend to vote otherwise. 194 The clear 
implication of these data is that (a) political knowledge is mal-distributed across social 
and economic groups of society, (b) under-informed voters do not vote the way that they 
would were they fully, or better, informed, and that therefore (c) the electoral behavior of 
lesser-informed citizens conveys less information about their preferences than does that 
of the better-informed, and (d) their interests are consequently promoted to a lesser 
extent. And "[b]ecause the likelihood ofbeing politically informed is at least partially 
determined by access to other economic and social resources, the public sphere often 
becomes a mechanism by which differences in economic, social, and political power are 
perpetuated and even exacerbated, rather than serving as an arena in which 
194 T6ka 2006, 23-5. 
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socioeconomic differences are discounted and in which citizens engage with each other 
on relatively equal footing (the underlying promise of 'one person- one vote' and other 
. f . . 1 ) ,195 notiOns o maJonty ru e . 
The Dissemination of Political Knowledge 
As I have framed it, the objection to Christiano's dualism is of the following form: equal 
consideration of interests requires both that individuals have equal political resources in 
the form of procedural equality, and that they are publicly treated as equals in the 
decision-making process. Procedural equality is limited by a minimum outcome 
standard, which operates to ensure that individuals' interests receive at least a modicum 
of consideration (in the form of preference-fulfillment) in those instances in which there 
are "clear public failures to satisfy the basic interests."196 The minimum outcome 
standard, however, fails to take into account the inequality in political power which will 
naturally arise as a result of the maldistribution of political knowledge throughout 
democratic society. Ifl am consistently uninformed or under-informed politically due to 
my position in society, then I will be unable to make use of my procedural equality to the 
same effect as those who have access to better information, regardless of the presence or 
absence of a minimum outcome standard. This is because the minimum outcome 
standard does nothing to address inequality beyond the basic minimum. We cannot say 
that political inequality beyond the ability to gain the basic minimum is not important - if 
it were not, then we would be left wondering why we should have democratic procedures 
at all? If the minimum outcome standard already generates all of the equality we need, 
195 Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 9. 
196 Christiano 2008a, 298. 
then everything else is extra and democratic procedures can be jettisoned. Only if we 
care about political equality above and beyond the ability to secure the minimum 
provided by the minimum outcome standard do we still have a justification for 
democracy on hand. 
122 
The objection as framed to this point does not do enough to undermine 
Christiano's position, however. Christiano acknowledges the problem that discrepancies 
in political knowledge generate for democratic equality, and as a result argues that the 
principles of equal consideration of interest and public equality require democratic 
institutions to take on the task of disseminating the relevant information widely, thus 
ensuring that individuals have the means of informing themselves ofhow to advance 
their interests politically. The justification for this rests in a clarification of just what is 
meant by an "equal share in the resources for deciding the collective properties of 
society." By "equal political resources," Christiano means to refer not only to each 
individual having an equal say through the franchise, but also having the requisite 
opportunity to inform herself both of what her interests consist, and of how to advance 
them politically. For this opportunity to exist, there must be a social mechanism for the 
wide dissemination of relevant political information to the citizenry. 197 
The problem with this approach is that the mere dissemination of information in a 
manner which guarantees equal access is still insufficient to ensure the equal 
consideration of interests. There is not merely a social mal distribution of political 
knowledge, or access to political information, but rather a difference in the capacity to 
understand and apply political information in the pursuit of one's own interests. Philip 
Converse famously postulated a distinction between "elite" masses and "public" masses 
197 Christiano 2003a, 65-6. 
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on the basis of his groundbreaking 1964 research into voter understanding of political 
issues. The average voter (a member of the public mass) does not have the same kind of 
underlying belief structure which organizes the political knowledge and ideologies of the 
elite. Members of the public mass are characterized by response instability -
inconsistency of responses to political questions across time198 - whereas elites 
demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of political issues organized around coherent 
abstract ideologies. Public masses additionally show a lack of coherence across political 
issues, and many fall into Converse's lowest category of political competence: "no issue 
content" - voters who demonstrate no competence regarding the significance of policies 
and how they interact on an abstract level at all. Since the kind of political sophistication 
which characterizes elite masses is more common in the upper classes, the distribution of 
elite and public masses roughly reflects socioeconomic divisions, with the upper classes 
garnering a greater ability to understand and manipulate political knowledge and, 
therefore, the lower classes. 199 
In addition to Converse's own quantitative research, there is a great deal of more 
recent evidence in support of his theory. Delli Carpini and Keeter cite several studies, 
each of which shows that the politically sophisticated demonstrate attitude or response 
stability. The data suggests that political understanding has a substantial impact on the 
extent of response variability in panel studies and is a strong predictor of response 
stability. On the other hand, "the ideologically illiterate show a pattern closer to that of 
the classic non-attitude holder than one might think possible in empirical research. "200 In 
other words, those without an abstract understanding of the ideological bases of various 
198 Iyengar 1973, 800. 
199 Converse [1964] 2006. 
200 Erikson and Knight 1993, qtd in Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 232. 
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political positions subscribe to such a wide variety of inconsistent political opinions that 
they may as well be responding to the prompts randomly. Meanwhile, political elites 
manifest more stable attitudes, and have been demonstrated to be more likely to change 
their attitudes in response to critical information and less vulnerable to propaganda than 
the less attitude-stable public masses?01 
Research conducted by Robert Luskin showed that political sophistication of the 
kind at issue here is determined to a greater extent by the ability to assimilate and 
organize information and the motivation to do so than by access to adequate political 
information. Not only that, but education, traditionally considered a strong determinant 
of political sophistication, was shown to have little to no correlation to political 
sophistication, once other important variables are controlled for. 202 The implication of 
this research is that the mere provision of information- be it through a public educational 
system or other institutional arrangement - is insufficient to equalize the political 
sophistication necessary to productively navigate the political system in furtherance of 
one's interests and preferences, and therefore is insufficient to provide an equal 
distribution of the political resources necessary to drive the equal consideration of 
interests in a democratic state. 
Deliberative Dissemination, Deliberative Consideration 
To some extent, Christiano anticipates this problem. In acknowledging the potential for 
large discrepancies in political knowledge and specifying that democratic institutions 
ought to ensure wide dissemination of political knowledge, Christiano turns to the value 
201 Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 233. 
202 Luskin 1990, 347-51. 
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of democratic deliberation. Deliberation plays a crucial role in ensuring political equality 
in Christiano's imagined democracy, helping voters to learn about their own interests and 
the interests of others, deepening voters' understanding of conflicting notions of justice, 
and strengthening the social bonds which hold together a political society otherwise 
divided on the basis of persistent political disagreement.203 Given the considerable power 
differential which can result from the maldistribution of political knowledge and 
understanding, public deliberation should be structured so as to ensure an egalitarian 
distribution of what Christiano refers to as the "cognitive conditions for the effective 
exercise of citizenship," as well as of opportunities to influence the political agenda and 
garner the equal respect which individual citizens ought to hold for one another.204 
Christiano's introduction of the deliberative aspect of egalitarian democracy is 
informed by his principle of public equality, much as his promotion of a minimum 
outcome standard is. Thus he says: 
Public deliberation is one of the main cognitive conditions for effective 
citizenship. It is the main process by which citizens learn about the issues and 
alternatives facing society. In it citizens come to appreciate alternate conceptions 
of justice and the common good. Citizens also learn about the interests of other 
citizens and about competing conceptions of the available empirical knowledge 
within the society. Finally, they learn a great deal about their own interests and 
their ideas about the common good to the extent that people respond to their 
accounts of their interests and the common good. 205 
According to Christiano, absent the kind of knowledge and understanding provided by 
egalitarian public deliberation, individuals would be highly likely to have their interests 
publicly given less than equal consideration. Given that diversity and disagreement in 
society are persistent and frequently irreducible, and given that individuals have a 
203 Christiano 1996, 84. 
204 Christiano 2008a, 197. 
205 Ibid., 198 (emphasis added). 
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tendency towards bias in favor of their own interests, even when not intending such a 
bias, citizens can not rely on their own interests being taken adequately into account in 
the public deliberation unless they are afforded an equal chance and ability to participate 
in the discussion. Were that equal chance taken away, a citizen would have a good basis 
for complaint that her interests were not being given equal consideration, and that further, 
she was publicly being treated as less than equal. 
Ultimately, Christiano is relying upon public deliberation to fulfill the last of his 
egalitarian needs: ensuring that each citizen has an equal ability to see that their interests 
are considered in the decision-making process. This equal ability is the natural upshot, or 
so Christiano claims, of having equal access to the deliberative sphere and being given an 
equal chance to participate in, influence the agenda of, and learn from the deliberative 
process - or at least, an egalitarian deliberative process is the primary means of ensuring 
this more robust form of equality of resources in the political process. On this account, 
deliberation is not an ancillary to democracy- rather, it is a fundamental part of the 
democratic procedure, a procedure which consists not only in majoritarian voting, but 
also in egalitarian public forums where individuals have the opportunity to persuade 
others to their way of thinking. Christiano envisions "a process in which individuals and 
groups advance proposals for the organization of society and arguments for those 
proposals ... a society wide [sic] process that takes place over a number ofyears."206 
With the addition of deliberation to our conception of the process, "having an equal say" 
can be comprised of more than just getting to vote, and an individual's opportunity to 
influence the outcomes of political decision-making can be seen to be more robust. 
What's more, the influence between the individual and deliberation goes both ways. The 
206 Ibid., 192. 
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individual is able to utilize public deliberation in order to promote her interests through 
rational persuasion, but on the other hand, deliberation is also supposed to help the 
individual to reflect on her own beliefs, critically evaluate her preferences, and form 
more fully elaborated and articulated desires regarding the social organization?07 
The tum to egalitarian deliberation also bolsters Christiano's reply to the problem 
of persistent minorities. Although some individuals may find themselves consistently in 
the minority when it comes to the vote, the opportunity to influence the votes of others 
through the deliberative process indicates at least some ability to ensure that their 
interests are considered. After all, if those in the minority are capable of persuading (at 
least some of) those in the majority to their perspective, then they have the ability to 
change the outcome of the decision-making process based on their defense of their 
interests. And even if their efforts ultimately fail at persuading members of the majority, 
if the majority were at least willing to consider the arguments presented by those in the 
minority, it seems like we have to say that the interests of the minority were given 
consideration. 208 
This latter argument suffers from a fatal empirical contingency. While it may be 
the case that members of a minority perspective receive consideration of their interests in 
those instances of true deliberative exchange, it is also the case that there are many 
circumstances in which majorities will simply refuse to consider the perspective of the 
minority. It might be the case that the majority is so convinced of its epistemic 
superiority that it does not feel it has anything to gain from actually listening to opposing 
207 Christiano 1996, 86-7. 
208 Lee 200 I a, 131-2. 
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viewpoints.209 It might be the case that society has been greatly polarized around a few 
central issues, to the extent that those most passionate about politics are the very same 
who are convinced of their ideology's superiority. Studies have demonstrated that in the 
contemporary political landscape, those who are most passionate about politics are also 
the most convinced that those of opposing viewpoints are not simply wrong, but immoral 
and untrustworthy as well210 - suggesting that the most passionate, and therefore most 
politically-involved, are likely to be unwilling to take into account the arguments offered 
by their opponents. Finally, it might be the case that the minority represents a discrete 
racial, ethnic, religious, or other group towards which the majority feels a strong 
prejudice. In this case, it is very likely that the majority's bias will prevent them from 
taking seriously the minority's interests, so that even if the minority are able to engage in 
the deliberative process, it is likely to be to no avail?11 We might take as a contemporary 
example of this phenomenon recent debates regarding the building of mosques or other 
Islamic centers within the United States. In many cases, the public debate has centered 
on whether the construction of such centers is disrespectful to the survivors of terrorist 
attacks perpetrated by Islamic extremists, but many commentators, pundits, and lay 
citizens have shown themselves unwilling to consider the interests, indeed the 
constitutional rights, of Muslims to practice the religion of their choosing. 
That said, it need not be the case that individuals are intentionally or maliciously 
refusing to take the interests of some into account through the deliberative process in 
order for it to be the case that the process is insufficient to protect the equal consideration 
of interests. Recall our discussion of deliberative democracy from chapter three. There, I 
209 Ibid., I 32. 
210 Berwitz and Sinrod 2006. 
211 Lee 200lb, 265. 
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highlighted some of the problems which arise from claiming that deliberation promotes 
the political equality of participants -problems which speak just as forcefully against 
Christiano's tum in this direction. 
First and most obviously, Christiano's account of deliberation as providing the 
"cognitive conditions" for effective equal citizenship still fails to take into account the 
wide disparity of rational capacities across democratic citizens. Even if we could ensure, 
through some institutionalized version of public deliberation, that the kinds of knowledge 
required for personal interest-promotion through political action were disseminated 
widely enough that all citizens had equal access to said knowledge, this would not 
address the vast differences in individual abilities to parlay that knowledge into 
persuasive participation in deliberation. Not only will there be a wide range of cognitive 
capacities among the population, there will also be a large difference in persuasive 
abilities, such that many, though knowledgeable enough about political issues, will not be 
well-equipped to get their positions heard, understood, and perhaps accepted by others. 
The implication is that it would not necessarily matter if those in the majority on an issue 
were handicapped by prejudice or simply closed-minded; even if they had open minds 
and a willingness to listen, some members of the polity would still be unable to get their 
perspectives across. Such differences in persuasive abilities could come down to 
linguistic differences- the effects oflris Marion Young's "cultural imperialism," for 
example - or to disparities in more abstract abilities, such as arguing publicly on the basis 
of reasons which others can relate to. 
We also saw in chapter three that political deliberation, rather than correcting for 
socio-economically-induced accommodationist preferences, actually exacerbates them, 
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by allowing individuals who are manifesting such non-autonomous preferences the 
"equal" chance to promote what they take to be their interests on the basis of them. In 
other words, individuals who are already at a socio-economic disadvantage may, in an 
attempt to reduce cognitive dissonance, form their preferences on the basis of that 
disadvantage, and then utilize the deliberative process to further preferences which they 
only hold due to the inequality which is manifested in society's maldistribution of 
resources. In this case, the preferences which they are promoting the fulfillment of may 
not be in their interests at all. It seems that Christiano would have to accept that this is a 
problem, given his commitment to the idea that interests are components of well-being, 
are not equivalent to the satisfaction of preferences, and in fact can be attributed to 
individuals whether or not they recognize them as such.212 
Most importantly, Christiano's tum to deliberation in service of his aim of equal 
political resources suffers from the same deep conceptual problem which plagued the 
deliberative democrat. In order to validate the claim that the process of deliberation 
enhances the political equality of citizens, especially those who don't get their way in the 
outcomes of political decision-making, it must be the case that the outcomes of voting are 
actually causally linked to the deliberative process. That is, deliberation must have some 
influence on the way in which people make their electoral decisions.213 We saw one 
problem for this above in reference to the problem of persistent minorities- that we 
could not say that the chance to deliberate meant that the interests of minorities were 
being given equal consideration if others in society were unwilling to even consider the 
arguments ofthe minority. 
212 Christiano 2003a, 44. 
213 Lee 200lb, 265. 
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There is a deeper issue than this, however. Recall that in our initial discussion of 
persistent minorities, we saw that in order to retain aggregativity, the principle of equal 
consideration of interests needs to be interpreted so as to require that individuals' 
interests have an equal actual, rather than potential, influence on political outcomes. 
While this actual influence does not have to be cashed out in terms of the outcome 
matching the individual's vote based on her interest, it does imply that an individual's or 
a group's interests cannot be consistently or systematically outweighed by competing 
considerations. In chapter three, the equal opportunity for influence in deliberation was 
characterized as an "equal a priori chance" to drive the deliberative body's decision. 
Although an equal a priori chance was seen to be inadequate for equal consideration of 
interests in our discussion of persistent minorities, here what is at issue is not an equal a 
priori chance to have one's favored outcome win in the electoral process, but rather an 
equal a priori chance to influence the beliefs and perceptions of other parties to 
deliberation regarding the best way in which to organize society. 
The deep conceptual problem, then, regards how to systematize an equal a priori 
chance to influence the outcomes of deliberation. In chapter 3, I argued that an adequate 
understanding of the equalizing function of deliberation requires that we take into 
account that individuals come to deliberation from asymmetrical socioeconomic 
backgrounds, and bring with them disparate capacities to argue persuasively in favor of 
their preferred political outcomes. A substantive account of equality of opportunity was 
necessary to ensure that there exists an ex ante neutrality among political outcomes 
before deliberation is entered into, and that the outcomes of deliberation are determined 
solely on the basis of "the force of the better argument." It was seen to be clearly false 
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that given the same resources (political or otherwise), individuals could manifest the 
same level of persuasiveness on behalf of their interests within the deliberative context. 
Therefore, an adequate account of equality of opportunity was shown to require that we 
take a capacities approach, focusing not on equal outcomes but on equal possibilities. 
We should seek to equalize the best outcome which each individual could attain, given 
their resources and natural capacities, and in this manner shift focus onto the 
opportunities which individuals actually have while recognizing that some have a better 
capacity for converting resources into favorable political outcomes. The implication is 
that we ought not to seek institutions which equalize actual political results, but rather 
those which equalize individuals' abilities- conceived of as possibilities based on their 
social status, persuasive abilities, and so on- to influence the decision-making process. 
Recall, however, that because it is impossible to judge the causal impact of 
individual's arguments on the outcomes of deliberation, it becomes near to impossible to 
judge whether substantive equality is being sufficiently maintained in terms of capacities 
to affect political decision-making. Since we are, again, not seeking to equalize the 
actual impact that individuals have on the deliberative process, the causal connection 
between persuasive capacities and outcomes is not clear. Without the ability to determine 
the causal impact of one individual's participation on the deliberation, we are left with no 
concrete understanding of what is necessary in order to guarantee an equal a priori 
chance to influence the outcomes of deliberation. Further, since we are not in a position 
to judge this causal connection, we are left without the ability to devise an institutional 
arrangement which adequately takes into account this requirement for ex ante equality. 
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Nail, Coffin: 
At the end of the day, Christiano's egalitarian account of democracy is a complex and 
sophisticated account of the legitimacy of democratic authority. At each stage, he 
correctly anticipates the type and direction of objections levied at democratic theories 
from the direction of empirical social science. However, at each stage he is likewise 
stymied by the plague of the democratic theorist: with each attempt to sidestep an 
empirical objection, the theorist opens herself up to objections from a different empirical 
direction. Christiano's retreat from proceduralism to a quasi-outcome-oriented theory, 
and his ultimate tum to deliberation demonstrate this point more forcefully than any 
theoretical story I could invent on my own: in recognition of the problem the 
phenomenon of persistent minorities presents for the procedural democrat, Christiano 
devises a way to incorporate outcome-based standards into his otherwise procedural 
theory. In this way, he can claim that no true democracy would permit such a thing to 
happen - a true democracy being one predicated on the equal moral status of individuals 
as cashed out in terms of equal consideration of interests. This move towards outcome-
orientation fails to rescue Christiano from another familiar type of objection, however, 
based in the wide discrepancies of political knowledge observed across contemporary and 
historical democratic populations. In order to address these kinds of empirical worries, 
Christiano must again revise the standard proceduralist theory in order to take into 
account the value of deliberation as it serves to educate citizens and give some political 
clout to those who might otherwise find themselves without it. However, this final tum 
towards deliberation proves also to open Christiano to the most decisive blow of all: 
despite its hypothetical ability to increase the political awareness and efficacy of citizens, 
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true egalitarian deliberation proves to be an impossible conceptual standard to define, 
systematize, and ultimately realize. There is not, among citizens, an equal capacity to 
parlay access to political knowledge and deliberation into consideration of one's interests, 
and absent an understanding of the causal connections between the relevant capacities 
and the outcomes of deliberation, we have no way to determine what distribution of 
political resources would generate such equality. Ultimately, Christiano's ingenious turn 
towards the virtues of deliberation results in his theory's being tainted with the same 
vicious brush as the full-on deliberative democrat's. 
CHAPTERS 
DEMOCRACY IN THE REAL WORLD 
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Although strictly deductive arguments have a place in democratic theory, their place is 
necessarily a small one, and they are embedded in crucial assumptions with which 
strictly deductive argument does not concern itself and probably cannot handle 
successfully?14 
I have evaluated justifications for democracy from across the spectrum of literature, 
ranging from instrumental accounts which base their arguments on the value of 
democratic outcomes, to what may be called intrinsic justifications, which look not to the 
outcomes of democratic procedures, but to the value of the procedures themselves. This 
analysis has also surveyed deliberative accounts, which display both instrumental and 
intrinsic characteristics, as well as the sophisticated hybrid account offered by Thomas 
Christiano. I have proceeded on the assumption that although there was not space to 
evaluate every possible justification of democracy, that an analysis of theories from 
across this spectrum would fairly represent the alternative approaches available to the 
democratic theorist, as well as the empirical problems to which they are subject. The 
evidence amassed in the preceding chapters demonstrate the difficulty with which the 
democratic theorist is faced when trying to formulate a principled defense of democracy. 
On each approach, the theorist is hamstrung by the various empirical realities regarding 
the rational and self-interested capacities of individuals and political bodies, and the 
distribution of those capacities across the population. 
The conclusion one might draw from the preceding chapters is that none of the 
arguments for the legitimacy of democracy have any merit at all. After all, each theory 
was shown to rely for its validity upon empirical assumptions which were proven false. 
214 Dahl 1989, 8. 
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An outright dismissal at this stage would be too quick, however. If it were the case that 
some of the empirical circumstances which work to undermine one or more of the 
theories under consideration could be changed, then we might be able to at least partially 
salvage a defense of democracy. This consideration motivates a closer look at the nature 
of the empirical data which has been brought to bear, as well as at the circumstances 
those data highlight, in order to determine whether all or some portion of the empirical 
hurdles standing in the way of democracy's justification could be removed, or at least 
substantially mitigated. 
To this end, it is a helpful heuristic to consider the empirical problems which have 
been levied against the democratic theorist as existing along a continuum between 
contingency and necessity. On one end of the continuum are phenomena which are (or 
which closely approach) necessary, given social or institutional features of democratic 
society. The research conducted by Kenneth Arrow, Richard McKelvey, and William 
Riker demonstrating the lack of meaning in electoral outcomes is of this type, and 
ultimately it is this non-contingency of the objections to interest-based theories which 
will motivate their abandonment. 
At the other end of the spectrum, however, there might be empirical 
circumstances over which we have more control. For example, it might be the case that 
we could mitigate the effects of socioeconomic disparities by enabling a more egalitarian 
distribution of economic resources within society. That some of the empirical 
circumstances undermining the justifications for democracy which we have reviewed 
may be of this latter type suggests two further questions: to what extent can the 
problematic phenomena cited in earlier chapters be mitigated through institutional or 
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other measures? And to the extent that such mitigation is possible, would an attempt at 
such mitigation be warranted, or even just? In order to gain a better understanding of 
exactly what would be involved in any attempt to clear the way empirically for 
democratic legitimacy, it is worth a more in-depth look at just what kinds of empirical 
worries are currently standing in the way. 
Instrumentalism 
In Chapter 2, we saw that interest-based accounts face a number of objections based on 
the behaviors and rational capacities of voting publics. We saw that interest-based 
accounts which construe democracy as valuable because it leads to individuals' abilities 
to pursue their own interests (construed as utility-maximization) through the vote rest on 
the important empirical presupposition that individuals are able to identify and pursue 
their interests effectively in the first place. This presupposition was shown to be false, in 
that individuals are susceptible to several extra-rational influences on their preference-
formation, and as a result their identification of their own interests is itself faulty. 
Although the rational (in)capacities discussed in this context can be held to a 
greater or lesser extent by different individuals, the interest-based theorist also has to 
contend with the problems of rational ignorance and rational abstention from voting-
problems which are far less contingent in nature. Given the necessarily large scale of 
democratic governance in contemporary contexts, it will always be the case that an 
individual's chance of casting the decisive vote in an election will be close to zero, and as 
a result she will have no rational motivation to educate herself on the issues, or indeed to 
vote at all, in the pursuit of her interests. Rationally, her time and efforts are better 
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invested in more direct means of pursuing her interests. The problems of rational 
ignorance and abstention are structural features oflarge-scale democracy, and therefore 
cannot be adjudicated in any manner that retains the core features of this form of rule. 
Most importantly, however, we saw that interest-based accounts which claim that 
the outcomes of voting procedures track the interests of citizens (however construed) 
must fail due to the fact that the outcomes of democratic decision-making are not 
reflective in any meaningful way of the inputs -this is the important result which 
political scientists such as Arrow and McKelvey demonstrated in the 1960s and '70s. 
The implication is that the role of the voter in producing outcomes which are valid 
because they track voter input is minimal at best, and interest-based accounts are 
resultingly severely undermined. As stated above, the intractable nature of these 
problems indicates that arguments in favor of democracy from the instrumental end of the 
spectrum must be abandoned entirely. 
Deliberative & Egalitarian Democracy 
On the other hand, while these theoretical objections show the interest-based approach to 
justifying democracy to be hopeless, it is worth asking whether the deliberative or 
egalitarian conception might be salvaged, given the right circumstances. The evidence I 
have presented against each of these theories has shown that the theories hang on 
important empirical assumptions regarding the capacities of individuals and voting 
bodies, as well as assumptions regarding the distribution of those capacities. However, 
this evidence leaves open the question as to whether it may be possible to mitigate some 
of the effects we have seen, and in so doing, potentially validate either the deliberative or 
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the egalitarian approach to justifying democracy. Furthermore, if it is the case that we 
could mitigate some ofthe conditions discussed in the preceding chapters, we must ask 
the additional question as to whether we ought to do so. 
A large portion of the body of evidence levied against the deliberative theorist 
regarded the kinds of pathologies which plague deliberative bodies: deliberation 
underperforms mere aggregation in brainstorming problems; deliberation can result in 
outcomes which individual participants later come to regret; the process of deliberation 
has a magnification effect on prior bias and drives the polarization of the participants, 
especially when parties to the deliberation identify a priori with specific subgroups 
within the deliberating body; individuals with dissenting positions often have their 
opinions suppressed if they are in the minority from the outset. Not only was there a 
great deal of evidence amassed against the epistemic value of deliberative processes, but 
it was further argued that the kinds of pathologies observed in the studies cited are 
similarly likely to manifest themselves in larger deliberating bodies such as characterize 
political debate within a typical contemporary democracy. In many cases, in fact, these 
pathologies are exacerbated by the greater scope of actual political deliberation. 
The damaging nature of deliberative pathologies to the deliberative democrat is 
reduced, however, to the extent that the deliberative theorist is prepared to abandon 
epistemic claims regarding the outcomes of deliberation. As we saw in chapter 2, at least 
some theorists are willing to do just that. For example, Habermas characterizes 
democratic legitimacy as "conceived as procedural rationality and ultimately traced back 
to an appropriate communicative arrangement," rejecting any external moral, and 
presumably epistemic, constraints on the legitimate outcomes of deliberative decision-
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making.215 Given that the bulk of the justificatory work in deliberative theory comes 
from the direction of equal respect and the equal ability to participate in the deliberative 
process, to jettison any epistemic claims would not appear to greatly weaken a 
deliberative theory. 
That said, the deliberative theorist was also subjected to further critiques based in 
the unequal economic status of citizens, and that inequality's impact on the cognitive and 
persuasive capacities of potential de liberators. Similar objections were levied against the 
egalitarian theorist, based in the maldistribution of political knowledge and 
comprehension throughout the polity, and the resulting unequal distribution of political 
influence available to voters through the franchise as well as, in the case of Christiano, 
their participation in deliberation. Both deliberative and egalitarian theorists make claims 
regarding democracy's ability to importantly equalize something. The deliberative 
democrat, I argued, is committed to the claim that deliberation gives citizens an equal 
opportunity to influence the outcomes of deliberation, while the egalitarian claims that 
having an equal say in political decision-making respects the basic moral equality of 
citizens by ensuring that political decisions are based on the equal consideration of 
citizens' interests. In each case, however, it was shown that democratic procedures 
(whether inclusive or exclusive of public deliberation) are unable to guarantee the kind of 
equality promised given certain ex ante inequalities between individual citizens. What 
appears to be the most damning evidence against each of these theories, then, regards 
inequality: not only inequalities in wealth, but also inequalities of political knowledge, 
215 Habennas 1996, 453; although I make the argument in Chapter 3 that both Habennas and other 
deliberative theorists are committed to at least some procedure-independent standards for the outcomes of 
political decision-making. Cf. pp. 83-6. 
141 
inequalities of political sophistication, and the resulting inequalities in the ability to bring 
one's interests and preferences to bear on political decisions. 
As we saw in Chapter 3, simple economic inequality can have a large impact, 
both direct and indirect, on the opportunity individuals have to influence the outcomes of 
deliberation. In addition to the direct role that economic asymmetry plays in ensuring 
that some segments of society do not have the resources necessary to adequately inform 
themselves and take time to participate, such disparities can also contribute indirectly to 
deliberative inequalities. For example, economic disparities can lead to the generation of 
accommodationist preferences by those in disadvantaged positions, or contribute to the 
kinds of social divisions in society which reinforce linguistic cultural imperialism, 
reducing the persuasive abilities of individuals who are not in the linguistic majority. 
The challenge of economic disparity may not be especially destructive to 
democracy's chances, however. Although such inequalities threaten the ability of 
individuals both to form authentic preferences and to deliberate productively with other 
members of society, ultimately economic disparities can be resolved or largely reduced, if 
desired, through institutional redistributive measures, while the indirect effects could be 
at least partially mitigated through educational efforts which focus on both linguistic and 
persuasive competence. While the question as to whether such disparities ought to be 
resolved is a complex one and will be considered later, greater educational efforts might 
also provide a relief to asymmetries in political knowledge within society. 
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The Importance of Political Knowledge 
The maldistribution of political knowledge was shown in Chapter 4 to be not only large, 
but consistently so. And although the distributional problems of political knowledge and 
political sophistication were not given a full treatment until the discussion of egalitarian 
accounts in Chapter 4, such asymmetries also manifest themselves in the abilities of 
citizens to navigate and adequately harness the deliberative framework in their favor, 
indicating that these inequalities weigh heavily against both the deliberative and the 
egalitarian democrat. 
An individual's level of"political knowledge" can be measured by her ability to 
respond to factual prompts regarding the structure of government, how the state 
functions, the identities of contemporary politicians, and their substantive positions on 
political issues. In an evaluation of vast quantities of survey data, Delli Carpini and 
Keeter demonstrated that over the last fifty years, it has consistently been the case that a 
very small proportion of American society knows a great deal about politics, while the 
vast majority of the population know far less.216 A greater breakdown of the data 
regarding the levels of political knowledge shows that certain demographic groups such 
as women and minorities consistently demonstrate lower-than-average levels of political 
knowledge, and that this is the case across a range of modem democratic societies.Z17 
Inequalities in political knowledge can impact the equal voice of citizens in a 
number of ways, in both deliberative and procedural contexts. Recall from Chapter 4 that 
level of political knowledge has been correlated with the level of political 
216 Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 154. 
217 T6ka 2002, 42. 
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participation.218 Voters who have more information about the policies or candidates in 
question are more likely to participate in the decision-making process, indicating that 
those with more knowledge actually have a greater involvement, and therefore a greater 
impact, on the outcomes of democratic procedures. Given that the maldistribution of 
political knowledge is strongly correlated with membership in minority groups, the 
implication is that entire demographics of society can be left with less political influence 
than their counterparts, exacerbating already-existing inequalities. 
Disparities in political participation are not the only manifestation of inequalities 
in political knowledge in a democracy. As discussed in Chapter 4, Gabor T6ka found in 
ten years worth of survey data that a lack of political knowledge systematically caused 
voters to vote differently than they would have had they had full knowledge, implying 
that voters' ability to effectively pursue their interests electorally is negatively impacted 
by knowledge deficits?19 Additionally, in a comprehensive study regarding the effects of 
mass media on voter perceptions of issues and candidates, it was demonstrated that voters 
with less political knowledge are more susceptible to media suggestibility regarding the 
relative importance of different political issues, and therefore to agenda setting efforts.220 
The implication is that those with greater political knowledge are less likely to have their 
political priorities supplanted by those with greater control over media outlets than those 
with less. 
How damning is the mal distribution of political knowledge to deliberative and 
egalitarian theorists, though? If it were the case that we could substantially reduce the 
relevant types of inequality, evidence from this direction might be less damaging to the 
218 Palfrey and Poole 1987, 530; Lassen 2005, 103. 
219 T6ka 2006, 23. 
220 Iyengar, Peters, et a!. 1982, 854-5. 
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theories in question. As it turns out, the distribution of political knowledge within society 
is an artifact that we do have some control over. Although it is a necessary facet of 
specialization in a large-scale polis that only a limited number of individuals can enter 
careers which encourage and drive the acquisition of political knowledge - such as 
politicians, lobbyists, and certain types of educators- formal education may be able to 
fill in some of this gap. In Delli Carpini & Keeter's exhaustive review of the literature, 
they found that the one variable most strongly correlated with level of political 
knowledge was level of formal education.221 Although the impact of actual political 
education (in the form of having had a high school civics course or college-level training 
in the social sciences) was negligible, citizens with some college-level education, of any 
content, were shown to be far more politically knowledgeable than those without.222 
We could speculate as to the causal explanation of this correlation, but the 
important lesson to take away is that there are institutional measures available for the 
greater distribution of political knowledge: specifically, the provision of greater access to 
higher education, or other measures intended to bring about the same results. In fact, 
deliberative democrats often argue that deliberation itself serves an educative function in 
the distribution of political knowledge.223 To the extent that this claim can be 
substantiated, it would prove a compelling point in deliberative democracy's favor, 
although early research in this direction suggests that engaging in deliberation does not 
significantly impact knowledge levels, once extra-deliberative learning effects are 
controlled for.224 
221 Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 189. 
222 Ibid 191·278 
223 Tho~pso~ 200.8, 509; Christiano 2008a, 198. 
224 Muhlberger and Weber 2006, 2. 
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The potential equalizing effect of institutional remedies on the mal distribution of 
political knowledge may be limited by more deeply engrained social norms, however. As 
discussed above, traditionally disadvantaged groups such as women and minorities 
consistently demonstrate lower levels of political knowledge than their majority, male 
counterparts. This may be because historically, women and minorities haven't had the 
same educational opportunities as their male, non-minority counterparts. On the other 
hand, it seems no large leap to conclude that this artifact of the distribution of political 
knowledge is at least in some part a manifestation of inequalities which have persisted for 
centuries and which continue to be propagated in social customs and traditional mores. 
In at least some cases, access to higher education for these groups may not be enough to 
mitigate political knowledge disparities, and to the extent that traditionally disadvantaged 
groups continue to struggle to gain equality along other dimensions, it is likely that the 
discrepancy in political knowledge along demographic lines will persist as well, 
continuing to undermine political equality. 
The Importance of Political Sophistication 
Even absent concerns regarding traditionally disadvantaged groups, however, the 
institutional provision of greater political knowledge is not sufficient for the kind of 
equality needed by either the deliberative democrat or the egalitarian. The problem once 
again devolves to the issue of political sophistication, a topic which has gained significant 
prominence in the literature. Broadly speaking, political sophistication refers to the 
intellectual capacity of an individual to coherently organize and integrate political 
information across a broad array of issues and topics. As we saw in Chapter 4, political 
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sophistication is often associated with ascription to a comprehensive and abstract political 
ideology. 
One popular view of political sophistication characterizes it as a product of 
ability, motivation, and opportunity: in order to form a comprehensive and coherent 
understanding of the political world, individuals require not only political information 
(opportunity), but also the cognitive capacity to filter and process that information 
(ability), and the interest or desire to do so (motivation).225 Although various institutional 
measures may be undertaken in order to mitigate the mal distribution of political 
information, it is more difficult to motivate political interest across different personality 
types or to provide the intellectual capacity necessary to adequately process the kinds of 
knowledge that political efficacy depends on. Although Philip Converse was the first to 
systematize the vast social mal distribution of political competence through his discussion 
of public and elite masses, the impact of this mal distribution on theories of democracy 
has been a subject of much discussion. The most prominent line of reasoning has been to 
assume that political sophistication, like political knowledge, was mostly a product of 
education, or else arose directly out of political knowledge, and therefore the effects of 
maldistribution could be at least partially mitigated through greater institutional efforts?26 
One origin of this assumption may be in the belief that political sophistication can be 
measured via "simple tests of factual information about politics."227 Research by Robert 
Luskin has undermined this popular view, however, demonstrating both that the studies 
which claimed to establish the correlation between education and political sophistication 
225 Luskin 1990, 335; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 8. 
226 See, for example, Converse 1974, 731-2. It is precisely this kind of assumption which motivates 
Christiano's tum to deliberation in his sophisticated hybrid account. 
227 Zaller 1990, I 25. 
147 
were flawed, as well as that political sophistication is determined to a far greater extent 
by native intelligence and interest in politics - ability and motivation, rather than 
opportunity. 
Although previous studies have claimed to demonstrate the presumptive 
relationship between education and political sophistication, Luskin points out that these 
previous analyses have relied on the use of unjustified composite variables in their 
models, failing to distinguish between education on the one hand, and important 
correlates such as political interest, occupation, and native intelligence on the other. 
When the variables are appropriately separated out and their correlations examined in 
greater depth, the result is a much more complex picture which shows a series of non-
linear interactions between variables such as individual and parental interest in politics, 
intelligence, education, occupation, exposure to political information in the print media, 
and exposure to the print media in general. 228 
Luskin's research ultimately concluded that education has no statistically 
significant effect on political sophistication, once other variables are appropriately 
controlled for. Instead what he saw was that interest in politics was the most influential 
variable - with its effects compounded by high levels of intelligence and politically-
impinged occupation (the extent to which an occupation is political, governmental, or 
conditioned by government policies). In addition, intelligence and occupation were the 
next most influential variables on political sophistication. Growing up in a politicized 
family was also shown to have a significant effect on political sophistication, an effect 
which was again amplified by politically-impinged employment.229 
228 Luskin 1990, 334. 
229 Ibid. 343-7. 
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Although Luskin's is not the only research to have demonstrated the lack of 
significant correlation between education level and political sophistication,230 these 
results are still counter-intuitive. It seems a small intuitive step from the claim that 
education can provide political knowledge to the claim that it can provide political 
sophistication. One might try to explain Luskin's results away by arguing that 
education's effects may be hidden in the effects of the other variables considered. For 
example, it might be the case that although education is not directly correlated with 
sophistication, the two are indirectly correlated: education affects occupation, and 
occupation affects sophistication. This explanation fails, however, because Luskin's 
study focused on the political impingement of an occupation rather its status features, 
such as income level or the level of education associated with it. As it turns out, the 
political impingement of an occupation is tied only moderately to education (a farmer 
who needs to know about different government subsidies, for example, is unlikely to 
have an advanced degree), so any hidden effect of education through this variable would 
have to be minimal. Another possibility is that education's effects are manifested 
through the correlation between intelligence and sophistication. This effect would 
likewise have to be small, however. Education and intelligence are correlated, but those 
with greater native intelligence tend to do better, and therefore go further, in school, 
implying that the direction of correlation is intelligence to education, rather than the 
reverse. And really, we can explain education's lack of influence on political 
sophistication with a bit of common sense: the fact is that in a democratic society, there is 
no dearth of political information. Citizens are barraged with it through the media, in 
every day conversation- political information is legion, whether it is obtained through 
230 See, for example, Bennett, Oldendick, et al. 1979, Graber 1984. 
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education or otherwise. What is missing for many is the ability to organize the 
information, retain it, and make use of it. And as Luskin points out, these skills are 
dependent on ability and motivation, not access to information. 231 
The maldistribution of political sophistication has wide-ranging implications for 
any claims to equality of political influence. Those who are politically sophisticated have 
been shown to be better at understanding and pursuing their interests politically,232 a 
finding which undermines the idea that given equal economic and educative resources, 
individuals could equally pursue their political preferences. Additionally, political 
sophistication has been strongly correlated with actual interest and engagement with 
politics,233 indicating that those with greater sophistication are not only more competent 
in the utilization of political resources, but actually more inclined to make use of them -
d o h 0 1" f 0 fl 234 compoun mg t e mequa 1ty o m uence. 
Political sophistication's correlation to intelligence, interest, and occupation 
demonstrate why the unequal distribution of political influence is so intractable. While 
the equalization of education, and therefore of political knowledge, is perhaps feasible, or 
at least approachable, native intelligence is not a feature that we have great ability to 
impact. It will simply always be the case that some individuals are more intelligent than 
others. Similarly, due to the demands of modem society, it will never be the case that we 
can ensure politically-impinged employment for all individuals - or that we would even 
want to. It is simply the case that society needs individuals to work in contexts which are 
largely insulated from political concerns in order to survive; we thrive on the basis of 
231 Luskin 1990, 348-50. 
232 Converse [1964] 2006,54-6. 
233 Inglehart 1979, 378. 
234 Luskin 1990,333. 
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occupational specialization. The result is that there will always be individuals who do 
not have professional motivations spurring their political sophistication. If there is a way 
to mitigate the vast discrepancies observed in political sophistication, then, it looks like it 
would need to be through the generation of greater levels of political interest. 
On the one hand, it is difficult to see how we could further incentivize interest in 
politics. It is already the case that large incentives accrue to political influence, given the 
breadth and scope of the results of political decision-making. The high level of incentive 
here goes far towards explaining the large role which corporations have found for 
themselves in the political decision-making process within the United States, for 
example?35 On the other hand, given the vast size of the polis in contemporary 
democratic states, it is also the case that individual participation is structurally 
disincentivized. As discussed in Chapter 2, as long as democratic decision-making is 
conducted on a scale in which the individual's chance of casting the decisive vote is 
nearly nil, it is actually far more rational for the individual to devote her time and 
attention to more direct means of pursuing her interests than the political. 
Another approach to increasing political interest - and through interest, 
sophistication and political effectiveness- might be to attempt to create a greater culture 
of civic morality; an emphasis on the responsibility each citizen has to the promotion of a 
greater society. How we might go about making such an attempt is difficult to 
conceptualize, however, and ultimately such an approach runs into a similar problem as 
any voting based on individual self-interest does: An individual can still look at the 
235 This example is not intended to make any claim regarding the appropriateness of corporate influence 
over politics, nor to make a claim that the influence of corporations on the political sphere is unavoidable. 
The example is merely used to show that, given the opportunity to have a large influence over the outcomes 
of political decision-making, it appears rational to do so, and the actions of corporations who are given this 
opportunity bear this out. 
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unlikelihood of her vote being decisive, and ask herself, "Why should I bother? My 
investment of time and effort into informing myself and voting will still have an almost 
zero percent chance of impacting the outcome ofthe decision." So even if the voter feels 
in some sense morally obligated to bring about good civic outcomes, she may realize that 
in fact the electoral outcome almost certainly is not causally related to her actions. If 
moved to act at all, then she will focus her actions on extra-political means ofbringing 
about civic improvements. This highlights the problem with partial solutions, such as 
requiring by law that individuals vote. Even if such measures address voter apathy by 
drawing voters to the polls, they still do nothing to increase voters' motivation to educate 
themselves such that they can vote wisely in pursuit of their goals. The resulting 
outcome may actually be worse than if those who were uninterested and uninformed 
about politics simply didn't vote at all. 
The Justification of Mitigation 
The argument to this point has proceeded on the basis of several important claims: First, 
that justifications of democracy at the instrumental end of the spectrum are unable to 
overcome the theoretical problems highlighted by mathematician Kenneth Arrow and his 
ilk. Second, that the largest empirical problems plaguing the deliberative and egalitarian 
theories of democracy are those regarding or related to the unequal distribution of wealth, 
knowledge, and political sophistication throughout society. Finally, that it might be 
worth at least exploring ways in which we might mitigate these inequalities and thereby 
perhaps salvage democracy's justification. 
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The preceding discussion suggests that although asymmetries in the distribution 
of economic and educative resources could be mitigated via institutional measures such 
as redistributive policy and greater investment in education, asymmetries in political 
effectiveness as determined by level of political sophistication are more intractable. The 
discussion to this point has so far left unanswered the question as to whether we would be 
justified in any attempt to implement institutional measures to combat the inequalities 
which have been observed, and consequently whether we would want to. 
One consideration relevant to this question is how successful attempts to mitigate 
the types of inequalities which have been cited are likely to be. If it is the case that we 
are likely to only partially mitigate these kinds of inequalities, then the next question 
must be whether partial success in the endeavor would improve the situation or make it 
worse. This is a difficult question to address, and it's not clear that it can be answered 
resoundingly in one direction or the other. It seems from what has been said so far that 
partially mitigating economic and educational differences, if possible, would at least 
present some benefit to those who are currently disadvantaged along these dimensions. 
At the very least, such measures could bring about a greater level and extent of equality 
in political resources for those individuals who have a minimal threshold of cognitive 
competence. On its face, such an improvement would at least have the virtue of 
increasing the relative level of potential political influence of those members of society 
who currently suffer political inequality due to an economic or educative deficit. On the 
other hand, we can easily imagine a scenario in which the partial rectification of 
educational asymmetries could cause more harm than good. It might be the case that, 
given a little more political knowledge, individuals would be more inclined to vote, 
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because they were more interested or simply because they felt more competent to 
represent their interests. However, it might be the case that these individuals are still not 
politically knowledgeable or sophisticated enough to adequately pursue their political 
goals, and the result may be that their decision to engage in the political process where 
they otherwise would not have does them, or society, more harm than good. 
What's more, the evidence does seem to suggest that a good deal of political 
inequality devolves to a type of inequality which can't be easily reduced by intentional 
measures: an inequality of political sophistication, based in large part on intelligence, 
interest, and occupation. Given that this kind of inequality cannot be reduced, it is 
unclear whether the costs associated with trying to equalize more basic economic and 
educative resources would bring about enough of a change to justify the efforts. This 
problem is exacerbated both by questions regarding the identification of the causal 
connection between the capacities of individual citizens and political outcomes, which I 
will address shortly, as well as by issues of justice, to which I now tum. 
Specifically, we must ask whether it would be appropriate for us to take the 
measures necessary to bring about what change we can, even assuming that change would 
be effective. The primary empirical hurdles for the democratic theorist to cross all appear 
to be driven by considerations of equality- equality of economic resources, equality of 
knowledge and education, and equality of political sophistication. To the extent that such 
inequalities can be lessened, this would have to in large part consist of redistributive 
measures which either directly or indirectly funnel wealth from the better-off to the 
worse-off in society. Given that this is the case, there is a big normative elephant in the 
room: does an adequate conception of justice permit the kind of redistributive measures 
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which would be demanded in order to bring about a more robust political equality than 
what is possible given the current distribution of resources? 
The answer to this question is too large to even attempt in this context, however a 
few comments may be appropriate. Although disputes about the correct account of 
justice in distribution retain a sizeable portion of the ongoing dialectic within political 
philosophy, to the extent that we are intuitively inclined towards democracy, this might 
influence what we expect justice to demand; ifwe're unwilling to give up democracy, 
this should be reflected in the principles of justice we ultimately accept. Additionally, 
although whether we think justice requires, or is even compatible with, the conditions 
necessary for the justification of democracy is too large of a question to answer here, we 
should keep in mind that if we accept the theoretical bases of the deliberative or the 
egalitarian accounts of democratic legitimacy, this entails acceptance of a respect for the 
basic moral equality of citizens. Both the deliberative democrat and the egalitarian 
claims that democracy is valuable because it respects this basic moral equality by 
providing citizens with an equal opportunity to influence the outcomes of political 
decision-making. If we accept that this consideration is enough to justify democracy as a 
system of rule, or would be if successful, then it is not a huge stretch to imagine that it 
would be enough to justify certain redistributive institutions within democracy as well. 
That said, such a move would require further argument that the considerations which 
motivate the egalitarian and deliberative accounts of democracy and the necessary 
redistributive institutions are somehow more important than, or sufficient to outweigh, 
other important considerations of justice such as personal property and individual rights. 
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So, at the moment the dialectic goes something like this: before we attempt to 
bring about the kind of equality necessary to get either the deliberative or the egalitarian 
theory of democracy off the ground, it would have to be shown to be justified to do so. 
Whether it would be justified to do so is a question which relies heavily on one's theory 
of justice, and until a theory of justice is hammered out it is unclear whether certain 
institutional arrangements involving the redistribution of wealth and resources would be 
justified or not. 
There are at least two additional concerns regarding the just implementation of 
institutional remedies to the empirical factors undermining democracy, however. First, 
given that we have decisively demonstrated that the interest-based justification for 
democracy fails, even if we could fix things so that either the egalitarian or deliberative 
account could work, we would still only be part of the way there. It might nevertheless 
be the case that the maximization of individual preference-satisfaction is the most 
important role for a political system to fill. If this were the case, then even if we could 
bring about the appropriate egalitarian distribution to justify democracy on deliberative or 
procedural grounds, we still would not have shown that democracy is the correct system 
of rule. This is precisely because we have already determined that democracy cannot fill 
the interest-maximizing role that economic theorists claim for it. 
In addition, even if it were the case that we could bring about the circumstances 
such that one or the other of these accounts worked and_show that this approach is more 
important than the interest considerations of the economic democrat, that would still not 
be adequate to justify the economic and social changes necessary for democracy's 
legitimacy on these accounts. This is because there are alternative systems of rule which 
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may be justifiable, given certain untrue assumptions about society or individual members 
of society- alternatives such as meritocracy or supermajoritarianism, for example. It 
might be the case that we couldn't justify these alternatives democracy given the current 
empirical circumstances, but that certain changes to the real world would be sufficient to 
get a justification off the ground. If this were true, why should we work to change 
empirical reality so as to make democracy justifiable, rather than meritocracy? 
Ultimately, then, even if it is the case that we can mitigate those empirical circumstances 
which are problematic for the democrat, there would remain a great deal of theoretical 
work to do in justifying such efforts rather than efforts intended to accommodate some 
other system of rule. 
Democracy, Capacity, and Causation 
To some extent, however, this dialectic presupposes too much. Even if we fully 
understood the issues of justice surrounding redistributive efforts and could adequately 
defend privileging these efforts over efforts to accommodate some alternative form of 
rule, there remains the conceptual objection which was raised in both Chapters 3 and 4 
regarding the causal relationship between citizen capacities, on the one hand, and the 
opportunity to influence the outcomes of political decision-making on the other. Recall 
that I earlier highlighted two problems regarding any attempt to provide an equal 
opportunity to influence the outcomes of political decision-making through the 
deliberative process. First, respect for the moral equality of citizens in the deliberative 
process, it was argued, required not that individuals have an equal actual impact on the 
deliberative process, but rather an equal potential to impact the outcomes of deliberation. 
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This was because the outcomes of deliberation are intended to be responsive to the best 
reasons and arguments offered during the deliberative process. We would not want it to 
be the case that bad reasons had an equal impact on the outcomes of deliberation as good 
ones - we want our deliberators to be responsive to the quality of the reasons being 
offered. On the other hand, a merely formal equality of opportunity to participate in the 
discussion does not appear sufficient to substantiate deliberative democracy's claims to 
promote substantive equality. That said, absent an understanding of the causal chain 
between rational and deliberative capacities and the outcomes of deliberation, it is 
unclear how we could determine whether individuals actually had an equal opportunity to 
impact political decision-making. As a result, it is also unclear how we could understand 
what is necessary to guarantee such equality. Second, given that we cannot determine the 
actual causal relationship between an individual's cognitive, deliberative, and persuasive 
capacities and their actual influence on the deliberative process, it would be difficult (if 
not impossible) to apply the requirement for the equal opportunity to influence outcomes 
to an institutional structure and determine whether that structure is actually producing the 
type of equality required.Z36 While this does not imply that it is impossible to bring about 
the kind of equality needed to ground claims to deliberative effectiveness, it does show 
that we could never determine whether our efforts to bring about such equality had 
succeeded or not. 
To some extent, the causal objection is not as forceful as it may appear at first 
glance. While we may never be able to flesh out the full causal chain between capacities 
on the one hand, and the outcomes of deliberation on the other, it does seem like we can 
generalize on some of the findings above to conclude that a greater equality of education 
236 Cf. pp. 92-4. 
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would bring us closer to political equality than what we have now. Likewise, we can 
generalize that a greater economic equality would be more conducive to certain kinds of 
equality as well. We can make these claims, at least, even if we can't get too particular 
or agent-specific with the institutional solutions proposed. Also, we should keep in mind 
that the tum towards deliberation for Christiano, at least, appeared to be motivated 
primarily by an attempt to address worries regarding inequalities of political knowledge 
and sophistication. To the extent that these worries can be addressed externally to the 
deliberative process, it is less clear that objections based on the causal connection of 
individual inputs to deliberative outputs have any bearing on egalitarian justifications of 
democracy broadly, or on Christiano's account more specifically. The causal story 
outside of deliberation is rather clear, after all: one vote counts for one vote, and if the 
emphasis is taken away from political persuasion and placed instead on political efficacy 
through the vote, then to the extent that the individuals behind those votes have equal 
capacities to make use of them, the causal problem is avoided. 
At the same time, however, the causal problem brings out more than just the 
difficulty of designing an appropriate institutional solution for the deliberative context. It 
highlights the epistemic problem which plagues any attempt to mitigate the effects of 
inequalities on political influence. Absent a settled understanding of the extent of 
justice's egalitarian demands, and absent a settled understanding of how to institutionally 
achieve the appropriate distribution of economic and political resources, we are left to fall 
back onto democratic procedures. Neither theorists nor citizens can come to agreement 
on the correct principles or institutions of justice in distribution, and the enforcement of a 
particular view looks to theorists and citizens both like an unjust (or unjustifiable) 
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imposition. It is an awareness of these kinds of epistemic shortcomings which prevents 
theorists such as Christiano from committing themselves to more comprehensive 
egalitarian schemes or more invasive limits on the outcomes of democratic procedures. 
The implication is that until such questions of justice are settled to some satisfactory 
degree, we are left not only with empirical circumstances which debilitate democracy's 
justification, but also without the necessary normative grounding for any institutional 
efforts designed to attenuate those circumstances. 
This is ultimately the puzzle which plagues the democratic theorist; a puzzle 
which seems to manifest itself over again at each level. On the one hand are democratic 
procedures, and the considerations which serve to ground them. On the other are 
empirical facts regarding the various inequalities which plague our world - facts which 
also serve to undermine the very grounding of democratic procedures. Proposals to 
mitigate the circumstances which undermine democracy's validity are seen and portrayed 
as themselves being undemocratic, as they can often take the form of limits to 
democracy's outcomes. While democratic remedies are a possibility, such remedies are 
demanding as they require the majority of citizens to acknowledge that circumstances 
require rectification as well as to agree on a solution. Add to this that democratic 
majorities are always shifting: alliances change with the issue of the day. The 
implication is that even should a democratic majority settle on a conception of justice and 
make efforts to implement the kinds of institutional changes that could contribute to the 
amelioration of the empirical obstacles to democracy's justification, those efforts are 
likely to be overruled or replaced by the next majority as alliances shift with time. 
Absent attempts to legislate in a binding way, the likely result is that no effort is ever 
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given a chance to fully play out, and the empirical obstacles are never fully mitigated. 
Further complicating matters, it is not clear that binding legislation (that is, legislation 
which includes in itself an inability to be repealed or reversed) is not itself undemocratic, 
as it removes political power both from present citizens in the future, as well as from 
future citizens who haven't had a say in the current decision-making process. Ultimately, 
then, the puzzle takes the form of a paradox: in order to salvage democracy, it looks like 
democracy must be sacrificed. A theorist such as Christiano might attempt to bite this 
bullet, by building limits to democratic outcomes into his justificatory story for 
democracy itself, but he did not appear willing to go as far as would be necessary to get 
the grounding democracy requires, and it is not clear that any theorist would - or that 
what would remain at the end could still be termed democracy, even in the very 
undemanding sense of the word that I have been using. 
The implications of the intractability of these problems are at least twofold. First, 
if it is the case that we are still motivated to salvage democracy, then we need to start 
thinking about either radically different approaches to its justification, or radically 
different conceptions of what democracy is. The organization of democratic defenses 
into a spectrum ranging from instrumental to intrinsic is intended to show that accounts at 
either end- and those in between- are fatally flawed with regard to their empirical 
assumptions. Although the work done by such theories may be valuable in explicating 
the justice of democracy in an ideal world, the circumstances we live in are far from the 
ideal, and those justifications fail to adequately normatively ground democracy in the real 
world. 
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Second, given that we are unable at this time to offer an account of the 
justification of democracy which is not vulnerable to this kind of objection, the efforts of 
contemporary western democracies to disseminate this form of rule to other nations are 
severely undermined. While it is unclear what the normative implications may be for 
those societies which voluntarily and with popular support move their political 
institutions in the direction of democratization, it is clear that attempts to foist democratic 
principles on societies which have not moved in this direction under their own impetus 
cannot be justified absent a more robust understanding of their justificatory foundation. 
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